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differences in both how they define progressivism and also the selection of and discourses surrounding
the tactics they employ for political action. Beyond these theoretical contributions, this dissertation also
provides a comprehensive understanding of what party activism looks like beyond participation in either
candidate campaigns or delegations to national party conventions.
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ABSTRACT

BECOMING PARTY ACTIVISTS: GRASSROOTS PROGRESSIVE ACTIVISM AND
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

John Remensperger
Michael X. Delli Carpini
This dissertation examines the relationship between grassroots progressive activists and
the Democratic Party. Building on Hirschman’s (1970) framework of exit, voice, and
loyalty, this dissertation combines literature on political parties, new media and politics,
citizenship, and social movements to examine how progressive activists become activated
in Democratic Party politics, how they negotiate their relationship with the Party, as well
as the strategies and tactics they employ towards their political goals. To that end, I
examined three pathways through which activists were attempting to influence the
Democratic Party: as delegates to the 2016 and 2020 Democratic National Conventions,
by involving themselves in and engaging in actions via the formal Party structure of the
California Democratic Party, and by engaging in activism via local progressive groups.
I explore these activist practices through a combination of direct observation, semistructured interviews, social media analysis, and textual analysis.
This dissertation explains how both the personal identity of activists as well as the
collective identity of their activist groups influence how they understand the Democratic
Party, what they think it can be, and how they conceive of their role in and around it. It
v

also refines and extends Hirschman’s theory to both add the notion of “entry” and to
show the hybridity of his concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty. I present numerous
examples of activists entering Democratic Party politics in order to exercise their voices.
toUsing the 2016 and 2020 Sanders delegations to the Democratic National Conventions,
I argued that a self-reinforcing relationship exists between activists’ personal identities,
the level of control exerted by a campaign, and the potential for the development of
collective identity. In the context of internal party elections at the state level. I present the
ideal opportunities, as well as the limitations of certain strategies and tactics for
networked mobilization. In the context of local groups, I introduce two typologies—
Party-First and Party-Second groups—for classifying and examining progressive activist
groups based on the differences in both how they define progressivism and also the
selection of and discourses surrounding the tactics they employ for political action.
Beyond these theoretical contributions, this dissertation also provides a comprehensive
understanding of what party activism looks like beyond participation in either candidate
campaigns or delegations to national party conventions.
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Introduction
On the final night of the 2016 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, I
watched as the over 4,000 delegates made their way into the convention hall and onto the
convention floor. Hundreds of delegates who were there to represent Senator Bernie
Sanders, who had narrowly lost the nomination battle to Hillary Clinton several months
earlier, entered the floor wearing matching yellow-green DayGlo t-shirts. The front of the
shirts read “Enough is Enough,” in reference to a phrase Sanders regularly spoke on the
campaign trail. When the lights went down, the shirts appeared to glow in the dark, and
became fodder for journalists covering the convention, distracting from the
choreographed program that had been crafted by the Democratic National Committee and
the Clinton campaign. This action was only one of many that I observed throughout the
convention, as Sanders activists attempted to disrupt the convention in protest. The
California Sanders delegation was particularly rowdy, modifying Hillary signs to read
“LIAR,” leading chants in protest of individual speakers, and organizing a walkout from
the floor after Clinton’s official nomination. In the years that followed Clinton’s
subsequent loss, there has been a constant stream of stories in the popular press about
conflict between factions of centrists and progressives and the ins-and-outs of battles over
issues such as leadership positions, primary challenges, and proposed reforms to the
nomination process.
Six months later, hundreds of progressive activists in California, some motivated
by their experience with the Sanders campaign and others by the shocking ascendance of
Donald Trump to the White House, ran to be local assembly delegates to the California
1

Democratic Party (CDP). They mobilized their networks to flood the Democratic Party’s
local caucus meetings and took the majority of the available seats, turning out 300%
more voters than participated in the previous election in 2015. This ideological shift in
assembly delegates allowed six months later for the first serious challenge in an election
for CDP chair since the 1980s.
For many of these new activists, their decision to enter Democratic Party politics
was the result of a discussion that emerged both nationwide, in their own activist
communities, and on social media following Sanders’ loss to Hillary Clinton. The
conversation centered around whether progressive activists should #DemExit—leave the
Democratic Party and try to build a new party that better represented their interests—or
#DemEnter—focus their activism on the Democratic Party to bring the Party’s priorities
to the left and more in line with their own (Vincent, 2017). This decision parallels
Hirschman’s (1970) dichotomy of “exit” (p. 4)—leave the organization, and “voice—
publicly expressing to leaders their dissatisfaction”—outlined in his seminal work
describing the ways in which an organization’s members can exert their preferences onto
the organization itself. Hirschman (1980) applied his theory to U.S. political parties,
critiquing long-standing political science models (Downs, 1957; cf. Hotelling,
1929/1990) that depict disaffected U.S. party members as powerless in the two-party
system because they have nowhere to go. He argued that they can also exert power via
voice, and moreover “voice will be wielded with special energy and dedication by those
who have nowhere to exit to” (Hirschman, 1980, p. 445).
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Beyond the CDP delegate elections, progressive activists have taken other steps to
engage in activism aimed at changing the Democratic Party. Chapters of new groups like
Indivisible emerged with varied progressive goals related to the Democratic Party,
joining the vast network of Democratic Clubs and left-leaning advocacy organizations
that have been part of the California political landscape since the 1950s (J. Q. Wilson,
1962). Those clubs themselves saw an influx of new activists from across the ideological
spectrum that constitutes the present-day Democratic Party. Our Revolution chapters
formed in major cities with the explicit goal of organizing primary elections against
Democrats they refer to as “corporate,” “centrist,” and “establishment” (Freedlander,
2019). Many of these groups use social media to leverage their network of progressives
for message dissemination and online fundraising.
One might look at these activities and events as simply the regular ebb and flow
of political opportunity structures and progressive activism in the Democratic Party.1
Indeed, in the recent past activists have used voice to oppose the Party’s nomination of
Senator Hubert Humphrey [over Senator Eugene McCarthy] in 1968 (Rising, 1997), to
support Senator Edward Kennedy’s 1980 bid to oust President Jimmy Carter as the
presumptive Party nominee (A. Abramowitz, McGlennon, & Rapoport, 1983), and to
push Party leaders to eventually oppose the Iraq War under George W. Bush in the 2000s
(Heaney & Rojas, 2015). Progressive activists also contributed in the early 2000s to the
rise of the Netroots, the blog-based online progressives who sought to “build a movement

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) explain how the conflicts between movements and
countermovements, the tactics they use, and the venues in which they interact, change in
response to shifting political opportunities.
1
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aimed at achieving lasting power in the Democratic Party by uniting grassroots
progressives in common cause via the internet” (Kerbel, 2016, p. 6). Progressive activists
have at other times chosen to exit, such as when many supported Green Party nominee
Ralph Nader over Democrat Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election (Judis & Teixeira,
2004).
I argue that these past examples not only lack the combination of sustained, public
conflict between many progressive activists and the Democratic Party establishment that
are taking place today, but also lack the complex repertoire of strategies and tactics that
new and long-standing Party activists are using in their attempts to bring about Party
change. The 2016 election saw voters’ opinions about their own party reach record lows
(A. I. Abramowitz & Webster, 2018), and the years since have seen progressive activists
trying to change the Democratic Party from the inside by leveraging the affordances
provided by the new information environment, and social media in particular.
Specifically, they are augmenting traditional, in-person and online organizing with new
types of “personalized political action” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011, p. 773) that
previously were more common in social movements (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley,
2016). These efforts are being carried out towards not only protest actions, but also
towards traditional citizenship goals such as holding public leaders accountable and
educating activists and their communities. Changes in journalistic practice in the new
information environment, such as the increasing use by journalists of social media trends
as the starting points for crafting narratives (McGregor, 2019), have also allowed activists
to amplify their voices in mainstream media coverage.
4

Further, I argue that the dichotomy of exit and voice limits how we understand
these current intraparty conflicts in the Democratic Party. Indeed, for Hirschman (1970),
the decision to use exit or voice is moderated by loyalty, or “special attachment to [the
party]” (p. 77) which simultaneously reduces the likelihood of exit and encourages the
use of voice. And yet, much of the recent increased use of voice, which has come from
progressive activists who have entered party politics for the first time, lacks a sense of
loyalty to the Democratic Party, and has the goal of bringing significant change to the
Party itself. This dissertation thus expands on Hirschman’s model, explaining how both
the personal identity of activists as well as the collective identity of their activist groups
influence how they understand the Democratic Party, what they think it can be, and how
they conceive of their role in and around it.
This dissertation also aims to shine a light on recent activities, events, and
practices that are in conflict with scholarly literature on activists and U.S. political
parties. For example, the influx of activists into local and state Party establishments
marks a change from long-standing scholarly literature on the rise of candidate-centered
politics and organizational decline of political parties (W. Crotty, 1980/1984; cf.
Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). It also aims to challenge most recent scholarly accounts of
party activists that either only acknowledge them solely for their role as the volunteer
backbone of the Party’s electoral campaigns or present them as problematic extremists
who contribute to polarization by daring to carry elaborate political opinions and
preferences and act on them outside of the context of election cycles (Polsby, Wildavsky,
Schier, & Hopkins, 1964/2016).
5

This research also shows that, while organizations continue to play an important
role in progressive politics, there are also progressive networks engaged in party activism
that rely less on organizational ties and more on elements of “crowd-enabled” (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2013) processes than the “netroots” activist communities that emerged around
Howard Dean’s presidential campaign and the anti-war movement in the mid-2000s. It
also reveals a different orientation among these groups to the Democratic Party. Indeed,
compared to the diverse combination of new Democratic Clubs and extraparty
organizations that have arisen in the orbit of the California Democratic Party in recent
years, the dozens of Democracy for America chapters that emerged in California in 2004
were all chartered as official Democratic Clubs, operating as ancillary Party associations
in a range of local areas. Despite party conventions being written off by pundits and
scholars as “scripted infomercials” (Karabell, 1998, p. 3) at worst and sites for activists to
engage in mediated, “active spectatorship” (Kreiss, Meadows, & Remensperger, 2015, p.
3) at best, the 2016 Democratic National Convention was the site of numerous protests by
left-leaning Democrats who had supported Bernie Sanders in the Democratic Primary
(Stein, 2016a). The convention also saw on-site activism pushing for rule changes aimed
at reducing the role of Party elites in the primary process (Strauss, 2016). Similarly,
decades of scholarship on U.S. political campaigns has pointed to the prevalence of
“controlled interactivity” in digital campaign platforms that restricts the ability of
supporters to use it in flexible, democratic ways. This dissertation reveals how the
absence of the formal Sanders campaign in California throughout 2016 led supporters to
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use more flexible systems for enabling group interaction, decision-making, and by
extension, building collective identity.
Recent scholarship that conceives of parties as networks (M. Cohen, Karol, Noel,
& Zaller, 2008) has begun to recognize party activists as players in coalitions of intense
policy demanders within party networks but has done little to empirically explicate their
role outside of cursory examinations of how they might influence presidential
nominations. In terms of understanding activist motivations for continued participation in
party politics, little has been done to build on long-standing studies focused on their
desire for “purposive incentives” (Eldersveld, 1983; J. Q. Wilson, 1962). Similarly,
studies of citizenship have focused extensively on the general decline of interest in
participating in political parties in recent decades (Bennett, 2007) or on steps that may be
taken to increase participation in parties through civic education (e.g. Levinson, 2010).
Yet, there has been limited rich, empirical research to reveal the early experiences of new
party activists after they have decided to get involved with a political party. Overall, the
literature lacks a comprehensive understanding of what local party activism looks like
outside of participation in either candidate campaigns or delegations to national party
conventions. This is the gap my dissertation aims to fill.
In this introductory chapter, I first provide a brief overview of the theoretical and
empirical literature around U.S political parties and their relationship to party activists in
order to provide a baseline understanding of how scholars have discussed parties in a
two-party democracy as well as the normative and empirical role of activists in those
conceptions.
7

It then situates the recent anti-elite activism within a longer historical trajectory of
critical moments in which public and activist expectations of participation in parties have
increased and formal structures for such participation have been enacted.
Using Hirschman’s concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty as a framework, I then
synthesize the empirical literature on party activism and the U.S. Democratic Party to
unpack the decision to engage in activism from inside the Party.
Following from this background on party literature, I then argue that several
fundamental changes have taken place in American politics that have contributed to
current activist efforts aimed at the Democratic Party and make this a distinct moment
requiring new research and scholarly reflection. First, changes in the U.S. media system
and the rise of digital media have made it possible for non-mainstream groups to
organize, fundraise and counter party statements made in legacy media. Second, changing
notions of citizenship have significantly impacted how activists conceive of themselves
in reference to parties and to institutions, and how they understand their own
membership, affiliation, and activism within parties. I review the literature on both of
these factors, highlighting the potential for new research in these areas and how it can
contribute to political communication research. I then outline the specific questions I plan
to explore via this dissertation, explain my interpretive research design, and then describe
my case study as well as the qualitative methods I will employ to carry it out. In
conclusion, I lay out some potential contributions of this dissertation to scholarly
understanding of the interplay between media, activists, and political parties.

8

Chapter 1: Literature Review
The history of political parties over the last century can be characterized by a move
toward increased participation by activists. Understanding the history of progressive
party activism and the Democratic Party requires understanding changes that have taken
place related to U.S. parties since the beginning of the 19th century. This first section
interweaves this history with an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature
around U.S political parties and their relationship to party activists. It aims to provide
historical context, as well as a baseline understanding of how scholars have discussed
parties in a two-party democracy as well as the normative and empirical role of activists
in those conceptions.
Early History of Party Activism
Scholarly debates about the ideal role for political parties in democracy are themselves
rooted in the varied conceptions of the normative role of individual citizens in the process
of democratic governance. Michels (1915) observed that political parties tend towards
oligarchy as they grow large and self-sustaining enough to require bureaucracies for
efficient administration. He referred to these tendencies as “technical and practical
necessit[ies]” (p.35) that outweigh the theoretical requirement that parties maintain a
strong commitment to internal democracy, which can be seen as a formalized avenue for
activist voice. Many of the normative discussions and debates about the role of activists
and members in political parties center on whether or not these oligarchic tendencies are
to be accepted as a necessary part of effective organization or as practices that should be
guarded or fought against.
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In the mid-20th century, political scientists in the U.S. were for the most part
enamored with a number of theories of democracy and parties that fell under various
headings and titles including The Competitive Model of Democracy, Elite Theory, and
the Responsible Party Theory. These models and theories, while certainly different,
presented political parties as crafted by groups of strategic leaders, including politicians
aiming to provide distinct choices to everyday voters.2 While these scholars had differing
opinions as to whether these elites should be elected (e.g. Duverger, 1959) or strong,
organizational leaders (e.g. Schattschneider, 1942), they had in common that they either
omitted or actively dismissed any role for grassroots activists. Schattschneider (1942),
most associated with the Responsible Party Theory, argued against a role for grassroots
activists, stating emphatically that “democracy is not to be found within the parties but
between the parties” (p. 60).
That said, at the time many of them were writing there were few actually existing
party activists of the type of volunteer or “amateur” (J. Q. Wilson, 1962) activist that we
understand today. At the turn of 20th century, the major parties were basically organized
as hierarchical systems of often corrupt power players beginning at the lowest level with
local precinct party leaders and continuing up to state level bosses, interconnected with
powerful business interests as well as local, state, and national politicians who were at
best only accountable to one another (Hofstadter, 1963). Party activists typical of that era
provided labor to Party leaders in exchange for employment, appointments, or other

For a discussion of various perspectives and conflicts related to defining political
parties, see (White, 2006).
2
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“spoils” upon the successful election of candidates. This exclusive system left little room
for grassroots activists. Beginning in the Progressive era, this overt patronage system
began to be dismantled, albeit slowly, from the U.S. party system. Many states also began
to adopt direct primaries for certain elected offices, reducing the hegemony of the parties
in determining the candidates voters could choose from. However, the decline of the
Progressive movement in the late 1910s and early 1920s stagnated the push for reforms to
party nomination processes aimed at reducing the hegemony of the parties in determining
the candidates voters could choose from.
In the Democratic Party, its base of patronage-seeking activists was largely
replaced with members of the labor movement, after President Franklin Roosevelt, in
collaboration with labor leaders, incorporated the tenets of many labor parties into both
the New Deal and the Democratic Party. This effectively solidified a decades-long
alliance in which labor filled the activist void, left after the dismantling of the patronage
system, by carrying out much of the Democratic Party’s grassroots organizing for
elections. This alignment between the Party and labor also effectively negated the
possibility of a leftist third party emerging around the labor movement in the United
States. While the structural incentives in the United States were already tipped in favor of
a two-party system, this alliance made it even harder.
The intraparty dynamics of this alliance were also observed by sociologist V.O.
Key., who pointed to the labor leaders being “received more cordially by Democratic
committees” (1942/1964). His writing about political parties during this period provided
descriptive and theoretical insight into their structure and activities. He outlined a three11

part model for categorizing the functions of political parties: the party in government
(partisan elected officials), the party in the electorate (partisan voters), and the party as
organization (organizations, processes, leaders, and activists at the local, state, and
national level). In the context of party as organization, he pointed out the potential for
intraparty democracy at the local and state level could encourage one-party rule, with
democracy taking place within rather than across parties. He also provided one on the
first, although brief, accounts of the modern party activist group:
In a few states new-style organizations have developed based more on
common policy outlook and less on a common ambition for patronage.
These organizations seem to have a way of growing up outside the formal
party organization, whose form and manner of operation are closely
regulated by law. They also have in common an attempt to regain for the
organized activists a determining voice in nominations, a reaction from
experience with the direct primary, whose results often seem most erratic.
Wilson (1962) explored such groups in his study of the Democratic Clubs that emerged
by the hundreds in the 1950s and 1960s in New York, Chicago, and California. He
observed these clubs to be “purposive organizations” (p. 165) populated by activists
driven by a “felt need to participate.” He further wrote with disdain about those who he
referred to as “amateur democrats” (p. 2) arguing that intraparty democracy would create
leadership and nominations contests in which individuals “outbid one another in an effort
to prove their ideological purity,” resulting in candidates that are unable to compete in
general elections. Larimore-Hall (2014), in the context of the California clubs, argued
that their emergence revealed that partisan activists are motivated to engage in party
politics even in the absence of any formal participatory structure, and indeed will create
their own structures in “an act of partisan entrepreneurship” (p. 71).
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Despite this increased grassroots activism, the party system in the U.S. had taken
few steps in the first half of the century to open up their decision-making process to
democratic decision-making. For example, at the presidential level, even with the
adoption of the direct primary, a substantial, percentage of party insiders—regulars,
elected officials, local and state committee members—were needed for a candidate to win
the party’s nomination. Because these insiders still controlled the nominations process,
primaries during this period largely served as a means for candidates to prove their
potential viability in a general election to those party insiders who still controlled the
majority of delegate votes. This was the case in 1960, when John F. Kennedy used the
primaries to assuage the concerns of Democratic Party leaders worried that his
Catholicism would be a deal-breaker in southern states (Jamieson, 1996). This period of
stability in nominations ended abruptly with the raucous 1968 Democratic Convention
and the nomination of Hubert Humphrey (J. H. Aldrich, 1980).
The 1968 national convention, which will be discussed at length in the next
section, resulted in reforms that created the presidential nominating process that, absent
some minor changes between contests, exists in the Democratic Party to this day. Indeed,
the 2016 reforms that now prevent superdelegates, Party leaders and elected officials,
from voting for the presidential nominee on the first ballot, are the most substantial
reforms to the system since its inception in 1972. This change also produced the most
prolific period of scholarly work about party activists to date, as scholars engaged in
often contentious debate over the advantages and disadvantages of this new role for party
activists.
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Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, and some theoretical extensions
Hirschman’s (1970) dichotomy of exit and voice have been used to explore the ways in
which dissatisfied members of organizations choose to act on their discontent. They can
exit—leave the organization—or use voice—expressing their dissatisfaction to
management, directly, indirectly, or via general protest. Several factors influence a
member’s decision to exit or use voice. Members who have a sense of loyalty to the
organization may be less likely to exit. Those who see nowhere to exit to—such as
partisans in a two-party system—may also eschew the exit option, whereas those who see
potential organizations to exit to—such as partisans in multiparty systems with
proportional representation—may be more comfortable with exit.
Exit, Voice, and Parties
For voters and parties, variations in the structure of party systems can change the appeal
of exit or voice as a means to achieve institutional change. In multi-party systems with
proportional representation, voters can theoretically support any party knowing that, even
if that party only achieves, for example, 15% of the vote share, that roughly 15% will be
represented by that party in the legislative body3 and have the opportunity to form
governing coalitions with other parties in exchange for guarantees that at least some of
their issues will be prioritized by the government. Applying these dynamics to party

While proportional representation ideally works out to a 1:1 ratio of vote percentage to
representation, in practice the apportionment of seats is much more complicated because
a jurisdiction must select a finite number of representatives and it is not possible to elect a
partial representative. Methods of apportioning seats have varied outcomes. For example,
some benefit larger parties, while others benefit medium-sized parties at the expense of
both large and small parties (Schuster, Pukelsheim, Drton, & Draper, 2003).
3
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activists operating with specific political goals in such a multiparty system, it stands to
reason that they can easily choose to exit their party for strategic purposes and apply their
efforts to another party that can better help them achieve those goals. Due to the choices
available to activists in a multi-party system, loyalty likely plays a role in discouraging
activists from exiting parties.
By contrast, two-party systems, while simpler for voters, present those voters with
a choice between two “highly complex packages” (J. H. Aldrich, 1980, p. 6) that may
have many positions that are misaligned with their own views. And yet, to exit a major
party for a third party in the U.S. means a voter is giving up the right to vote for the
package they most prefer. As such, it has long been accepted within political science that
the way in which U.S. elections are carried out disincentivizes exit from the major parties
to smaller parties (Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1929/1990). Duverger (1959) discussed the
psychological effect of feeling like one’s vote is wasted after defecting to a third party
that has virtually no chance of winning an electoral contest. Hirschman (1970) agreed
that, while in theory, partisans should be able to “exit” (p.4), thus expressing
discontentment with the party while also lending their support to a third party more in
line with their interests, doing so reduces an individual’s power, particularly if done in
the middle of an election cycle.
This dilemma logically applies to activists as well. As such, it may be the
systemic constraints of the two-party system, rather than loyalty, that keeps them from
exiting the major parties, as one party is likely more aligned with the political goals they
hope to achieve than the other. To that end, Hirschman (1970) argues that the ability to
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exit is not the only way to wield power and that partisans in the U.S. have the ability to
turn to voice as a strategy for wielding political power within parties.
Conceptual Additions to Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Hirschman has published several articles reflecting on or updating his model of exit,
voice and loyalty. In the context of the management of organizations, he articulated the
concept of “institutionalized voice,” in which avenues for voice can be formally
integrated into organizational processes as an arrangement. He argues that such practices
do not necessarily suppress voice through hierarchy, but instead “institutionalize and
routinize it” (Hirschman, 1980) Other scholars have attempted to expand on Hirschman’s
concepts in a variety of disciplines and contexts. Management scholars have explained
how disaffected employees can forego both exit and voice and instead engage in
“neglect” (Farrell, 1983, p. 598) via acts like showing up late, missing entire shifts, and
producing careless work.
O’Donnell (1986), writing about repressive governments, theorized a difference
between “vertical voice,” which is directed at authorities or officials via methods like
petitions, verbal communication, or protest, and “horizontal voice”, which takes place
between peers. He argues that horizontal voice is a potential predecessor to the formation
of a collective identity by admitting that: “we share some basic (if often fuzzy) ideas
about what it is that makes us a ‘we,’’ but also that we share some ideal and/or material
interests, the pursuit of which supposedly will guide our collective action.” In a later
work, Hirschman (1992) discussed this distinction between horizontal and vertical voice,
arguing that the former is necessary to bring about the latter because it helps build
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collective ties between members around shared concerns. This above conception of “we”
has parallels in the field of social movements and the study of collective identity, which
will be explored later in this literature review.
Attempting to apply these additional concepts to the relationship between activists
and parties, it is clear that neglect does not provide an immediate contribution. Indeed,
activists, if they have not exited, are by definition engaged in some kind of activity aimed
at bringing about change. However, the concept of horizontal voice, and the role it plays
in bringing about vertical voice, has direct parallels to the way in which the new
information environment facilitates activist communication via social media, allowing for
the growth of like-minded political communities that can be mobilized towards party
change. Similarly, the concept of institutionalized voice has applicability to formal party
processes, such as proposing changes to bylaws and submitting resolutions. As such, both
of these concepts will be explored in detail throughout this dissertation.
Additionally, this dissertation will see the ongoing introduction of an additional
concept, the self-explanatory but important concept of “entry.” Hirschman’s original
model of exit, voice, and loyalty is about the choices existing members can make when
they are dissatisfied with their organization. But this dissertation will show that the twoparty dominance over U.S. politics leads even those outside the party to at times be
incentivized by favorable political opportunities to enter the party and use its mechanisms
to change it from the inside. The next section briefly summarizes the presumed
relationship between party leaders, rank and file members, and activists in the 1940s
through the early 1960s. I then turn to an overview of activist voices within the
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Democratic Party beginning with the 1968 election, one of the clearest attempts by newly
entering Party activists, both operating in and attempting to change the existing party
system, to exercise voice on a large scale.
Party Leaders, Rank and File Members, and Activists in the 1940s through the
Early 1960s
Studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s found minimal ideological differences
between democratic activists and rank-and-file Party voters (Nexon, 1971) and even saw
Democratic Party leaders to be slightly more progressive than their Party activists
(McClosky, Hoffmann, & O’Hara, 1960). However, the absence of ideological Party
activists from studies that focused on campaign volunteers and convention delegates does
not mean that no ideological grassroots activism was taking place, they simply were not
represented in the populations of these studies, which were limited to campaign
volunteers and convention delegates. I argue that the over-reliance on these groups to
study party activists is a problem that continues into today’s studies of new media and
politics. Indeed, Wilson’s (1962) influential study of “amateur democrats” (p. 2), many of
whom were catalyzed into politics by Adlai Stevenson’s failed presidential run in 1952,
covered the same time period.
Wilson found that in large cities during the late 1940s and early 1950s, activists
groups called “democratic clubs” were formed by (mostly middle-class) people he
characterized by an idealistic, deliberate, and wonkish approach to politics and policymaking as well as a “felt obligation to participate” (p. 4) that was distinct from the
pragmatic, interest-driven approach of “professional politicians.” Many of these groups
were committed to the same tenets of internal democracy that would later characterize
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many of the movements of the 1960s—such as the New Left and the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee—that maintained a commitment to participatory
democracy (Katsiaficas, 1987). The strategies and activities of these activists varied
depending on the local party structure and political context (J. Q. Wilson, 1962), but their
commitment to internal discursive processes followed by specific actions provides an
example of how horizontal voice presages vertical voice in activist organizations.
In New York and Chicago, cities with strong Democratic Party machines, these
activists worked within the Party’s systems to capture district level positions in the Party
with the goal of changing the system directly, and used voice to rally against Party
“bossism,” (p. 50) corruption, and patronage, and to influence Party decisions about the
nomination of candidates for office. In Los Angeles, which lacked a strong Party
structure, the clubs recruited and organized leftist candidates for local offices and
congressional races. As it was illegal in California for the Party’s district and county
central committees to endorse candidates in advance of primaries, these unofficial
democratic clubs had the unique opportunity to utilize voice in an arena where the official
voice of the Party was noticeably absent. This presented voters with a more outspoken
liberal perspective than they likely would have garnered from the actual Party. These
amateur democrats also saw it as their role to act as “the conscience of the Party”
(p. 298), acting as a public interest counterweight to the narrow goals of special interests
and working to ensure that like-minded candidates did not buck their ideology after
winning elections.
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That said, not all of these democratic clubs were successful in achieving broad
political change. In New York, for example, the ability of activists to enter the formal
Democratic Party structure and seek lasting reforms may have had long-standing
repercussions for the Party machine. But in California, the success of Democraticclubs
was more limited and incremental. They never successfully supplanted an incumbent
with a club-endorsed candidate, though they were perhaps able to push them on particular
issues. Their candidates had limited success in Republican districts, but many
demographic and political factors at play in California at that time make it difficult to
ascribe the success of these candidates to club activity. The clubs had little to no impact
on presidential politics and were for the most part unrepresented at the national
conventions (Nexon, 1971, p. 724). This would change in 1968.
Activist Voice and the Democratic Party During and After 1968
Beginning in 1968, Party regulars would see the rise of progressive activists entering the
Party in an attempt to use voice to push the Democratic Party toward their more
ideological ends. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and into today, numerous
organizations, movements, and citizen networks have attempted via various methods to
transform the Democratic Party. There have also been specific moments where electoral
campaigns have energized activists to use voice in their attempts to achieve Party change.
Amateur Democrats
The wave of scholarship that emerged after the 1968 Democratic Convention noted the
existence of a dichotomy in the Democratic Party between more pragmatic activists—
“Party regulars” (W. J. Crotty, 1983)—and the ideologically extreme Party activists—
20

“purists” (Polsby & Wildavsky, 1964/1976). The studies of the latter, and even the name
“purists” given to describe the activists, imply that party rules were the only thing
holding convention delegates back from endorsing unelectable candidates that matched
their out-of-touch liberal ideology.
Activist Organizations
Beginning in the early 1970s, national formal organizations formed aimed at achieving
leftist goals via the Democratic Party. Michael Harrington, a member of the Socialist
Party, led a faction within the Party of members who supported the development of what
he called the “left wing of the possible” within the Democratic Party (Aronowitz, 1995),
a position that has been critiqued as a devil’s bargain by much of the ideological left.
This view saw Harrington’s strategy as giving up on socialism and revolution in
exchange for the maintenance of the welfare state and the potential for other incremental
gains. That said, Harrington’s book, The Other America, arguably helped put poverty on
the national agenda in advance of Johnson’s decision to pursue The Great Society
(Aaron, 1978). His faction eventually left the Socialist Party to help form the Democratic
Socialist Organizing Committee—now today’s Democratic Socialists of America—
which still continues to work toward incremental change via local issue organizing, as
well as the endorsing of progressive candidates including from both inside and outside
the Democratic Party.
More recently, the early 2000s saw the rise of numerous groups and organizations
aimed at increasing the voice of progressives in the Democratic Party. The “Netroots,”
the loosely-connected network of “bourgeois elite” (Kerbel, 2016, p. 51) groups of online
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progressives emerged and gained notoriety around their support for, and collaboration
with, Vermont Governor Howard Dean’s anti-war campaign for the Democratic Party
presidential nomination in 2004. These activist networks, and their use of horizontal
voice to build a community motivated to change the Democratic Party, were in many
ways an organizational precursor to the social media-based networks of activists that
have supported Sanders and other insurgent progressives beginning with the 2016
elections (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016). Indeed, these early Netroots, which are
discussed at length later in this dissertation, sought to “build a movement aimed at
achieving lasting power in the Democratic Party by uniting grassroots progressives in
common cause via the internet” (Kerbel, 2016, p. 6). After both Dean and fellow
progressive Dennis Kucinich failed to win the nomination, the infrastructures of both
campaigns were rolled into two national organizations, Democracy for America
(formerly Dean for America) and the Progressive Democrats for America (Karpf, 2012;
Selfa, 2008/2012). Both organizations aimed to develop and channel progressive
grassroots energy into the Democratic Party and, though their heyday has likely passed,
still exist today. Democracy for America (DFA) has a national organization, but also
encourages the establishment of autonomous grassroots local chapters, which run
trainings, and recruit and endorse local candidates (Karpf, 2012). Progressive Democrats
for America (PDA) also claims chapters around the country, but has a more formalized
structure for linking grassroots caucuses with Congressional institutions, such as the
Congressional Progressive Caucus (Progressive Democrats of America, n.d.).
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These organizations, along with Netroots activists and the peace and justice
movement that emerged around the Iraq War, combined long-standing activist repertoires
of physical protest with the affordances for voice provided by the new information
environment, contributing to the Democratic takeover of both the U.S. House and the
U.S. Senate in the 2006 midterm elections (Heaney & Rojas, 2015; Kerbel, 2016). They
worked to elect Democratic candidates, including moderates, accepting the pragmatic
idea that an incremental takeover of Congress by the Party would be an improvement
over the status quo, in which Republicans controlled the presidency and both houses of
Congress. The Party leadership simultaneously aligned itself with the movement in its
messaging. The post-election experience of these organizations and the anti-war
movement depicts one of the major frustrations of progressive groups working inside the
Party. After the 2006 midterm elections, progressives who had worked to help return the
party to power found hesitance from Party leaders to wind down the war in advance of
the 2008 elections (Heaney & Rojas, 2015). The anti-war movement fizzled, as many of
its supporters saw the Party’s gains in the midterms, followed by Obama winning the
presidency in 2008, as a sign that they were now represented in the government. The U.S.
presence in Iraq, and other areas of the Middle East disrupted by the war, continues to
this day. Lance Selfa, a leftist critic of the Democratic Party, argues that the PDA, and
other inside groups, serve Party elites by providing an avenue for the voices of leftists
who would otherwise exit, and had exited in 2000, to the Green Party. Other leftist
activists argue that these insider strategies can only achieve “limited tangible objectives”
(Boggs, 1983, p. 347).
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Candidate-Driven Change Movements
Whether or not to support Democratic candidates is also a subject of much debate on the
left. Supporting a candidate is indeed a type of voice, and sometimes a particular
candidate provides a means for activists to have their voice heard through formal
channels when otherwise they would be limited to outsider strategies, such as organized
protest. 1968 provides a case in point. Had the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which turned
many Democratic voters against the war, happened three months later, incumbent
president Lyndon Johnson would likely have won the nomination, and the voice of the
anti-war movement would have likely remained outside the Party. Instead, the events of
the 1960s led activists to seek major reforms to the Democratic Party’s nominations
processes. Three campaigns depict how electoral campaigns can catalyze outside actors
to enter the Democratic Party—McCarthy’s anti-war campaign in 1968, George
McGovern’s in 1972, and Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition in 1984.
In 1968, Eugene McCarthy declared himself a candidate for the Democratic
Party’s presidential nomination, opposing incumbent president Lyndon Johnson on an
anti-war platform. Thousands of student activists chose to enter the Party and go “Clean
for Gene,” cutting their hair, shaving their beards and going to work to support his
campaign. In effect, he served as a vessel through which activists who were both
frustrated with the political system and against the Vietnam war could enter the Party,
channel their activism, and express clearly their dissatisfaction through the Party’s own
channels (Rising, 1997). At the convention, anti-war and reform-oriented McCarthy
delegates, along with many who had supported George McGovern and the late Robert F.
Kennedy used vertical voice—public protests, chants, songs, as well as procedural
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maneuvers, to express their dissatisfaction with the nomination of Hubert Humphrey, and
to push the Party regulars who controlled the convention to adopt the resolutions,
discussed earlier in this chapter, that led to the McGovern-Fraser commission, which
increased public participation in the Party’s presidential nomination process. The media
also played an adversarial role with the Party, as it was the lens through which the public
viewed the division and dysfunction that took place both inside and outside the
convention. The attempt by parties to avoid such public crises led to the subsequent era of
“scripted” (Karabell, 1998, p. 3) political conventions and a more symbiotic relationship
between the media and parties surrounding those events.
Four years later, many members of the New Left, including Tom Hayden, entered
the Democratic Party and worked to help secure the Party nomination for anti-war liberal
George McGovern. The combination of new entrants into Party activities and the new
rules for delegate selection caused some to infer that the Party was now being driven by
an extreme base whose ideological concerns outweighed party loyalty and the fielding of
candidates who could win elections (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 1976; Polsby & Wildavsky,
1964/1976). They held up the nomination of George McGovern, and his lopsided loss to
Richard Nixon as evidence of these concerns. Scholars have subsequently examined
McGovern’s supporters and found these concerns to be overblown. His delegates were
concerned about electability and also flexible on McGovern’s shifting issue positions as
he entered the general election campaign (W. J. Stone & Abramowitz, 1983). Similarly,
when Senator Edward Kennedy challenged incumbent President Jimmy Carter in 1980
and setup a convention battle between the parties liberal and centrist wings, delegates that
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ideologically aligned with Kennedy eventually fell in line for Carter, citing his
electability and lead in the delegate count. These works challenged early concerns by
pundits and scholars (e.g. Polsby & Wildavsky, 1964/1976) about “purists” controlling
the Party and reveal the high level in both parties of party loyalty amongst party activists
as “one of the last bastions of partisanship” [Abramowitz1983, p. 1014] at odds with both
the declining party ID in the electorate and the continued rise of single-issue interest
groups.
In 1984, Jesse Jackson sought the Democratic nomination and used the primaries
to build what he called a “Rainbow Coalition” that included minorities, gays and
lesbians, students, peace activists, and environmentalists who wanted a strong populist
response to the neoliberal policies of Ronald Reagan (Barker & Walters, 1989). Because
Mondale, the establishment favorite, had the support of traditional political groups,
including the African American political elite and the AFL-CIO, Jackson brought, from
places like African American churches, new people into Democratic Party politics who
had not previously engaged. Due to the decentralized structure of his organization, he
also had to depend solely on volunteer efforts from local activists who often set their own
agenda for the campaign. Many of the grassroots supporters who formed the Rainbow
Coalition were less interested in Jackson as a candidate than in the way in which he was
pushing the nominations conversation to the left by introducing new issues into
mainstream political discourse (Askenaz, 1986, May). For many, the Rainbow Coalition
was not just a campaign, but a model for what they wanted the Democratic Party to be—
inclusive, and committed to economic, racial justice, and social justice. After his loss, a
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new national organization committed to social democracy and diversity, the National
Rainbow Coalition, a potential “confederation of progressive activists” (Rogers, 1990)
with locations in 29 states was formed. While some chapters effectively lay dormant until
Jackson’s next run, others allowed local activists to develop local political programs and
leaders. Katsiaficas (1987) argues that Jackson’s position as the sole figurehead of the
Rainbow Coalition limited its potential longevity as a movement to change the
Democratic Party and society writ large. While the coalition that Jackson brought into the
Party remained, his vision of a justice-focused, Rainbow Coalition was ultimately passed
over as the Party shifted further to the center in the 1990s.
Looking forward: Lessons from Activist Voices and the Democratic Party During
and After 1968
This section has depicted many examples of how progressive activists have used voice to
pursue change from within the Democratic Party. It also makes clear many of the
challenges activists have historically faced when trying to use voice to enact such
changes, especially systemic change, such as the regular nomination by the Party of
leftist candidates, or a durable ideological shift away from the center. Critics of these
insider strategies argue that the Party’s embeddedness in systems of power—e.g. the
political bureaucracy, business, and trade union leadership—prevents permanent change
from taking place as a result of activism from within the Party (Selfa, 2008/2012). And
yet, activists continue to organize attempts to achieve such changes.
The events experienced by the activists that are the focus of this dissertation draw
parallels with many of the historical examples discussed in this section. In many ways,
the progressive, anti-establishment, and discursive nature of the amateur democratic clubs
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of the 1950s parallels the local progressive groups discussed in Chapter 4, as many are
increasingly using horizontal and vertical voice to try to achieve progressive change via
the contemporary Democratic Party. Similarly, there are certainly tactical similarities
between the raucous anti-war delegates at the 1968 convention and the 2016 Sanders
delegates discussed in Chapter 2.
But beyond these formative experiences that drew many of them to enter the
Party, there are also comparisons in their subsequent actions. Many activists from the
New Left, who had eschewed mainstream politics, entered the Democratic Party via the
McGovern and Jackson campaigns but were unable to bring about a sustained leftward
trajectory for the Party. Progressive activists who were dissatisfied with Jimmy Carter
supported Senator Edward Kennedy’s challenge, but once it was clearly unviable, they
threw their support behind Carter. The coalition that included the progressive Netroots
and the anti-war movement in the early 2000s worked to elect both progressive and
centrist Democrats with the goal of taking back the House and Senate as an incremental
step on the way to their larger goal of changing the Democratic Party. And yet, after the
2016 primary, many Sanders supporters did not fall in line and support Hillary Clinton. It
is the aim of this dissertation to not only contribute narratives events to the scholarly
history of progressive activism, but to unpack some of the strategic choices that cynics
might see as ideological contradictions or evidence of co-optation and to highlight those
moments where activists choose to be confrontational with the Democratic Party. The
subsequent sections outline how changes in the makeup of the U.S. media ecosystem,
including the rise of the new information environment, combined with changes in how
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people conceive of themselves as citizens and in relation to parties, has uniquely
impacted the ability of activists to challenge parties.
Old Media, New Media, and Changing Party Power
In the imaginary of U.S. political culture, there has long been the ideal of the “lonely
pamphleteer,” or “soapbox orator,” speaking publicly against powerful institutions by
contributing to public debate. And yet, using voice to effect change on long-standing
institutions, such as political parties, requires reaching a larger audience than is possible
for the isolated individual. Historically, activists have engaged in organized collective
action to garner media attention (Sobieraj, 2011), increase public awareness of issues
(Shirky, 2011), and apply pressure to intransigent institutions. Early writings about digital
media and democracy argued that networked technologies would reduce the need for
such organizations—that “the lonely pamphleteer can, with relative ease, share his or her
viewpoints with the world” (e.g. Rivas-Rodriguez, 1998, p. 125). Subsequent empirical
studies found such views to be overoptimistic (cf. Hindman, 2008) and, that in fact, an
average activist would potentially reach more people passing out pamphlets alone on the
street than by blogging. Despite this pessimistic view of individual activists, numerous
theories and empirical studies show how digital technologies have provided new
opportunities for groups of activists to amplify their voice via organized collective action
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). In the context of the 2016 election, scholars have
documented how activists are using digital technologies, particularly social media, to put
pressure on U.S. political parties in ways previously observed by those who study social
movements (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016). To understand how such change might
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be taking place, it is necessary to understand how parties have maintained power even in
the face of the reforms that ostensibly opened nominations up to the public, and to
examine ways in which aspects of digital technologies may allow activists to challenge
that power. One of the main ways in which parties have historically maintained power is
by leveraging their relationships with mainstream journalism organizations and other
media elites to influence the media agenda and craft dominant narratives.
Media, Party Elites, and the Invisible Primary
In the party primaries, several scholars highlight the role of media in influencing the
outcomes of these contests. Much of this work focuses on presidential nominations and
argues that, the reforms enacted in the early 1970s reduced the power of party elites in
nominations and resulted in contests that were “candidate-centered” (Wattenberg, 1991,
p. 1), with individual campaigns competing with one another and relying on building
their own organizational capacity rather than relying on that of the parties. Although
those reforms ostensibly placed the bulk of nomination decisions in the hands of primary
voters, many argue that they actual made the media the elite “power center” (e.g. W. J.
Crotty, 1985, p. 129) of the nominations process (Hagen & Mayer, 2000), and that
nominations are largely decided in the media in the months before the first primary votes
are cast.
Arthur T. Hadley (1976) referred to this dynamic as the “invisible primary”
(p. xiii), in which the nomination battle has unofficially begun but exists outside the
context of the formal rules that define primary elections. He argues that, with few
exceptions, the candidate who wins the invisible primary has a clear path to the
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nomination that is theirs to lose. Other scholars refer to this pre-primary period as the
“early days” (Kessel, 1980/1992), the “surfacing stage” (Trent & Friedenberg, 1991), or
the “exhibition season” (Barilleaux & Adkins, 1993; Cook, 1989). Hadley (1976)
explains that winning is a function of candidate performance on six “tracks” (p. 14)—
psychological, staff, strategy, money, media, and constituency—in which candidates
compete in advance of the primaries. The “media track” (p.17) is conceptualized as the
place where candidates compete to both be accepted by journalists as serious, viable
candidates and to garner non-negative press coverage, but a close reading of Hadley’s
work finds mediated elements to the other five tracks as well.
Eventually, some scholars began to bring the concept of party back into the
literature, reconceptualizing them not as the federated, elite-driven organizations of the
pre-reform period, but as networks of elected officials, party leaders, activists,
fundraisers, interest group leaders, and candidate campaigns (C. Cohen, Karol, Noel, &
Zaller, 2001). In their aptly titled book, The Party Decides, Cohen, Karol, Noel, and
Zaller push back on the candidate-centered theories of nominations, arguing that the
absence of both strong, organizational party structures as well as the “smoke filled
rooms” (p. 13) of party insiders common at pre-reform conventions has not precluded
these party networks from exerting power over various tracks in the invisible primary,
particularly the money and media tracks. Nominations processes are thus conceptualized
as long-running, public, mediated conversations amongst party insiders as to which
candidates can both hold the party’s various interests together and also compete to win
the general election. These candidates are conferred with the financial and organizational
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resources necessary to compete for the nomination and provided with positive media
coverage and momentum in the form of public, elite endorsements and media statements
touting their viability in the eventual general election.
Elite endorsements made by party leaders and covered by the media have been
shown to influence the choices of lower-level activists as well as voters (C. Cohen et al.,
2001; M. Cohen et al., 2008; Steger, 2000, 2007), especially in scenarios with candidates
that are ideologically similar, such as the 2008 Democratic primary between Senators
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton (Jamieson & Hardy, 2009). They also provide
candidates with positive media coverage, encourage subsequent endorsements from other
elites, increase a candidate’s standing in public polls, and increase a candidate’s
fundraising capacity (M. Cohen et al., 2008). The power of party endorsements extends
beyond presidential primaries, and influences state-level (Bardwell, 2002), congressional
(Dominguez, 2011), and local primaries (Nowlan & Moutray, 1984). In many cases, state
and local parties will endorse a specific primary candidate, discouraging potential
challengers and resulting in uncontested primaries (Bardwell, 2002). Following the
invisible primary, voters go to the polls but are presented with a “stacked deck” (Steger,
2000, p. 728) of predetermined candidates or even individual candidates for nomination.
Despite activist employing tactics such as organizing for collective action,
attempting to engage in agenda building, and garnering media influence via protest, it is
clear that the interplay between legacy media and political parties provides the latter with
significant advantages for influencing both debates around issues and nominations.
However, research into the changes to media systems and practices brought about by
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digital technologies reveal new ways in which outside groups can influence media
narratives and challenge powerful institutions. Recent presidential primaries have also
begun to deviate from the outcomes one would expect if party networks truly controlled
the invisible primary. Scholarly work on the digital media practices of journalists,
political elites, campaigns, and activists can offer some insight into these changing
nominations processes.
Digital Media and Party Activism
Since the early days of the internet, scholars have observed ways in which digital media
has impacted the relationship between citizens and political institutions. As early as 2000,
scholars were discussing ways in which online action “transgresses and/or inverts
established social and political mores, norms and hierarchies” (Foot & Schneider, 2002).
By 2003, political blogs were providing new avenues for progressive activists to use
voice to critique mainstream politics and garner information about like-minded
candidates (Kerbel, 2016). As the adoption of digital media became more widespread,
campaigns and activists continued to develop tactics for mobilization and information
dissemination alongside the traditional hierarchical structures and gatekeeping practices
of the mainstream media (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2019). In electoral politics, the 2008
and 2012 Obama campaigns famously balanced both a strong traditional media campaign
with disciplined online systems that balanced interactivity and control (Chadwick, 2017;
Kreiss, 2016).
By 2016, the interplay between traditional and digital media logics during the
presidential primaries contributed to the unexpected rise of insurgent candidates Donald
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Trump in the Republican Party and Bernie Sanders in the Democratic Party. While only
Trump went on to win the nomination, Sanders succeeded in forcing an unexpectedly
contentious primary with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, capturing 46% of the
Democratic Party’s elected delegates (RealClearPolitics, 2016). Neither Trump nor
Sanders were favored by those party elites who scholars had long argued decide the
outcome of each party’s invisible primary and create the “stacked deck[s]” (Steger, 2000,
p. 728) of party-approved candidates going into the early primaries (M. Cohen, Karol,
Noel, & Zaller, 2016). However, much of the theory on the invisible primary was
developed during a “media regime” (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011, p. 16)—“a
historically specific, relatively stable set of institutions, norms, processes, and actors that
shape the expectations and practices of media producers and consumers”—characterized
by substantial control over political discourse by political and media elites. As this
regime has broken down due to political, economic, cultural and technological factors,
Chadwick (2017) has argued that a “hybrid media system” (p. 4) has emerged, created by
the interplay between the logics of new media and those of traditional journalistic
organizations, allowing opportunities for other challengers (Kriesi, 2004, p. 196),
including activists, to gain access to and influence media.
The new dynamics of this hybrid media system have been observed in the context
of social movements, as networked technologies have contributed to the practices of
activists around the global justice movement (Bennett, 2003; Lievrouw, 2011), the Arab
Spring Tufekci & Wilson (2012), and Occupy (Wolfson, 2014). In Europe, multi-party
systems have seen the rise of anti-establishment “digital parties” (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 3),
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such as Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy, that build their strategies
around digital platforms and offer a variety of digital tools for citizen participation that
ostensibly (cf. Mikola, 2017) influence these organizations’ political activities. In the UK
and the U.S., where two major parties dominate, the last two decades have seen
movements, including Momentum, the Tea Party, and the Netroots, employ digital tools
to help mobilize activists to use voice to push those parties toward their preferred
ideological ends (Agarwal et al., 2014; Chadwick, 2013/2017; Kerbel, 2016). Cases like
these all have unique political, economic, and social factors that impact the adoption,
implementation, and potential efficacy of digital media for activism. Examining them
together reveals specific affordances—ways in which a technology encourages and
enables users to perform certain activities (Gibson, 1977; Norman, 1999)—that
technologies can potentially provide to amplify the voices of citizens, activists, and
political organizations.
Using examples from empirical studies of digital technology use by citizen
activists, parties, candidates, and social movements, this section first outlines how the rise
of digital media has provided numerous affordances that allow activists to use voice to
influence the media agenda and counter dominant narratives in new ways. It then
explains how these affordances also allow activists to expand their repertoires—“the
whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different
individuals” (Tilly, 1977) for interaction, engagement, and mobilization, while also
noting ways in which established parties have simultaneously adopted digital media
strategies to their own ends. It then outlines how these affordances can both allow
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insurgent candidates and the activists who support them to combat the influence of the
party elite over the invisible primary, and support activists working towards bringing
long-standing change to major parties from the inside. It concludes with a discussion of
ways in which the affordances of digital media, and social media in particular, have
contributed to a muddying of the boundaries between exit and voice, and allowed
activists the hybridized choice of “qualified exit.”
Influencing media and countering dominant narratives
In discussing the hybrid media system, Chadwick (2017) notes that, while elites in
traditional media continue to hold powerful positions in the media environment, the
interplay between bloggers, citizen activists, politicians, and other actors has created
“complex assemblages” (p. 63) in which these diverse actors exchange information and
interact with one another. Chadwick refers to these multi-actor environments as “political
information cycles” (p. 63). He explains how the integration of Facebook and Twitter
into the practice of journalism allows outsiders greater influence on the media by activists
who utilize these platforms. “Ad hoc discursive communities” (p. 77) of citizens can
form around live events, such as political debates, and protests. Such communities can
critique mainstream coverage of events, as early Black Lives Matter activists did to
reports that emerged about the shooting of an unarmed black teenager in Ferguson,
Missouri in 2014. Similarly, right-wing bloggers played a major role in amplifying and
disseminating the conservative critiques of CBS Evening News Anchor Dan Rather’s
2004 critical report about George W. Bush’s entry into and performance in the Texas Air
National Guard (Cornfield, Carson, Kalis, & Simon, 2005). The scandal that surrounded
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the veracity of this report led to Rather’s demotion and eventual ouster from CBS News.
Though many studies have shown that most news still emerges from legacy outlets
(Graber & Dunaway, 1980/2017), activists have had success at using digital media to
distribute non-mainstream stories to influence media coverage of contentious events (e.g.
C. W. Anderson, 2010). In each of these examples, actors were able to extend the life of
these news events to achieve their political goals.
The digital media practices of citizens and activists can also influence the media
in less direct ways. Recent studies of journalistic practices reveal that many reporters
have come to use social media as a real-time gauge for public opinion surrounding
political events, such as debates, and can potentially select those online narratives that
support their pre-existing take on the story (McGregor, 2019). Information released by
organizations such as Wikileaks can spread quickly through digital networks with
significant political consequences. Cables sent by U.S. diplomats disparaging Tunisian
autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali energized activists in late 2010 during the revolution
that led to his overthrow (Zayani, 2015). Social media allowed citizens to rapidly spread
the emails that Russia hacked and stole from the Democratic National Committee’s
servers in 2016, creating a crisis for Hillary Clinton’s campaign in advance of the 2016
Democratic National Convention. THe leak introduced negative coverage about Clinton
into the media agenda that blunted the negative effect on Trump of the just-released
Access Hollywood Tape that showed him admitting to sexual assault (Jamieson, 2018). It
is clear from these examples that the new information environment has significantly
changed the selection of and method through which information is disseminated to the
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public, and how the public interacts with and consumes information. For individual
activists and political organizations, it has also provided ways to reach and mobilize
constituencies in new ways.
Interaction, engagement, and mobilization
Several scholars have discussed ways in which activists have harnessed new media to
increase participation in movement activities. These writings have focused primarily on
large-scale protest events or on digital activism taking place in new media environments.
Much of the early research in this area discussed the “Battle of Seattle,” in which activists
in the global justice movement used new media to organize massive protests at the annual
World Trade Organization meeting in 1999 (Bennett, 2003; Bimber, 2003; Kahn &
Kellner, 2004; Lievrouw, 2011). These activists engaged in “mediated mobilization”
(Lievrouw, 2011, p. 25) in which individuals use horizontal voice via technologies like
social media, websites, and email listservs to build and maintain online networks based
on shared goals and values, eventually mobilizing these networks to collectively use
vertical voice to coordinate simultaneous demonstrations and to influence traditional
media. Other social movement scholars have focused on issues of resources in the
emergence of “multi-issue, internet-mediated organizations” (Carty, 2011), like
MoveOn.org, that use digital media to mobilize supporters around multiple issues over
long periods of time with a small staff and low overhead. Karpf (2012) argued that new
media have allowed movement organizations to operate with limited staff and overhead,
reducing the costs of collective action and resulting in new types of political expression.
In terms of mobilization tactics, Carty (2011) highlighted MoveOn’s successful online
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fundraising appeals, two-way communication with members via online forums, and
increasing awareness of public issues as emblematic of this new type of organization.
Similar tactics were employed by the Netroots and Howard Dean’s presidential
campaign during the 2004 Democratic presidential primary. Though the Netroots have
lasted much longer than Dean’s unsuccessful campaign, it is difficult to separate the
digital practices of the Netroots in 2004 from that of the Dean campaign, largely because
he relinquished so much control of messaging and organizing to these online activists
(Teachout & Streeter, 2007). The campaign used digital tools to collect email addresses
of individual supporters and subsequently target them with messaging, fundraising
appeals, and instructions on how to sign up online to host or attend a local event with
other Dean supporters (Kreiss, 2012). The Netroots overwhelmingly championed his
candidacy and made their own appeals to their audiences on Dean’s behalf, amplifying
his messaging and rallying support for fundraising in advance of the federal fundraising
deadlines that precede media reporting on fundraising totals. This digital collaboration
allowed the campaign to raise substantial funds during the pre-primary period without
high-dollar donations from the Democratic Party elite (J. Aldrich, 2009) and organize
hundreds of local activities (Kreiss, 2012).
As digital technologies have become more complex and their adoption more
widespread, the ways in which they can be utilized for engagement have become more
advanced. Digital media has changed how activists can respond to political opportunities.
The so-called “Arab Spring” in late 2010 and early 2011 saw citizens use social media
technology as part of their mobilization tactics against repressive governments in the
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Middle East (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Zayani, 2015).
Contrasting long-standing theories of collective action and their concern about free riders
(cf. Olson, 1965/1965), Bennett and Segerberg (2013) discuss two types of “connective
action” (p.5)—“the forms of digitally networked action that result from large-scale
personalized and digitally mediated political engagement.” In connective action, digital
media not only “connects actors across time and space” (p. 15) and allows them to
engage with and commit to political action, but also allows them to share personal stories
and other content aimed at mobilizing their networks also to participate. Such actions can
be grouped into two categories: “organizationally-enabled collective action” (p. 13),
organized by networks of organizations coordinating behind the scenes, and “crowddriven collective action” (p. 13), which lacks central or lead actors. An examination of
both categories makes clear how they allow for increased horizontal, and subsequently
vertical, voice.
In organizationally-enabled collective action, organizational actors link with one
another around common themes, and use their skills to create spaces for horizontal voice,
such as official twitter streams, where they can highlight topics and frames, time actions,
and simultaneously activate networked supporters to use vertical voice both at protest
sites and online around the world. Movements like the indignados in Spain and Occupy
in the U.S. have leveraged their membership to create user-generated content for “crowdsourced social justice blogs” (Gerbaudo, 2017b). Similarly, electoral campaigns have
shown a trend toward “microsites” (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015). The Obama campaign
combined microsites with the interactive features of online forums to crowdsource the
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process of fact-checking to its supporters by creating the websites
KeeptheGOPhonest.com, Attackwatch.com, and Keepinghisword.com, which allowed
supporters to both supplement the work of the campaign’s fact checkers and also feel a
sense of involvement with the campaign. Compared to the relinquishing of control that
Dean gave to the Netroots, the trend in political campaigns, including Obama’s has been
toward “controlled interactivity” (Stromer-Galley, 2014, p. 2) in which campaign
volunteers feel they have choices (i.e. what to share, what to talk about on social media,
etc.) but they are limited to those choices the campaign wants them to have.
By contrast, the concept of crowd-enabled connective action is in many ways a
movements version of the idea of “organizing without organizations” (Shirky, 2008). In
this typology, individuals from a variety of networks join digitally together and engage in
horizontal voice around a specific (sometimes broad) event, concern, or issue. As more
people join, their own personal networks are leveraged and brought into the fold, rapidly
expanding the overall network. These networks can rise up quickly, cover large distances,
and respond rapidly. In terms of organization and decision-making, the diversity of
priorities and backgrounds of the larger network often impedes the ability to coalesce into
a unified vertical voice with single specific actions or to sustain themselves after the
moments of contention during which they were formed. Bennett and Segerberg (2013)
use the case of Occupy to examine crowd-enabled connective action, citing its broad
digital reach, rapid growth via network effects in many locales worldwide, grounding in
public space, and difficulty translating its initial actions into sustained advocacy.
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Despite such difficulties and challenges, the affordances, and by extension
potential opportunities, that digital media provide for activists are clear. But digital
media are obviously not solely a tool for activists. The same powerful institutions that
activists use digital media to challenge also develop their own digital practices that can
limit the voice of activists. For example, Egypt, one of the countries that famously
utilized social media to organize during the Arab Spring, has recently seen the
government block websites, arrest bloggers, and engage in other acts of digitallymediated repression (Deibert, 2015). Other institutions, including parties, also have the
opportunity to leverage digital media toward their preferred political ends.
Digital Media and Party Power
It is important to note that while digital media provide numerous affordances for activists
looking to put pressure on U.S. political parties, digital media also provides parties with
affordances that can limit challenges from activists. Processes of “normalization”
(Margolis & Resnick, 2000) can lead to the same inequalities that have long existed in
offline politics being replicated in online spaces. Indeed, political elites still maintain
strong relationships with the legacy news organizations (Wolfe, Jones, & Baumgartner,
2013) that most often generate the content that appears in social media and on digital
news websites (Hindman, 2008). Further, though journalists may be interested in broad
Twitter trends as a barometer for public opinion (McGregor, 2019), at the individual level
it is often elites on Twitter that influence the agendas of journalists (Parmelee, 2014).
The platforms through which citizens participate also matter. During the early
days of digital campaigning, Howard (2006) argued that the rise of digital campaigning
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gave rise to a new elite class of political technocrats whose decisions about the
architecture of platforms for online engagement had negative consequences for
democracy. He argued that, despite the democratic potential of digital campaigning, these
systems reduced online participation to those acts preferred by campaigns, restricted
certain types of political engagement and effectively creating “managed citizens”
(p. 170). A similar, though less polemic argument is made by Baldwin-Phillipi (2015)
who points to the increased movement of online campaigning to social media as limiting
the participatory possibilities of users. Contrasting the blogs, websites, and microsites
that were popular in the 2004 and 2008 campaigns with social media, she cites “the
material constraints of social media exert[ing] a more limiting effect on the type of
content that can be circulated” (p. 132). Because these sites are owned by third parties,
organizations and campaigns are often limited to the logics imposed upon them by the
corporate owners of these platforms (Gillespie, 2010). Parties and campaigns face similar
limitations in the various systems they use for fundraising, volunteer management, and
campaign data.
The ability to collect and analyze campaign data is one of the main affordances
provided to parties by digital media. In the mid-2000s, Party chair and former
presidential candidate Howard Dean leveraged the digital media prowess of his 2004
campaign staff to create a national voter database for the Democratic Party, providing the
Party’s candidates with databases and tools to target voters for volunteer recruitment,
fundraising, and voter turnout efforts (Kreiss, 2012). These systems were deployed
during the 2006 midterm elections as part of Dean’s “50 state strategy” and leveraged by
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Obama during both the 2008 primary and general election. Compared to the Republican
Party which has historically had a more federated system of state voter databases, The
Democratic National Committee (DNC) maintains the relationship with a single national
database vendor, but the state parties create rules about which candidates can access the
Party’s data. As such, the Party has the potential to control, and potentially limit access
to, databases that would allow insurgent campaigns to better compete with establishment
candidates. As more Democratic incumbents have faced primary challenges from the left
in recent years, media reports have revealed that some states prohibit database access by
candidates challenging incumbent Democrats (e.g. Lapowsky, 2017). In practice, this
means that challengers begin campaigns with limited or no knowledge about the political
leanings over individual voters.
In addition to the Party-sponsored database systems, separate ecosystems of thirdparty digital strategy firms have emerged around both major parties (Kreiss, 2016),
offering campaigns hundreds of data and analytics products and services that can help
inform and carry out their campaign strategies. While small-dollar fundraising might
allow the campaigns of primary challengers to afford these various services, many of
these firms are tied up in the larger network of the Democratic Party. There is evidence
that the Party is leveraging the scale of their campaign organization to limit access to
these firms by Democrats challenging incumbents. In March 2019, the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the arm of the Democratic Party that
works to support Democrats in close races, released a statement that it would “not
conduct business with, nor recommend to any of its targeted campaigns, any consultant
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that works with an opponent of a sitting Member of the House Democratic Caucus”
(Lacy, 2019). Effectively, this forces digital firms to choose between soliciting clients
from the entire network of Party-approved campaigns and supporting challenger
candidates.
Digital Media, the Invisible Primary, and Party Activism
While digital media have afforded advantages that benefit both activists and parties, there
are specific ways in which digital media have the potential to disrupt certain
mechanisms—campaign financing and media strategy—through which parties have
historically influenced the invisible primary. These media also allow activists to leverage
networks of citizens activists toward their political goals.
As discussed above, influencing the outcome of the invisible primary requires
party elites to engage in a months-long, publicly mediated conversation, during which
they coalesce around specific candidates and publicly make clear their endorsements,
creating narratives that have historically been salient with the public and with party
activists. In the hybrid media system, digital media can allow bloggers, citizen activists,
non-mainstream candidates, and other “challengers” (Kriesi, 2004, p. 196) to use voice to
both engage in the mediation and critique of the rallies and Sunday talk shows in which
these endorsements are announced and to build separate agendas for niche online
audiences (Pfetsch, Miltner, & Maier, 2015). These counter narratives can make it
difficult for a dominant narrative to emerge around specific candidates.
Party elite also provide advantages to specific candidates by providing them with
access to networks of party donors. Digital tools for fundraising from small-dollar donors
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can help a non-elite candidate raise substantial funds during the pre-primary period
without high-dollar donations from party elite (J. Aldrich, 2009). Because the media use
fundraising totals as a metric for ranking candidates, successful online fundraising can
provide insurgent candidates with positive coverage in the horse-race media reports that
are so prevalent in U.S. campaign reporting. Indeed, during the 2004 Democratic
Primary, Howard Dean entered the Iowa Caucus as the front runner in national polls
(McSweeney, 2007) in large part due to his success in leveraging online, small dollar
fundraising. Successful small-dollar fundraising can also provide insurgent candidates
with the potential resources to purchase advertising and assemble staff beyond early
states like Iowa and New Hampshire, which was historically difficult without the support
of party donors. Though Obama in 2008 was by no means an insurgent candidate
ideologically—his views were very similar to Clinton’s (Jamieson & Hardy, 2009)—his
ability to replenish his campaign coffers by repeatedly soliciting small donations from his
email list shows how a less established candidates can compete in an extended primary
against an opponent whose wealthy donors had already given the maximum contribution
allowable under the law (Wilcox, 2008).
Outside of electoral campaigns, research on digital activism aimed at pushing the
Democratic Party to the left has largely focused on the Netroots, and the multi-issue,
internet mediated activists organizations like MoveOn, Democracy for America and the
Progressive Change Campaign Committee, all of which have their roots in the early
2000s. Almost two decades later, many of the Netroots sites, such as the Daily Kos and
Talking Points Memo still exist as sites for news and commentary in the progressive
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community. Dozens of internet-based organizations have emerged, and the few with large
memberships, such as MoveOn, have garnered large enough memberships to build their
own systems for engaging in “analytic activism” (Karpf, 2016, p. 3), allowing them to not
only disseminate activist messaging, but also to analyze member data in order to improve
strategy and increase mobilization potential.
However, these updates to the literature focus largely on how digitally-enabled
activist organizations are increasing their digital capabilities and using them for
progressive activism. What has not been explored is the degree to which crowd-enable
connective action, facilitated by the new information environment and independent of
these formal organizations, is potentially allowing loose networks of activists to coalesce
around their shared political interest in enacting ideological change within the
Democratic Party. These changes in how party activism is carried out push the limits of
Hirschman’s dichotomy of exit and loyalty. Indeed, the fluidity of social media networks
allows disaffected party activists with depleted loyalty to their party, to physically exit
the party and remain digitally engaged in horizontal voice with the broad network of
activists working to change the party from the inside.
While digital media has contributed to these blurred lines between exit and voice,
and to changing activists’ practices, other political, social, and cultural factors also play a
role in determining when and how citizens choose to engage politically. I argue that
changes in how individuals conceive of themselves as citizens and in reference to
political institutions has contributed to the current surge in party activism.
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Citizenship
The way in which “citizenship” is practiced in the United States is complicated and has
changed significantly since the nation’s founding in the late 18th century (Schudson,
1998). Many scholarly works, particularly those following Putnam (2000/2014), have
looked to understand the arguably declining levels of traditional civic participation—
including membership in political parties—in the U.S. As early as 1984, studies of
partisanship and voting behavior revealed the weakening of long-standing electoral
alignments, as well as increased fragmentation and volatility in political parties (Dalton,
1984). Attempts to explain the decline of party identification cited the increasingly
personal, candidate-driven campaigns reducing the efficacy for voters of partisan cues,
and by extension party loyalty (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). Beyond parties, studies
revealed increased indifference to mainstream politics (Mair, 2006), while surveys of the
electorate increasingly revealed a disconnect between the government and the concerns
of citizens, especially those from the millennial generation (Xenos, Vromen, & Loader,
2014).
To understand more than the decline of traditional types of citizenship, many
scholars argued for broadening our conception of civic or political participation to
include alternative forms of political action beyond voting, campaigning, and
involvement in traditional civil society. In generation-based studies about conceptions of
citizenship, there is now a prevalent dichotomy of the dutiful citizen (DC), whose votingcentric and traditionally obligatory civic life is based in civil society organizations and
political parties, and the actualizing citizen (AC), who is motivated to follow their own
pursuits, is less engaged in traditional politics, and prefers “loosely networked activism to
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address issues that reflect personal values” (Bennett, 2007, p. 14). This type of citizen is
often drawn to the types of “connective action” discussed in the previous section. Other
scholars explain that that while such dutiful means of participation—including joining
political parties—have declined, this is due to individuals engaging in “political choice”
(Thorson, 2015) from a wide range of activities, including types of “engaged
citizenship,” (Dalton, 2008) which involves norms of self-expression, including direct
action and volunteering.
Relatedly, citizens engaging in politics in the new information environment now
increasingly prefer to engage in “personalized political action” (Bennett & Segerberg,
2011, p. 773) which lends itself more to issue-based activism than institutionalized party
politics. Accordingly, the U.S. has continued to see citizens, especially the young and the
educated, move from dutiful citizenship to other forms of engagement. This is especially
true for millennials, whose trust in institutions has declined as they have seen financial
crises impact their employment prospects and struggle with high levels of student debt.
These factors are not without consequence. As Bennett and Segerberg (2011) explain:
with such “socioeconomic conditions that are complex, disperse, and
transnational…there is a growing separation of individuals in late modern
society from traditional bases of solidarity such as parties, churches, and
other mass organizations (p. 771).
Others argue that the rise of Sanders and Trump cannot be explained by a simple
disconnect between citizens and parties, but rather by a broader global change in
ideology. Gerbaudo (2017a), argues that the global movements of the early 2010s, such
as Occupy and the Arab Spring, have led to the rise of “citizenism” (p. 3)—that “pits the
self-organized citizenry against economic and political oligarchies.” These “indignant
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citizens” feel that the existing power structures limit their citizenship, defined as the
“possibility of individuals to be active members in their political community with an
equal say on all important decisions” (p. 7). He explains how, during the Occupy Wall
Street protests in 2011, new participants engaged on social media to gain the selfconfidence and skills to participate in street protests. Indeed, “changing conceptions of
citizenship and engagement are coded into” digital technologies, social media platforms
and applications that…citizens are using throughout their everyday lives for both political
and non-political purposes (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011, p. 838).
And yet, until 2016, personalized political action has largely been limited to
engagement with campaigns via the “controlled interactivity” that steers users to
personalize their actions in ways predetermined by the campaign. The interplay between
the factors discussed in this proposal—the history of increasing expectations and
opportunities for participation in parties, the affordances of digital media for challenging
media narratives, and changing conceptions of citizenship—likely all contribute to the
Democratic Party being seen by activists as a site for contentious politics. This
dissertation looks to explore the ongoing impact of this change, as activists have
continued to put pressure on the Party via presidential primary contests, local and statelevel intraparty activism, and broader grassroots organizing.
Collective Identity
Collective identity as a concept has seen a resurgence in recent years as scholars have
begun to re-examine its applicability to networked movements taking place in digital
space where organizational boundaries, or presence at all, is less of a requirement. Jasper
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and Polletta (2001) define collective identity as “the individual’s cognitive, moral, and
emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution” (p.
285). “It is a perception of a shared status or relation which may be imagined rather than
experienced directly, and is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of
a personal identity” (p. 285). While some scholars disagree with aspects of that
definition, most can agree that it tends to include a shared sense of “we-ness,” similar to
the “we” invoked by O’Donnell (1986) earlier in this chapter in the context of his
explication of horizontal voice. This sense of ’we-ness” is typically developed via the
combination of shared experiences carried out in the context of group participation,
including, but not limited to collective decision-making, electing of leaders, determining
priorities for action, and participating in rituals.
Scholars recognize there is some difficulty at times distinguishing between
personal and collective identities, especially in the context of identity politics, given the
significant overlap between how people conceive of the group as part of their own
identity. In short, an activist’s collective identity as part of a social movement cannot be
entirely disconnected from their own personal identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Other
scholars show how organizations serve as venues in which activists can develop their
identities in a fluid and ongoing process of construction and reconstruction (Evans &
Boyte 1986; Morris 1984). Traditionally, this process takes place under the guidance of
organizers and leaders who are dedicated to maintaining and growing the organization.
(Jasper, 1997). Further, maintaining a collective identity also serves to sustain ongoing
participation in groups by new and returning members. By extension, the decline of
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collective identity can often be linked to the decline of a group or movement as a whole
(Jasper & Poletta, 2009). Dissonance between a group or movement’s actions and the
collective identity of its members often spells the end of that group, as “the collective
identity stops lining up with the movement” (p. 292). and activists “stop believing that
the movement ’represents” them (p. 292). Political scientists Clark and Wilson (1961), in
their discussion of values, also make clear the need for an organization to match the
personal values of members, as a necessary condition for participation. This dissertation
will rely on these concepts from the literature on social movement studies to inform and
expand on discussions of horizontal voice.
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Chapter 2: Research Questions, Data and Method
The direction this research took was guided by three central questions about the
relationship between progressive activists and the Democratic Party:
•

How do progressive activists negotiate both what it means to be a
progressive and their relationship with the Democratic Party? When do
they draw lines and when do they dig in their heels? When are these lines
discursive and when do they have to do with action? What do they see the
Party as and how do they see themselves in reference to it? This first
question focused on both new and long-standing activists.

•

Through what processes do progressive activists get involved in
Democratic Party politics? What motivates them to begin to do politics
within the Democratic Party? What change do they aim to make and what
challenges do new activists face as they increase their level of activism? What
role does technology play in facilitating the involvement of new activists?
Exploring these questions required me to conceptualize the idea of “entry” as
an addition to Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty, given the diffuse nature of
party membership in the United States.

•

What does voice look like in the context of progressive party activism?
What are the strategic goals of progressive activists and how does this
manifest in action? How does the use of voice by progressives vary across
groups? Does technology enable new types of party activism? Answering
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these questions required empirical research carried out across a broad
geography and a wide range of progressive groups. It also required an eye
toward the implications of recent technological changes in media and
communication and the impact they may have had on party activism. The
next section outlines my research design, including my reasons and
processes for strategically constructing a networked field site for understand
progressive party activists and the Democratic Party.
Research Design
The research design for this dissertation grew out of two initial research projects, the first
of which took place at the 2016 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, where I
was then living and working on my Ph.D. coursework. Four years earlier, as a master’s
degree student in North Carolina, I had attended and co-wrote an academic paper about
media outlets, delegates, and technologically-mediated activist practices at the prior
Democratic National Convention that was held in Charlotte in September of 2012. Given
that the 2016 convention was for a second time in my newly adopted home state, I
arranged to attend the event with the initial goal of writing a comparative follow-up
paper.
Throughout the first day of that convention, I observed as the activists who made
up the California Bernie Sanders delegation were at the center of ongoing protests, inside
and outside the convention, that were aimed largely at the Democratic National
Committee, Hillary Clinton, and her supporters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this behavior
was completely unlike anything I had seen at the 2012 convention, which had effectively
54

served as a four-day campaign rally for the renomination of President Barack Obama. But
it was also at odds with any convention I remembered seeing on television in recent
memory. In 2008, Hillary Clinton’s speech in support of then-Senator Obama had
successfully quelled her discontented delegates who were calling themselves PUMAs
(Party Unity My Ass). As a committed Howard Dean supporter in the 2004 primary, I
had followed closely the nominations battle and did not recall threats of revolt against the
Democratic Party by the supporters of Dean nor those of Dennis Kucinich, the other selfidentified progressive in the race.
After that first day at the 2016 convention, I decided to center my research on the
protest activity of the California Sanders delegates, as well as their related interactions,
both in-person and via social media, with other delegates, Party leaders, members of the
media, and the public. This research is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. During interviews
I conducted after the convention, many former delegates told me their activism was
continuing beyond the 2016 Sanders campaign. They told me about an online debate
among activists over whether to #DemEnter—enter the Democratic Party and try to take
it over—or #DemExit—leave the Party in protest over its support for Hillary Clinton over
Bernie Sanders during the 2016 primary. Some were getting involved in a combination of
activist groups, including local Democratic Party clubs, as well as chapters of Our
Revolution and Democratic Socialists of America. A few had run to be assembly districtlevel delegates to the California Democratic Party.
Months later, in June of 2017, I again had the opportunity to observe many of
those former delegates at a subsequent Party convention. The California Democratic
55

Party was holding its annual three-day statewide convention in Sacramento four days
prior to the International Communication Association academic conference in San Diego.
I arranged to fly to California early and conduct field work at that convention. It was
immediately clear that this event, though certainly less publicly visible than the national
convention, was just as uncharacteristically contentious. People in “Bernie” (Sanders)
gear were seemingly everywhere and were interrupting the majority of speakers. Tom
Perez, the newly elected chair of the Democratic National Committee, was booed as he
took the stage. These activists were also extremely engaged in the race for state Party
chair between Kimberly Ellis, who they clearly supported, and Eric Bauman. I go into
detail about both this race and that convention in Chapter 4. It was also clear, and
unsurprising to anyone with a background in California politics, that there was a
substantial contingent of progressive Party activists at the convention who had been
working within the party since long before these new Party activists who had been
activated by the Sanders campaign and the election of Donald Trump. After conducting
observational field work during, and interviews after this event, I began to consider how I
could expand my study of progressive activism, technology, and the Democratic Party for
this dissertation.
As I consulted the literature and developed the research questions outlined in the
previous section, I worked to determine how to bound such a study of progressive
activism and the Democratic Party. While California progressive activists had been the
impetus for developing these questions, was the state also the right place to answer them?
I concluded that it was. Below, I outline how California serves as an ideal setting for
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examining progressive activism, address some of the challenges inherent in conducting
research across such a large and diverse setting, and outline how I mitigated these
challenges.
Why California?
There are numerous advantages to choosing California as a setting for studying
progressive activism. First and foremost, California is large, diverse, and influential. As a
single state, California has both the largest economy and is also the most populous. If it
were a nation, it would be the fifth largest economy in the world (Fuller, 2018). Its major
population centers, distinct communities, and diverse industries all have varied political
interests that converge on the Democratic Party as a primary site of contention. California
is also influential at the federal policy level. Since the mid-20th century, issues from
across the ideological spectrum have taken hold in California, including gay marriage,
environmental regulation, and conservative tax breaks, have become priorities for federal
lawmakers (Kamieniecki & Ferrall, 1991; O’Sullivan, Sexton, & Sheffrin, 1995).
California also has a long history of activists engaging in activities that can be
categorized as both exit and voice. The state has a long history of progressive third
parties, such as the Peace and Freedom Party, which was formed by New Left activists in
1968 (Elden & Schweitzer, 1971) and still organizes around progressive issues and
candidates in the state. The Green Party has also seen some recent success in the state at
the local level (Holt, 2007). But the state is also no stranger to progressive activists trying
to bring about change from within the Democratic Party, as first depicted in Wilson’s
(1962) work on the grassroots-driven Democratic Clubs that came about in the 1950s.
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Various other Democratic Party-focused movements have also emerged at specific sociopolitical moments, such as the Campaign for Economic Democracy, a grassroots
initiative led by former New Left leader Tom Hayden (Boggs, 1983) during the Reagan
administration, as well many in-state “netroots” organizations, including the chapters of
Democracy for America that formed during the movement in the early mid-2000s to
oppose the Iraq War (Democracy for America, n.d.). Familiarizing myself with this
documented history of Democratic Party activism allowed me, through comparison, to
more confidently see the historical parallels with the past, as well as the unique aspects of
this specific moment of Party activism.
Studying progressive activism and the Democratic Party is inherently about
conflict among Democrats themselves, as well as between Democrats and those just
outside the margins of the Party. While California has seen disagreement between
progressives and centrists for decades, recent trends in political demographics and party
affiliation have increased the potential for intraparty conflict. While the Public Policy
Institute of California recently found the average Californian to lean Democratic, the
opposite was true as recently as 2012, when they found the average Californian to lean
slightly conservative (McGhee & Krimm, 2012). Voter registration trends continually
show the Democratic Party increasing its share of registered voters, as a result of both
registering new voters and of Republican voters changing their registration to the
Democratic Party or to “No Party Preference.” “No Party Preference” voters lean
Democratic by 10-15 percentage points, and when they do join a party, they choose the
Democratic Party by a 3:1 margin. These these statistics depict a high likelihood that
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Democrats will continue to win statewide races and maintain their 75% majority in the
state assembly. This influx of moderate independents and former Republicans make clear
that, in California, the Democratic Party’s so-called “Big Tent” covers voters who have
an increasingly diverse range of political ideologies, experiences, and worldviews. As
Democrats have little need to tack to the center and compete with Republicans on their
issues, competing ideas in California increasingly play out within the Democratic Party.
Beyond shifts in party identification, recent changes in the state’s electoral rules
and scheduling significantly increased the opportunities for observing activists engaged
in progressive party activism. First, California’s unique “top-two” process that the state
uses for non-presidential primary elections encourages sustained contention between the
Party’s moderate and progressive activists. Since 2012, the system, colloquially referred
to as the “jungle primary” (Shapiro, 2018), has allowed all primary voters, regardless of
party, to vote for the candidate of their choice, and the two candidates with the most
votes, regardless of party, advance to the general election. As a result, in heavily
Democratic districts or statewide races, the same two Democrats may face each other in
both the primary and the general election, as was the case in the state’s 2018 Senate Race
between incumbent Senator Dianne Feinstein and challenger Kevin de Leon (Luna,
2018), who was supported by many progressive groups. The state also played a larger
role in the Party’s presidential nominating processes in 2020 than it had in recent election
cycles. The state’s primary election, which awards more delegates than any other state,
was held on March 3, three months earlier than it was in 2016, when it was held on June
7. This change meant that the state saw a barrage of political activity from state and local
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Democratic Party institutions, activist organizations, interest groups, and candidate
campaigns, as well as an influx of political resources from outside the state.
Most importantly, the State has numerous avenues through which activists can
seek to influence Democratic Party politics, each of which has the potential to serve as a
site for research. As discussed in Chapter 1, the state has since the 1950’s had a large
network consisting of local Democratic Clubs, whose “amateur democrats” were a major
focus of James Wilson’s (- J. Q. Wilson, 1962) work of the same name. This tradition
continues to this day, as The California Democratic Council website touts 562 individual,
Party-chartered clubs operating within the state, although research for this dissertation
occasionally found some to be defunct or barely maintaining a skeleton crew. All of these
clubs are at minimum organized around a specific place (e.g. Santa Monica Democrats),
with the bulk of them relying solely on location as their official way of determining their
universe for potential members and local issues. Others, organize around both location
and specific constituency groups that usually aligns with the state Party’s caucuses
(e.g. San Diego Labor Democratic Club, Modesto Progressive Democrats, or the Harvey
Milk LGBTQ Democratic Club of San Francisco). Extraparty groups, such as Democracy
for America, Progressive Democrats of America, Our Revolution, and Indivisible also
engage in activism aimed at bringing about a more progressive Democratic Party. The
Party’s open and accessible district-level elections, the result of participatory reforms at
the state Party level in the 1970s and 1980s, allow activists from across this ecosystem of
groups to find success competing for and winning delegate positions to the State
Democratic Party. The ideologically heterogeneous delegations produced by these
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processes bring with them the potential for intraparty conflict around endorsements and
other Party business (Larimore-Hall, 2014). As a result, progressive Party activism is
often present, and can be observed and documented at annual Party conventions,
nomination events, executive board meetings, and other events.
With these numerous justifications outlined above, I set out to study the
Democratic Party. To tackle a site as large as California in a way that would not be
empirically thin, I turned to the concept of “Field Site as Network” as a model for inform
my research design.
Field Site as Network
Many of the above reasons for studying progressive Party activism in California were
also simultaneously challenges to doing so. The size of the state, both geographically and
in terms of population, posed logistical challenges, particularly for qualitative work. At
the local level, there are hundreds of Democratic Clubs and extra-party progressive
groups operating throughout the state. In designing this research, I considered narrowing
the study to look at the ecosystem of progressive Democratic clubs and extra-party
progressive groups in one or two locales. But it was immediately clear that doing this
would have meant giving up much of what had been so compelling about the 2016
national convention and 2017 state convention. How could I truly explore how digital
media was allowing activists from across the state to organize and engage with other
activists across groups as well as locales. I was interested in loose networks of activists
from around the state.
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Relatedly, one of the contributions of this dissertation comes from opting not to
use candidate campaigns as the lens through which to study Democratic Party activists.
While numerous studies (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; e.g. Kreiss, 2014; Nielsen, 2012) have
contributed valuable insights about Party activists working on the campaigns of specific
candidates, those studies inherently exclude activists who are engaged in continued Party
activism but, for whatever reason, choose not to support the campaign under study. In the
digital era, there is no easily bounded coalition of Party-focused leftist activists to mirror
the California club movement that Wilson (1962) explored in his seminal work on
amateur democrats. As digital technologies have connected individuals and groups across
wide geographies, scholars have constructed new methods to study those social
phenomena that have emerged and are not easily bracketed by organizational or physical
boundaries.
This research design borrows from one such construction, developed originally in
ethnography, the idea of “field site as network” (Burrell, 2009, p. 190) which involves
beginning the research from “entry points” (p. 190) rather than specific sites. By
following people, objects, and stories across multiple types of networks, the researcher
iteratively and over time “maps out the social relations of research participants and their
connections to material and digital objects and physical sites” (p. 191). Constructing a
field site as a network can be helpful in scenarios where the geography is both “too
complexly heterogenous…and simultaneously too geographically limited as a unit of
analysis” (p. 189). As a location for study, California, and its progressive activist
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network, is obviously quite large and diverse, but it is geographically limiting in that
interactions take place online with activists both inside and outside of California.
Accordingly, this study began by exploring progressive activists in California
through three entry points: 1) The 2016 California Bernie Sanders Delegation to the
Democratic National Convention 2) The Progressive Caucus of the California
Democratic Party; 3) Our Revolution—the political action organization that grew out of
the 2016 Sanders campaign.
The 2016 California Bernie Sanders Delegation to the Democratic National
Convention which at 200-people comprised almost half of the state’s pledged delegates.
Throughout the four days of the convention, the Sanders delegates, most of whom had
minimal experience in Democratic Party politics, were regularly highlighted as the
leaders of dissent and protest amongst the various Sanders delegations (Malone, 2016).
After the convention, many continued their activism, and some ran successfully to
become assembly delegates to the California State Democratic Party. This entry point
was utilized in a pilot study and informed the selection of the other entry points.
The Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party—which refers to
itself as the “raucous caucus” is a formal caucus of progressive delegates within the
California Democratic Party. Its delegation, of over 700 activist members from around
the state, was a driving force in opposing the (eventually successful) nomination of a
long-standing centrist Party member at the 2017 state Party convention. Their statement
of principles describes themselves as believing in:
the promotion of principle before politics and policy before unquestioning
fealty to any individual or organization…[and seeking] to build a
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movement within the Democratic Party so that we may one day see a
government controlled by citizens, not oligarchic interests.
Following the 2016 election, the caucus commissioned a report entitled Autopsy: The
Democratic Party in Crisis that rated the party and gave recommendations in 7
categories: 1) Corporate Power and the Party; 2) Race and the Party; 3) Young People
and the Party; Voter Participation and the Party; Social Movements and the Party; War
and the Party; and Democracy and the Party. They distributed the report via nationwide
party networks as well as media channels, and also published a progress report one year
later. This entry point was chosen to provide to both an understanding of activism from
within the Party organization, and to understand how leftists are trying to gain power in
the state Party organization.
Our Revolution—the federated political action organization that spun out of
the 2016 Sanders campaign is a grassroots activist organization that aims to educate and
involve new voters and activists in politics, as well as develop, encourage, and support
progressive candidates for local, regional, and statewide offices. Its political priorities
include, but are not limited to, income inequality, single-payer healthcare, money in
politics, the minimum wage, strengthening social security, and prescription drug prices. It
includes 20 “featured” groups in California as well as numerous smaller local groups.
This entry point provided insight into how a combination of new and seasoned
progressives work towards the organization’s stated goal of “transforming the Party.”
Each of these entry points provided different ways to explore the perspectives,
activities, and experiences of progressive activists in California. My ability to access
these three entry points came from both the pilot study I conducted about the California
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Bernie Sanders Delegation to the Democratic National Convention and my subsequent
field work at the 2017 and 2019 California Democratic Party (CDP) Conventions. At
each of these events, I gathered contact information from activists and took field notes
about the acts of protest and resistance I had witnessed in order to inform future
interviews. The producers of several of the web-based progressive news shows also
attended the 2019 CDP Convention and I was able to exchange contact information with
several of them. These connections allowed me to interview local Party leaders from
several cities throughout the state. While carrying out my pilot study, I was also able to
expand my interview pool by identifying and reaching out to potential subjects on social
media and by asking my subjects after their interviews if they could put me in touch with
additional subjects. I did this again during the interviews that emerged from the above
entry points. Additionally, some of the subjects from the pilot study are also members of
or know people affiliated with the other entry points.
Limitations
The approach that I am took via these three entry points help me capture the current
progressive wave in California, but it was not without its limitations. One of the
downsides is that, while these groups are not solely made up of middle class, white,
educated progressives, they are dominated by them. As such, studying California
progressives did not pick up on more diverse progressive efforts that may be going on
elsewhere in other state parties. By centering activists and their broad networks, this
research builds on previous research on party activists, with an eye toward the broader
network of activists, unbound by specific electoral campaign organizations.
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Methods
Direct Observation
This dissertation incorporates observational research I conducted in and around
Democratic Party events and meetings between August 2016 and August 2020, the bulk
of the fieldwork took place between October 2019 and January 2021.
The major events included: the 2016 Democratic National Convention in
Philadelphia; the 2017 and 2019 California Democratic Party Annual Conventions in
Sacramento and San Diego, respectively; the 2019 California Democratic Party preprimary nominating convention in Long Beach, the 2020 California Progressive Alliance
annual meeting in Berkeley, and the 2020 Democratic National Convention (attended
virtually due to Covid-19). Each of these large events consisted of large, general sessions
events with well-known speakers, as well as smaller sessions such as caucus meetings,
trainings, social events, and meet-and-greets. When appropriate, I recorded many of these
speeches and presentations for subsequent analysis. In most cases, I acted as an outside
observer during these events, focusing on discussion between participants about past or
upcoming activist practices and goals, or on on-site activism, such as protests outside the
convention halls or during speeches. More specifically, I aimed to identify moments of
coordination between activists with the goal of following up with those activists to
discuss those moments in subsequent interviews. I also paid attention to when and how
activists utilized digital media to enable or supplement those communicate acts. Activists
at these events typically kept packed schedules. As a result, I approached activists
primarily between sessions for quick questions or to exchange contact information for
future conversations.
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While these days-long, well-attended, statewide events were rich in observational
data and served as an ideal recruiting ground for interviewees, more frequent smaller
events also provided important ethnographic data. These events included campaign
events, meetings of local Democratic Clubs, rallies for progressive candidates, protests,
and social events, all of which which allowed me to observe activists carrying out or
discussing specific communicative acts and strategies. I also attended monthly meetings
of chartered Democratic Clubs and extraparty groups throughout the state. Due to Covid19, events held after March 12, 2020 were attended via Zoom or other online meeting
software. These events allowed me to observe the planning and evaluation of specific
instances of progressive activism, providing insights into activists’ motivations, goals,
and definitions of success.
These instances of direct observations provided me with a collection of empirical
observations for subsequent analysis. As discussed later in this section, observation at all
of these events also allowed me to recruit interviewees, tailor and guide interviews, and
identify digital spaces for further collection of social media data and documents. It also
provided context for data collected via these methods.
Interviews
Since 2016, I have conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with activists engaged
in progressive party activism via candidate campaigns and ballot measures, as well as
through a combination of online groups, Democratic Clubs and extraparty organizations.
Some were concentrating their efforts on pursuing change via the state Party while others
were focused on national, state, as well as local and county level organizations. Subjects
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were identified in several ways. I reached out to several subjects after observing them
engaging in activism either in-person or online. I also utilized the progressive
adems2017.vote (accessible via archive.org) and adems2019.vote websites to garner lists
of CDP delegate candidates from the 80 assembly districts throughout the state.4 Given
that these lists were organized geographically and also included short political
biographies of each delegate candidate, using them allowed me to ensure that my sample
included activists from varied regions, political backgrounds, and group identities. Others
were identified via snowball sampling, as some interviewees steered me to others who
had more firsthand knowledge of certain activities that emerged in our semi-structured
conversations or of communicative acts that I had observed online or at in-person events.
All interviewees were first asked general questions about their activist
backgrounds, including the initial catalysts for their party activism. These general
questions also focused on their relationship with legacy and digital media, and their
relationship with the Democratic Party. Asking these questions up front allowed me to
refer back to these experiences and relationships as the interviews progressed to
discussion of specific activist practices. The central focus of these interviews was to
understand the collective planning and execution of individual communicative acts
employed by these activists to achieve their political goals. I also worked to understand
the challenges, motivations, contestation, as well as issues of identification and
belonging, that surrounded those acts. I guided these interviews to allow participants to
not only explain these acts (what they do) but also to link them to their political
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These websites are discussed at length in Chapter 3.
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backgrounds, as well as their relationships with, and expectations of the Democratic
Party.
This pool of 43 interviewees included 23 men and 19 women. As discussed in
detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation and outlined by Larimore-Hall in his 2014
dissertation [@-LarimoreHall2014], Democratic Party activists in California often engage
in activism via membership in numerous groups and towards a range of issue priorities.
Further, their motivations for participation in specific groups and events varies
significantly from person to person. As such, the creation of simplified categories or
“buckets” of interviewees for discussion here felt reductive. Instead, I provide next some
basic statistics outlining the breadth of the full pool of interviewees. 32 interviewees were
members of, or regularly attended, local Democratic Club meetings. 11 of them held, or
had previously held, leadership roles in those clubs. 18 were members of multi-issue
progressive Party groups such as Our Revolution or Progressive Democrats of America.
Five held leadership roles in those groups. The pool of interviewees contained activists
representing a range of levels of experience in activism. Despite the prominence of new
activists in recently formed extraparty groups such as Our Revolution and long-standing
activists in Democratic Clubs, this trend was certainly not mutually exclusive. In building
the pool of interviewees, I made a concerted effort to maintain diversity in activist
experiences as I selected interviewees from across progressive activist groups.
The subjects were promised confidentiality. In addition to their statements lacking
identifiable attribution, they also could ask that statements be “off the record.” This
distinction allowed them to provide me with context for their statements while also
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maintaining their confidentiality in regard to comments that would personally identify
them as interview subjects.
Social Media Data
For this project, I collected social media texts—posts (or tweets), videos, links, etc.—
from Facebook and Twitter. Understanding this data collection process requires
understanding first how I collected these data and what data specifically I collected.
These data were collected using a combination of APIs (open, but limited access
to databases provided by digital platforms), data scrapers, and manual collection. The
Twitter API was most useful for collecting future Twitter data (e.g. posts made by an
activist after I identify their Twitter handle). To access the Twitter API, I utilized the
Digital Methods Initiative Twitter Capture and Analysis Toolset (DMI-TCAT), a
software set developed by engineers at the Digital Methods Initiative at the University of
Amsterdam. This tool was especially useful for cataloguing the tweets of convention
delegates to the virtual 2020 Democratic National Convention. That said, in recent years
many platforms have made their APIs more limited and less useful to researchers
(Freelon, 2018). To that end, I used multiple digital tools to compile the past posts of
activists and activist groups, directly from the viewable pages of Facebook and Twitter
rather than from the platforms’ databases.5 Both of these methods placed the individual
social media texts into Microsoft Excel files for subsequent analysis. Recent

I began this project using the python based tool Twint, available at
https://github.com/twintproject/twint. In October 2020, Twitter disabled its non-java
script version, making this tool unusable for my purposes. At this point, I switched to
snscrape, available at https://github.com/JustAnotherArchivist/snscrape, which has robust
functionality for Twitter and limited functionality for Facebook.
5
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methodological critiques noted an over-reliance on big social media platforms (Twitter in
particular) due to their ease of access. While these critiques have merit, in the case of this
project, most activists I interviewed cited Facebook and Twitter as their primary online
venues for activism, justifying their prioritization in data collection.
While these tools were incredibly helpful, they also had limitations. I also
collected social media data manually. This process took two forms, 1) browsing the
public pages of individual activists, activist groups, and manually saving data in the form
of PDFs and screenshots, and 2) observing the activity of online communities and writing
descriptive field notes based on those observations. I employed the latter method most
often in smaller communities, cataloguing activists planning activities, disagreements,
and other interactions.
While the above processes describe how I collected social media data, the process
for deciding which data to collect was more complex. With an iterative research design
such as a field site as network, the process of collecting relevant social media data was
also iterative and took place in parallel to the construction of the field site. As discussed
in the research design section, I began the construction of my field site as network
through specific entry points. For example, two of my entry points were: 1) Sanders’
delegates to the 2016 Democratic National Convention’, and 2) members of the
Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party. As such, I began my social media
data collection in much the same way, by searching online for the Twitter handles and
Facebook usernames of the activists whose names I found on lists of convention
delegates and lists of members of the progressive caucus. Both of these lists were
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available online, though hidden in the depths of the California Democratic Party website.
I followed the same process for members of local progressive groups. As my project
continued and my field site expanded, I expanded my lists of activists accordingly.
As four years of social media data by individual activists and their organizations
quickly became unwieldy, I created a corpus of data and regularly cross referenced it
using specific search terms or hashtags. For example, the hashtag #imwithkimberlye was
used by activists supporting Kimberly Ellis’ campaign for Party chair, which is discussed
in Chapter 3. Searches for (party) platform helped me compile data depicting how
activists used social media to oppose the platform in the context of the 2020 Democratic
National Convention. In some cases, I used date ranges to pull relevant data from the
corpus. For example, I pulled all posts by 2020 convention delegates from one week
before and one week after the nomination of Kamala Harris for the Vice-Presidential
Nomination in 2020. Searches within this corpus for terms including specific candidates
(e.g. Joe Biden or Bernie Sanders), issues (e.g. #Medicare4all), or memes
(e.g. #TooFarLeft) were also employed.
In addition to activist hashtags, I also archived institutional Party hashtags used in
the context of large events. For example, the hashtags #CADEM, #CADEM2017, and
#CADEM2019; were the official hashtags for the California State Party Conventions in
2017 and 2019. Examining these universal hashtags provide discursive context for the
activist hashtags and also make it clear how much conversation was taking place in
activists hashtags as a percentage of a larger universe.
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Beyond social media discourse, I also compiled data about events, largely from
individual event pages and organizational calendars both of which were commonly
employed on Facebook. These helped inform me of both prior and upcoming actions to
discuss in interviews and attend for participant observation. As many events are cohosted on Facebook, these also helped me see linkages between activist organizations and
expand my field site accordingly.
Documents and Other Texts
In addition to the direct observation, semi-structured interviews, and social media data
discussed above, this multi-method dissertation also took advantage of textual sources
produced by traditional and citizen journalists as well as by individual activists,
progressive organizations, and candidate campaigns. I compiled data about numerous
debates and events to build an archive of activist websites, op-eds, press releases, blog
posts, public quotes, meeting agendas and minutes, saving them in digital formats for
subsequent analysis. I also compiled promotional materials, such as slate cards and
biographies related to the campaigns of individual activists. Beyond these documents, I
also compiled archives of livestream and promotional videos obtained via YouTube,
Facebook Live, other sources. Due to the automated closed-captioning that many of these
services deploy to meet the needs of persons with disabilities, I was often able to export
automated transcriptions of meetings in text format for subsequent analysis. When
available, I also compiled digital archives of certain important meetings that either predated my in-person research or that I was unable to attend in-person or virtually.
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The internet archive’s wayback machine also proved indispensable for examining
campaign and activist websites from the recent past. Compared to blogs and journalism
sites, activist websites are constantly updating themselves with minimal priority placed
on preserving historical data on the site. For example, after elections, endorsements are
often taken down from the websites of both the organizations who give the endorsement,
and the candidates or ballot measures who receiving them. In fact, I found that candidate
websites and those related to ballot measures regularly disappear from their official web
domain within months of the election.
Via these texts, I identified common metaphors, themes, and arguments that
informed my understanding of how individual activists and progressive groups articulated
their values and ideals, as well as their shifting understandings of and relationships with
the Democratic Party. For certain sections of the dissertation that required historical
context and event timelines, I used a variety of online texts in conversation with one
another to construct histories and narratives. For example, the May 2017 race for CDP
chair, discussed in Chapter 3, required me to reconstruct the history of the race, including
efforts of individual activists and campaigns that began in mid-2015, two years prior to
the start of my field work. These efforts both informed, and filled in gaps in, the data
obtained by, my interviews with activists.
Data analysis
Following Miles, Huberman, & Saldana (2013) I organizeD these ideas, concepts, and
themes into a priori codes. In addition to the a priori codes, I employED an open coding
system (Corbin & Strauss, 2014) to allow additional themes to emerge throughout the
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data analysis process. The transcripts, field notes, and primary texts were coded using
Atlas.Ti qualitative data analysis software. This combination of systematic and emergent
qualitative analysis allowed me to explore deeply the ideas that emerged from deep
examination of these primary sources but to do it with an eye to my own personal
experience with this topic as well as the extensive historical literature that exists around
party activism in the U.S.

75

Chapter 3: Convention Delegates and the Realization of Collective Identity
Much of the popular press coverage of Sanders delegates at the 2016 Democratic
National Convention depicted them as out-of-touch ideological zealots, clinging to the
hope that Sanders could somehow be nominated at the convention despite his clear
disadvantage in the delegate math (e.g. Mehta, 2016). These portrayals by Democratic
Party regulars and the popular press characterized the Sanders contingent as having
counterproductive antagonism towards the would-be nominee and naiveté with regard to
the political process. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, a California Democrat who
was one of many Party leaders booed by the Bernie supporters at the delegation
breakfast, when asked about the Sanders delegates in a post-event interview, echoed this
feeling when she said, “some people are new and not familiar with how things work”
(Hains, 2016). This one-dimensional view of delegates presumes that their protests were
only in service to the unlikely political outcome of nominating Bernie Sanders. In reality,
their protests, as well as their disregard for the expected norms of party conventions, were
an expression of a collective identity at odds with the Democratic Party. This identity,
rooted in their own values and worldviews, was formed over the course of the campaign,
as they discussed at local events and on social media both their passion for Sanders as
well as what they viewed as antidemocratic injustices carried out by the Clinton
campaign, Party elites, the DNC, and the media. Inside the convention, they saw their use
of vertical voice as not only representative of their own ideology and grievances with the
Party, but also of Sanders supporters back at home as well as those protesting outside the
convention. Their actions at the 2016 convention, aided by social media and traditional
organizing methods, were grounded in both ideological goals—pushing the Party to the
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left— as well as larger concerns about process, democratic ideals, representation, and
alienation from the political system. Four years later, after Sanders again lost the
Democratic nomination—this time to Joe Biden—the virtual national convention held by
the Democratic Party as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic meant there was no
convention floor from which his delegates could protest. However, members of the 2020
California delegation, throughout the summer of 2020, leveraged their position as
delegates to engage in numerous acts of strategic activism aimed narrowly at Democratic
Party leaders. As in 2016, their activities were an expression of their collective identity as
delegates, which varied significantly from that of their predecessors. Compared to the
Sanders delegates of 2016, these delegates were more experienced in Party politics, had a
more nuanced articulation of their relationship with—and expectations of—the
Democratic Party, and also experienced a notably different primary campaign. Further,
after experiencing four years of President Donald Trump, many Sanders supporters
believed that extending his presidency for an additional four years would be dangerous
for the country. Given all of these factors, even if there had been a traditional convention,
there is reason to believe the delegation would have chosen more discriminating activism
over the level of disruptive acts carried out in 2016.
This chapter first explores the processes through which members of the 2016
California Sanders delegation, most of whom had minimal experience in party politics,
became activated in the Sanders campaign, developed a collective identity in opposition
to the Democratic Party, and eventually carried out disruptive activism at the Democratic
National Convention. It then examines the 2020 California Sanders delegation, revealing
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how numerous factors, including their experience in Party politics, the reality of four
years with Donald Trump as president, a less contentious primary campaign, a modified
delegate selection procedure, as well as the virtual convention resulting from the Covid19 pandemic, influenced the activism carried out around the 2020 Democratic National
Convention.
Activation and Organizing for the 2016 Convention
The people who eventually formed the 2016 California Sanders delegation came from
very different backgrounds and held different views on activism and its role in party
politics. But, beginning with their involvement in the Sanders campaign, they went
through a shared experience in democratic practice while working on the campaign,
running for delegate, and self-organizing their delegation via social media. This
experience came to inform their collective actions at the 2016 Democratic National
Convention. Specifically, their work on the campaign provided them with a sense of their
own political efficacy and a focus on the progressive ideology and democratic ideals that
were prevalent in Sanders’ rhetoric. As they ran for delegate positions, they carried these
ideals into the practice of politics in local party caucuses, further developing in them a
sense of normative democratic practice and an appreciation for process, which they then
carried into their delegation’s collective efforts at self-organization. At the same time,
their use of social media expanded from the individual process of information gathering
about the campaign, to helping them organize for their delegate elections, and eventually
to helping build a collective online environment for their statewide delegation.
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Early Campaign Work and Creative Organizing
While the Sanders delegates did have some previous experience in activities like union
leadership, local ballot measures, and single-issue activism, most had minimal experience
in party politics. In the past, many had either passively supported the Democratic Party’s
candidates or voted for long-shot candidates who aligned with their progressive
ideologies but had little chance of winning an election. Some had historically been
registered with third parties or had been unaligned with a political party. Others had
consciously rejected voting for president altogether. One delegate admitted to a reporter
from the Los Angeles Times that for the previous twenty years he had written in “dead
yellow dog” on his presidential ballot rather than selecting someone from the available
slate of candidates (Mehta & Moore, 2016). The Sanders delegation also included college
and high school students for whom 2016 was their first opportunity to participate in a
presidential election. Most of these delegates-to-be began hearing about Sanders via
traditional media and in messages shared on Facebook. They admitted that they originally
saw him as the candidate that most aligned with their views and planned to support him
but did not initially see him as viable in the national primary.
Many of these delegates were drawn to the campaign’s use of moral claims and
narratives about U.S. society, policy, and political culture that resonated with their own
worldviews. Many described connecting with Sanders on policy issues like single-payer
health care, free education, and corporate regulation, but also on big-picture issues about
democracy, representation and the electoral system writ large. Others were drawn to his
campaign because his history of registering as an independent coincided with their own
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frustration with the major parties. A delegate from San Diego for whom Sanders was “the
first candidate in modern history that [he] trusted”, explained:
I’m 56 years old . . . I had been either an independent or an NPP, no party
preference, depending which state I was in, all of my voting life. Once it
appeared to me that the DNC was going to rig the whole primary process
in favor of Hillary Clinton, I decided to re-register as a Democrat to make
sure my vote was going to count in the primary (Interview Quote).
For these activists, the Sanders campaign embodied many of their ideals in its rejection of
corporate contributions from SuperPACs. They began to identify and refer to themselves
as “Berniecrats,” rhetorically linking their involvement with the Democratic Party to their
support for Sanders. For long-standing Democrats with more loyalty to the Democratic
Party, the term provided an early collective identity, as well as a way to collectively
articulate their voice, within the big tent of the Democratic Party and in groups of selfidentified progressive Democrats. For the independents and third-party members who had
entered the Party specifically to support Sanders, it also served to qualify their presence
in the Party, in effect saying, “I wouldn’t be here if not for Bernie.”
One delegate, a registered Democrat, who had been a fan of Sanders for many
years and had previous experience volunteering on congressional campaigns, recalled her
immediate interest in volunteering for Sanders after he declared his candidacy in April of
2015. She explained:
I remember seeing him on TV and Bill Maher said, ‘you think you’ll run?’
and he said, ‘if people want me to.’ And I thought ‘boy I want him to,
that’d be cool to have that voice.’ So, when he did I jumped on it
(Interview Quote).
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She described connecting with the campaign online and setting up a recurring monthly
donation to the campaign. Via the campaign’s website, she signed up to host door-to-door
canvasses on nights and weekends, recruiting other volunteers from her local area.
The campaign’s online presence was an entry point for all of the delegates early
on in the race. At that time, the campaign had no physical presence or local organizers in
California. In fact, the campaign would not open its first California office until a year
later (Wick, 04/21/2016), just two months before the national press would call the race
for Hillary Clinton on the day prior to the California primary. Because of this, all formal
interaction between the campaign and its California activists took place online, largely
through the predetermined options available on the campaign’s website,
berniesanders.com. One activist explained:
The phone banking, stuff like that, that was kinda sourced through the
campaign but that was just online. There wasn’t really any interaction with
anyone…The Bernie campaign had no one out here (Interview Quote).
Other delegates described hearing about Sanders via their friends’ public posts on social
media and slowly learning more about the campaign. Many joined Sanders-focused
Facebook groups (e.g. Central Coast for Bernie Sanders) that local supporters were
creating in the absence of formal campaign infrastructure, crafting and sharing messages
about Sanders with their personal online networks. Across these networks, they followed
the campaign’s social media hashtag #feelthebern, a rallying cry originally created
independently of the campaign by out-of-state Sanders supporters (Grossman, 2016).
Early on in the campaign, delegates began meeting in person. Some found out
online about socially-focused meet-ups to discuss Sanders. While some of these “house
parties” were publicized on the Sanders campaign website, the campaign rarely provided
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an agenda or outline for what was to be done or discussed at these events. One long-time
party activist and Sanders supporter who attended events in East Los Angeles described
these early meetings as organized, “completely chaotically” with “30 people in [a] house
all drinking wine and a few people talking about the revolution” (Interview Quote).
Delegates explained how the “movement,” as they referred to the campaign, grew as
people who were driving 30 minutes to the closest meeting decided to host meetings in
their own cities and neighborhoods.
I went to one in Downtown LA, and we were like “do we need to start
more? But why would I host? I’m not a leader. [Eventually I was like] I
just have to step it up here because there’s nothing like that going on in
my neighborhood. . . . Fuck it. I’ll just do it. So, I signed up and I started
hosting stuff, and people started coming. So, it was like okay, I see a need
for this (Interview Quote).
Several college-age delegates first got involved with, or started Sanders campaign
offices, on their campuses. Those that could afford to do so also began donating to the
Sanders campaign. Others used the Sanders campaign website to find local volunteerhosted efforts including phone banks and door-to-door canvassing events, eventually
leading and hosting these events themselves as they gained confidence and increased
their engagement with other local Sanders supporters.
In August 2015, Sanders held his first California rally, drawing an audience of
27,500, including an overflow area, to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum complex.
Several Southern California delegates explained how attending that event gave them the
confidence that Sanders’ run could be more competitive in the primary than they had
originally thought and moved them to increase their involvement with the campaign. One
would-be delegate who attended that rally was entering her senior year of high school
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that same month. After seeing a “[USC] Trojans for Bernie” sign at the rally, she was
inspired to start a group at her high school organizing student volunteers to help the
Sanders campaign engage in voter outreach and volunteer recruitment in her local
community.
As the campaign progressed, these activists continued to engage on social media
and at in-person events organized by other local activists. They organized voter
registration drives, creating their own flyers to inform new voters about Sanders’ policy
positions. Some began designing and purchasing their own Sanders buttons, bumper
stickers, and t-shirts. One activist even painted a Bernie Sanders mural in downtown Los
Angeles.

Figure 1: A mural in Downtown Los Angeles depicting Bernie Sanders. The mural was created by local
artist Lydiaemily Archibald in August 2015.

By summer 2015, as Sanders’ polling and popularity was increasing nationwide,
his most ardent supporters in California, and around the country, began to express
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frustration with media coverage of both Sanders’ White House bid and of the race as a
whole. They felt that coverage was lopsided in favor of Hillary Clinton and that reporters
often spoke presumptively about her chances of winning the nomination. Online, Sanders
supporters on Facebook groups, Reddit called this the “corporate media blackout” of
Sanders. In late July 2015, the national Sanders campaign hosted a “house-party
simulcast” in which over 100,000 supporters at 3,500 houseparties nationwide logged in
simultaneously online to watch the Senator speak. When local and national media outlets
covered the events the next day, Sanders supporters crowed online that “people power”
had beaten the “Bernie Media Blackout” and forced the media to pay attention to them.
An activist from Los Angeles, posting on the activist-run “losangelesforbernie.org”
published a list of links to mainstream media articles about the previous night’s events.
He cited the coverage as proof that “by stay[ing] positive and on Bernie’s message, our
movement will become powerful enough to allow our voices heard” (Los Angeles For
Bernie, 2015). While this message was generally positive, it indicates that for him and
other activists, they were beginning to see the media as an obstacle to be overcome.
In September 2015, a Southern California activist organized a conference call
with the leaders of fifteen local Sanders Facebook groups from across the state, as well as
leaders who were organizing constituency groups (e.g. Latinos for Bernie, LA Labor for
Bernie). Few activists on the call reported any contact with the Sanders campaign. Those
that did said the campaign’s outreach was cursory, usually from someone out of state, and
provided minimal opportunity for continued coordination. One activist was frustrated
because she had collected emails from interested voters for the campaign but was unsure
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where to send them. Their sense that the campaign was absent was not unfounded, as the
campaign was barely investing resources outside of the early states of Iowa and New
Hampshire, let alone in California, whose June primary would be one of the last ten
contests in the race (Dovere & Debenedetti, 2016).
Without any contact with campaign staff, the only information they received from
the campaign was from its national campaign email list. Most information California
supporters received about the campaign came from social media, as well as legacy and
online media coverage of the campaign. Throughout the fall of 2015, these media would
increasingly highlight critiques of the Democratic National Committee and its cozy
relationship with the Clinton campaign as compared to its relationship with her main
primary opponents, former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley and Senator Bernie
Sanders. These critiques would reinforce narratives of a “rigged” system that delegates
were already reading, sharing, and discussing on Twitter as well as across national,
statewide, and locally focused Sanders groups on Facebook and Reddit.
While the preference for Clinton among Democratic politicians and party leaders
had been apparent for months as she racked up endorsements throughout the invisible
primary, it was conflicts over the scheduling of debates that brought the notion that the
process was being “rigged” by the DNC into the public discourse. In early August, the
DNC announced that it was only scheduling six sanctioned debates and would bar from
those debates any candidates that participated in any additional unsanctioned debates.
Further, the party-sanctioned debates were largely scheduled on weekends when
viewership was typically limited. In late August, O’Malley gave a speech to the DNC,
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covered by national media outlets, in which he called the Party the “undemocratic party,”
arguing that the limited debate schedule was a “rigged process” the likes of which the
Party had “never attempted before” (Rucker, 2015). Sanders, who at that point had
largely limited his rhetorical opponents to vague antagonists (e.g. “establishment
politics”) and his critiques of Clinton to policy issues (e.g. her support for the Keystone
XL pipeline), took a more measured approach, explaining in a CNN interview:
“I have let the leadership of the Democrats know that I think this country
benefits, all people benefit, democracy benefits, when we have debates
and I want to see more of them” (Tapper, 2015).
His campaign also distributed a petition aimed at increasing the number of debates. The
petition stated, “I know that if Secretary Clinton wants more debates, we’ll get them,”
highlighting Clinton’s strong relationship with Party leadership and trying to increase
public pressure on her to also call for more debates (Frizell, 2015). Beyond these
remarks, Sanders and his campaign kept public critiques of the Democratic Party to a
minimum throughout the fall of 2015, focusing his critiques on Hillary Clinton’s policy
positions and calling for changing the “status quo.”
By contrast, many delegates explained how they became increasingly angry and
vocal about the Democratic Party and the mainstream media during that same time
period. To some degree, supporting Sanders in the 2016 primary arguably brought with it
from the beginning an inherent ideological critique of the Democratic Party’s policy
priorities. But for many supporters this critique grew over time to include accusations that
the Democratic Party’s leadership, as well as national media outlets, were stacking the
deck in support of a Hillary Clinton nomination and doing so in ways that went beyond
the typical “invisible primary.” On social media, activists used the hashtag #AllowDebate
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while sharing videos of O’Malley and Sanders supporters protesting outside the DNC
headquarters in Washington, DC, calling for the Party to expand the number of debates.
After the first debate in mid-October, communities in Sanders-focused Facebook groups,
as well as on Twitter and in Reddit communities (e.g. “r/Bernie Sanders” and
“r/CaliforniaforSanders”) lamented what they saw as bias from the “mainstream media,”
much of which had declared Clinton the winner of the debate. This anger and frustration
spilled out into broader internet communities, as many Sanders supporters overwhelmed
unscientific online polls and commented on the social media posts of people and
organizations in their online networks (Voorhees, 2015).
A few days later, Robinson Meyer (2015), writing in the Atlantic, coined the term
“Berniebro” to negatively depict a type of over-confident, mostly white, male Sanders
online supporter who dismissed those who had concerns about Sanders or planned to vote
for a different candidate. As the term took off in the public discourse, most delegates,
especially female delegates, saw coverage focused on “Berniebros” as the media both
spreading an unfair generalization about Sanders supporters as well as a distracting from
a campaign they felt was focused on important issues. While the Sanders campaign
would not address the issue of the “Berniebros” until early the following year,
indignation about the term was widespread amongst his supporters. As progressive online
media, including Jacobin and In These Times, published critiques of the term (e.g.
Bruenig, 2015), Sanders activists shared these in their Facebook groups. They also
continued to develop narratives that the mainstream media was dismissive of Sanders,
arguing that he received less coverage than Clinton and that the coverage he did receive
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was either dismissive or focused on trivial issues. Via these interactions, they began to
develop a collective identity that was not only about being progressive and supporting
Sanders, but also at odds with the Democratic Party and the national media. One delegate
explained:
It appeared to to me—to all of us, that the DNC was going to rig the whole
[thing] in favor of Hillary Clinton. And…it was so frustrating because no
one seemed interested in investigating what was so obvious to us
(Interview Quote).
Then, in December, the tenor of the Sanders campaign became much more aggressive.
First, it began making claims of media bias. Sanders tweeted out statistics from a report
about candidate media coverage that showed he received less media coverage than
Clinton and Trump. His campaign also circulated a petition to supporters demanding that
he “receive the same level of coverage on the nightly news as other leading candidates”
(Borchers, 2019). A few days later, mid-level Sanders campaign staffers were caught
exploiting a breach in the DNC’s voter database system that allowed them to view data
belonging to the Clinton campaign. Media coverage of the scandal was widespread. The
Party’s decision to then temporarily revoke the entire Sanders’ campaign’s access to their
own voter data—housed in DNC servers—was seen by supporters as a disproportionate
response that, had the roles been reversed, would never have been levied on the Clinton
campaign. When CNN commentator and former Obama David Axelrod tweeted that it
was a “harsh penalty” and that the DNC “was putting its finger on the scale”
(@davidaxelrod - David Axelrod, 2015), his comments were seized on by Sanders
supporters who immediately shared it with their social media networks. Jeff Weaver,
Sanders’ campaign manager, held a volatile press conference accusing the Democratic
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National Committee of “denying [the campaign] access to its own data” and “actively
attempting to undermine [their] campaign” (Jackson, 2015). The campaign then filed a
lawsuit against the DNC to regain access to the database. Several progressive groups,
including Democracy for America, chastized the DNC, accusing it of damaging the
party’s Democratic Process. Former U.S. Senator Jim Webb, a relatively conservative
Democrat who had briefly been a candidate for the nomination alongside Clinton and
Sanders, espoused his support for Sanders’ lawsuit on social media, tweeting that “The
DNC is nothing more than an arm for the Clinton campaign.”

Figure 2: Tweet by Senator Jim Webb in support of Bernie Sanders. Webb supported Sanders’ claims that
the DNC was putting its finger on the scale in support of Hillary Clinton.

According to interviews with campaign insiders, the dispute over the database
was a permanent turning point for the Sanders campaign, which had previously kept its
suspicions that the DNC favored Clinton behind closed doors. After the database
incident, they made a decision to publicly fight the “democratic establishment” and their
media allies head on, intensifying existing narratives of a rigged system bolstered by
Party insiders and their media allies (Dovere & Debenedetti, 2016). These narratives,
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which had been circulating in activist circles for months, motivated many of the delegates
interviewed for this dissertation. One activist explained:
Every time [the media] treated him like crap, which was often, I’d throw
in $50. And a lot of us did that. A lot of us dug deep and got all of our
change together and gave it to Bernie all along (Interview Quote).
Further, the discourse of Sanders and his supporters as David, to Clinton, the DNC, and
the “establishment’s” Goliath, would become one of the dominant ways in which these
activists saw themselves as they ran for Party delegate, and eventually engaged in public
acts of protest at the Democratic National Convention.
Developing and Practice Democratic Ideals
While the experiences of Sanders activists on the campaign were unique and exciting to
those participating in them, and the absence of formal campaign staffers afforded them
some flexibility in their activism, their campaign activity—knocking doors, phone
banking, registering voters—was in practice very similar to processes of activation and
engagement described in previous studies of U.S. political campaigns (Baldwin-Philippi,
2015; Nielsen, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014). As discussed earlier in this dissertation,
many supporters of movement-style candidates such as Howard Dean (2004) and Jesse
Jackson (1984 and 1988) also felt at odds with the more intractable elements of the
Democratic Party. However, as these would-be delegates moved on from the day-to-day
tasks of campaign work to the process of running for delegate and self-organizing their
delegation, they had experiences that were more flexible, democratic, and provided them
with a sense of their own political efficacy. These experiences in normative democratic
practice within the Democratic Party contributed to their collective identity as Sanders
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delegates and would inform the planning and execution of actions they chose to take at
the 2016 Democratic National Convention.
Running for Delegate: Practicing Democracy
In April 2016, the Sanders campaign, in concert with the California Democratic Party,
issued a call to its supporters seeking delegates to attend the Democratic National
Committee in Philadelphia in support of Bernie Sanders. For seasoned Party activists, this
call referred to a familiar process, but many first-time delegates at the time said they had
no idea what a delegate was or how the process of becoming one was to be carried out.
We “all kinda went, ‘huh?’ and we put out hats in the ring,” one delegate explained
(Interview Quote).
In presidential primaries, each candidate is awarded a specific number of
delegates from each state based on their performance in that state’s primary or caucus.
An individual has four paths with which to become one of these delegates to the national
convention. The first way is to be a Party leader or elected official, colloquially referred
to by the acroym “PLEO”. The second is to be appointed by a PLEO, each of which has
an allotted number of delegate seats to fill, as an at-large delegate. The third way is to be
a superdelegate, the controversial long-term Party insiders that are not bound to vote for a
specific candidate regardless of the outcome of the state’s primary. In California,
Superdelegates include members of the Democratic National Committee, members of the
U.S. Congress, and the Governor.
The fourth way for a person to become an elected delegate, which was the path
for almost all of the delegates interviewed for this dissertation, is to run to be a Party
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delegate for the state assembly district in which they live. In this process, facilitated by
the individual campaigns in collaboration with the state Party, separate elections are held
at the assembly district level for each presidential candidate, with would-be delegates
running against others who support their same candidate and voted on by Party members
in attendance. Because the voting pool for these contests includes any registered
Democrat in the assembly district who shows up to caucus, the process effectively
requires candidates to both convince those present to vote for them and more importantly,
to bring registered Democrats with them to support their candidacy for delegate. In
California in 2016, due to the late primary in June, candidates were actually running to be
potential, or conditional delegates, since the number of Sanders delegates from each
district would depends on his showing in each district in the primary election.
In advance of the caucuses, candidates experienced some of the more mundane
aspects of politics, writing and submitting progressive biographies to local Party websites
and creating Facebook pages with information about their backgrounds and political
priorities. Some formed or joined slates of candidates with other like-minded candidates
to help combine their individual supporters into more formidable voting blocs. In
practice, this served as a means of mutual endorsement. When a voter came to support
one candidate, they were handed a slate card, a flyer with names and photos of other
candidates who had joined together with their candidate, and encouraged to vote for the
full slate. In some cases, potential delegates who used social media to recruit support had
included their slate cards in their messaging. One Sanders supporter and long-term Party
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member who attended the 2008 convention as a delegate for then-Senator Barack Obama
described his experience running for Sanders delegate eight years later:
I lost and I think that’s partly because newcomers to the party did such an
excellent job organizing new people to participate. There are some
preexisting social networks that came in and sort of dominated because
again these are sort of popularity contests. You have to turn out enough
people to vote for you that know who you are. It really helps some of
those people that they have those big social networks. That was really the
only way they could have won. There were many other [experienced]
delegates that also lost when they tried to be Sanders delegates because of
that (Interview Quote).
While this activist was eventually able to leverage his local Party experience to attend the
2016 national convention as an at-large delegate for Sanders, his experience at the
caucuses highlights the organizing capacity of the new Sanders activists that had entered
Party politics. They were able to mobilize the networks they had formed over the
previous year to place themselves ahead of many Sanders supporters who had been
committed to progressive Party politics for years. Many of these new activists found they
were winning delegate positions in spite of being naïve to the process. One activist who
earned the most votes in her assembly district explained:
I didn’t know these games. I didn’t know what a slate was. It was kind
of—and I really have to say, my situation was absolutely not rare—It’s all
of my friends, all of my Bernie people, we’re all the same. You raise your
hand [when someone asks] “how many of you got involved with politics
before? Zero (Interview Quote).
To these newly elected delegates, being selected over long-standing Party members by
local progressives provided them with validation that their movement’s goals were salient
with other Democrats and gave them confidence and momentum heading into the
convention. It also gave them confidence in their own political efficacy. One delegate
whose first activist experience was protesting the Vietnam War explained:
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I was first place in my district which shocked me . . . . they announced the
vote and I just burst into tears because I knew, I really really really wanted
to do this. And I knew then that I was 100% going - even if he lost our
district. I am going. I was just literally overcome with gratitude (Interview
Quote).
After winning their assembly level elections during the contests held statewide on May 1,
these would-be delegates returned to the process of campaigning for the upcoming June 7
primary between Sanders and Hillary Clinton that would help decide which candidate
would be the Democratic Party’s presumptive nominee. During this time, delegates selforganized into a private Facebook group specifically for Sanders delegates, a process that
is revisited later in this chapter. At this point, most delegates knew very little about what
to expect from a convention and found little guidance from the Party or the Sanders
campaign which from their perspective expected delegates to be Party regulars who
already knew how to prepare for and participate in a national convention.
One first-time delegate explained:
And the Democratic Party [was not] ready for us. I think that’s what it
was. Just so old and entrenched. No need to change anything because no
one new was passing through. They didn’t explain things well. We had no
idea how things worked, even if you look on their website it’s just
awkward. We had—we couldn’t figure out the system, so we were asking
each other—and we had to self-organize. I don’t know how but somebody
started a Facebook group and added us all to it and that’s how I started
you know, communicating with all the delegates [in California] at once
(Interview Quote).
The Sanders staff member responsible for managing convention delegates had a different
perspective:
In places like California, they had these caucuses to elect potential
delegates. But who the actual delegates were was not determined until
after the California primary. A bunch of them decided that because they
had won one of the six potential spots in their district…they needed to
book all their shit. We had to tell them that whether or not they’re actually
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going depends on how well we do in the primary…and they need to be
focusing on knocking on doors and talking to voters and shit to help us
win more delegates. I think there’s some degree to which their lived
experience could be they weren’t getting anything from the campaign in
terms of guidance about how to get to convention, but I think the other
piece of it I would say is we were probably telling them not to worry about
it yet and they didn’t like that answer (Interview Quote).
During the three months prior to the convention this Facebook group became a mediated
lens through which the Sanders delegation would experience and play out the contentious
last months of the primary campaign and work to prepare for the convention. It was also
a site for them to collectively experience the conflicts between the democratic ideals and
practices they had been developing and the behavior they saw from Democratic Party
leaders. These mediated events all contributed to a collective delegate identity that, while
initially built around support for Senator Sanders, came to encompass distrust of the
Democratic Party, contempt for the media, and a desire to use their collective voice to
call out political elites for what they viewed as undemocratic processes.
Democratic Ideals Meet Party Politics
After the Sanders delegation was elected, they were excited about their new roles as
advocates for Sanders beyond their roles on the campaign. One delegate described the
earliest conversations in the newly formed delegation Facebook group:
How are we going to talk to the Hillary people and really try to open their
eyes about Bernie Sanders because that’s what our job is. In effect, we are
supposed to be lobbying for him. That’s what we thought our jobs were as
delegates. We need to start getting active and communicating with
[superdelegates.] Maybe have meetings with them…where we could have
these open conversations about our candidate. We thought…and we were
completely fucking naive, that this was a process. Like a democratic
process. . . . How should [we] present ourselves? Do we not want to be
like, crazy left-wing socialist types that we may or may not have been?
How should we dress and what should we avoid saying, you know that
kind of thing, just discussions like that (Interview Quote).
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But this vision of intra-party deliberation over candidates and issues did not last long as
the ideals they had developed and practiced while becoming delegates would soon be
challenged by what they perceived as unfair Party practices and rigged political and
media systems. This would lead them to see their collective voice as unfairly suppressed
within the broader Democratic Party electorate.
Mediated Events Challenging Democratic Ideals
In the months prior to the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, several
political events became formative focal points for California Sanders supporters on their
Facebook groups. First, the Nevada State Democratic Convention on May 18th turned
into a 16-hour, raucous event in which Sanders supporters accused Clinton supporters
inside the Party of utilizing inaccurate “voice votes” to steamroll Sanders supporters over
rules that allowed Clinton to secure extra delegates to the Democratic National
Convention. As the event erupted into physical chaos and Sanders supporters rushed the
stage, YouTube videos went viral on social media and were picked up by traditional
media, with several outlets reporting that the event had turned violent and chairs were
thrown. Democratic National Committee Chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz appeared on
MSNBC decrying the behavior of the Sanders supporters at the convention and
demanding a condemnation of the behavior by Sanders himself. As additional videos and
photos emerged online that indicated some of these reports may have been exagerrated,
Sanders supporters shared these media via Youtube, Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter.
Sanders and his campaign made similar statements in the days that followed. In a
statement, Sanders called the claims that his supporters were prone to violence was
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“nonsense,” citing his numerous campaign rallies that had “zero reports of violence”
(Taylor, 2016). He accused Party leaders of “us[ing] their power to prevent a fair and
transparent process from taking place.” He also said that:
If the Democratic Party is to be succesful in November, it is imperative
that all state parties treat our campaign supporters with fairness and
respect that they have earned.
This statement effectively implied that, at that moment, the Party was not treating his
supporters with fairness or respect. In combination, these rhetorical statements placed his
campaign, as well as his supporters, further at odds with the Democratic Party. Online,
Sanders activists fumed collectively that mainstream media outlets and the Democratic
Party leadership that had been so quick to sensationalize the event took no steps to either
correct the record or more importantly, to respond to what they saw as undemocratic
practices at an official Party meeting that had real electoral consequences. This
experience further reinforced their feelings that the Party was an opponent of their
movement, that they would have to defend against as delegates. One delegate described
the tenor of conversation in the delegate Facebook groups at that time:
It was a forum for what was going on in the campaign. [People said things
like] What did they do to Bernie now? The media is quashing him again as
usual. Hillary said this. I can’t believe that. All that kind of stuff and then
a little bit of ‘What’s gonna happen in Philadelphia?’ (Interview Quote).
Online conversations like this, in which the delegates began to talk about the Party and
the media as the opposition would grow in number. A few weeks later, on the day before
the California primary, the Associate Press declared Clinton the presumptive presidential
nominee of the Democratic Party after surveys of superdelegates indicated that Clinton
had exceeded the threshold number of delegates necessary for the nomination. Other
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networks quickly followed suit and declared Clinton the presumptive nominee. Sanders
supporters nationwide called foul, arguing that the media had put its finger on the
electoral scale and decreased turnout in California and five other states holding primaries
the next day, thus preventing Sanders from achieving the minimum virtual tie in the
delegate count that they believed would have allowed him to contest the outcome of the
convention on electability grounds. The delegates in California saw this move by the
mainstream media as another example of a system rigged against Sanders and “the
movement” more broadly. Months-old YouTube videos immediately circulated amongst
the delegates that showed chair Wasserman-Schultz and other staffers at the Democratic
National Committee telling news anchors and pundits that delegate counts that included
superdelegate pledges in advance of the convention were inaccurate representations of
the state of the Party’s nomination process. The next day, Clinton won the California,
New Jersey and New Mexico primaries and claimed the nomination without
superdelegates, but the way the primary process played out in California left Sanders
delegates increasingly critical of the media and the Party. For them, Clinton’s primary
win in California was illegitimate—the result of turnout that had been suppressed by the
media’s improper call of the election for Hillary Clinton.
Despite a nationwide rush by left-leaning organizations that had supported
Sanders, such as the Communication Workers of America and MoveOn.org, to endorse
and rally around Clinton as the presumptive nominee, Sanders delegates in California,
fueled by their candidate’s decision to stay in the race, continued to hold out hope that
something would happen to create an opening for Senator Sanders to contest the
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nomination. The state’s slow post-election process of counting 2.4 million provisional
and mail-in ballots (Myers, 2016) fueled theories that Sanders had performed better in the
election than had been reported in initial vote tallies. In the void left by the busy primary,
delegates began to discuss online the systemic issues with the Democratic Party and the
political system that they felt had handed Clinton the nomination. These included: the
Party-created debate schedule in which events were held on Saturday nights and holiday
weekends to ostensibly constrain viewership and favor a household name like Clinton; a
consensus of public support by Party elites and elected officials for Clinton in the earliest
days of the election cycle; the influence of corporate money and SuperPACs; and a media
system they saw as both unsupportive in its reporting on Sanders and complicit in
suppressing voter turnout via acts like the superdelegate announcement described above.
One delegate explained how social media allowed them to build community while
countering narratives that appeared in mainstream media:
[Facebook provided] a lot of camaraderie and understanding of where we
were all coming from. Having these shared experiences. And the media.
Like the LA Times. We could say like, look what the LA Times wrote this
is not true. We were able to be—we became our own media (Interview
Quote).
The overwhelming support Clinton had from the Party establishment since the beginning
of the campaign cycle contributed to the outsider status that Sanders delegates felt in
advance of the convention. One delegate called the superdelegates “bought and paid for,”
referring to Clinton’s fundraising support for down-ballot candidates, many of whom
were superdelegates. Much of this collective animosity played out in the delegation’s
Facebook groups as they collectively experienced and analyzed what for them was the
exact “rigged system” that Sanders had rallied against throughout the campaign. While
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this feeling was shared by many Sanders supporters nationwide, some delegates felt it
was their duty to leverage their role as delegates to contest these injustices. Figuring out
how to do that was a process they began as they came together for the first time with one
another, and with Clinton delegates, at the Party’s statewide delegation meeting.
Rehearsing for the Democratic National Convention
A month after the primary, on June 19th, the Clinton and Sanders delegations attended
the California State Delegation Meeting. One Sanders delegate referred to the event as
“our Nevada,” referencing the controversial Nevada Delegation Meeting described
above. This was the first time the delegates had met in person and the first experience
they had with the Party bureaucracy that was not mediated by the television or the
campaign. It also coincided with a meeting of the state Party’s executive board.
Throughout the event, the presupposition by speakers, ready to coalesce around a
nominee, that Clinton had captured the nomination was met by outcries of “there’s no
nominee yet!” from Sanders delegates. The fact that Sanders had not yet conceded, and
would not do so for another month, emboldened his delegates. At Party events the night
before, RL Miller, a Sanders supporter, long-standing Party assembly delegate, and chair
of the state Party’s environmental caucus, had tried unsuccessfully to quell the impetus of
her fellow Sanders supporters to keep fighting. “I’m a supporter of Bernie Sanders, but
I’m also a realist,” “she implored.” (Mehta, 2016). At the delegation meeting, John
Burton, chair of the state Party, reflected to Sanders delegates about his own experience
supporting McCarthy in the 1968 primary, and the regret he and others felt for not
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supporting the eventual nominee, Hubert Humphrey, who lost to Republican Richard
Nixon in the general election.
Though the agenda of this meeting had little potential for controversy on the level
that Sanders supporters had seen in Nevada, delegates nevertheless had a knee-jerk
reaction as those leading the meeting began to conduct the business of ratifying at-large
delegates using the same “voice vote” procedures that they knew had been used for
controversial votes in Nevada. One Sanders delegate with experience in parliamentary
procedures raised a point of order resulting in the chair asking the assembly to indicate
both “ayes” and “nays” for each order of business, rather than only the “ayes.” The last
vote of the day was to elect California Governor Jerry Brown, who had endorsed Clinton
a few weeks earlier, as chair of the state’s delegation to the national convention. As the
chair asked for the vote, “nays” rang out through the auditorium, forcing a count of
individual ayes and nays. Though Brown prevailed in the vote, the Sanders delegation
felt a sense of satisfaction that they had forced the Party to do things by the book. At this
point, the delegates began to act as the opposition to problems they observed in the
Democratic Party rather than solely as advocates for the nomination of Bernie Sanders.
One Sanders delegate and lifelong Democrat described her interaction with a Clinton
delegate who watched her vote against Jerry Brown:
The woman behind me goes, ‘How can you do that? Even Bernie thinks
that’s acceptable. What are you guys doing?’ And I told her ‘Well
Bernie’s from Vermont I’m from California. [Brown’s] my governor. I
don’t want him at the head of my party because I’m mad at him because of
fracking. I have an opinion.’ But you’re not allowed to have that in the
Democratic Party anymore (Interview Quote).
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This clash over decorum and processes between Clinton and Sanders delegates
foreshadowed the experiences that the Sanders delegates would soon have at the
convention in Philadelphia. Further, the dissonance Sanders delegates felt between their
own ideals and how they viewed the Party’s treatment of Sanders would inform the
actions they chose to take at the convention, actions they would take in spite of appeals
for civility made to them by Sanders and his campaign staff. As the delegates planned for
the convention, Sanders became less of a candidate to them, in that they knew his
chances of being nominated were very slim. Instead, continued support for Senator
Sanders became an act of protest by delegates against the Party and, by extension, a
vehicle for bringing attention to the issues they had with the Party and with Clinton.
Logistics as Identity Formation
By the time California’s Sanders delegates were planning for the convention, they knew
in the back of their minds that a massive movement of superdelegates away from Clinton
was extremely unlikely and as such Sanders had little chance of getting the nomination.
One delegate explained, “If we could get Bernie elected by flipping superdelegates sure,
that was in theory. We all understood that that was not going to happen” (Interview
Quote). And yet, as this section shows, Sanders delegates were extremely motivated and
driven to get to the national convention despite extremely high financial costs and a very
low chance of nominating Senator Sanders. When Sanders conceded the race and
endorsed Clinton two weeks before the convention, it did little to change their plans. To
them, Sanders had no choice politically but to endorse Clinton. If anything, the forced
endorsement was just another sign of what was wrong with the Party and the system.
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Many pointed to the chilly awkwardness between the two candidates at the first ClintonSanders endorsement rally as proof Sanders had been cajoled into support for Clinton.
This narrative, according to a Senior Sanders staffer familiar with the delegations, was
one that frustrated Sanders and his campaign staff. He explained:
A lot of delegates seemed to have this viewpoint that when Bernie said
’our goal is to help the nominee win and defeat Donald Trump that there’s
someone sitting behind him with a gun when he’s saying it and he doesn’t
actually want that. . . . He definitely wanted Hillary to win (Interview
Quote).
Continuing to support Sanders served three main purposes for the delegates: to bring
public attention to key issues related to trade, the environment, and U.S. military
participation in ongoing foreign wars, to highlight what they saw as the unfair practices
of the Democratic Party and the political system, and to connect and network in-person
with members of the movement nationwide. One delegate explained:
California was a very, very active and pre-organized group of delegates.
And partly that’s I think because we were at the end of the primary season,
and we were watching in horror as things went. And we went. Hey…we
need to get our act together (Interview Quote).
Beyond discussing issues of politics and ideology, the California Sanders delegation
spent much of the month before the convention trying to figure out how to get to
Philadelphia and where to stay. They had long-since realized that their lack of both
organization and information about the logistics of the trip to Philadelphia and their role
as delegates was not going to be remedied by the Democratic Party or the Sanders
campaign. In an interview, a Sanders campaign Director who oversaw delegate processes
admitted that the staff member reponsible for communicating with delegates in advance
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of the 2016 was “flaky” and “probably didn’t get a hold of a lot of people” (Interview
Quote).
At the state delegation meeting they had received a single-page flyer with basic
information about the official state delegation hotel in Philadelphia and about
complimentary shuttles between the hotel and the Wells Fargo Center, where the large,
evening convention was to be held. A Sanders staff member was assigned to the
California delegation, but most delegates reported no contact with him. Those who
reported speaking to him only remembered that he emphasized the importance of staying
at the official delegation hotel at its $700 a night room rate, and otherwise provided little
information beyond that which was available on the flyer.
The high cost of the trip to Philadelphia—the California Democratic Party told
delegates to budget $3250 for the trip—was a startling surprise for the Sanders delegation
who saw this as another institutional barrier to activist participation. Many delegates
created pages on GoFundMe, an online “crowdfunding” platform used by individuals,
charities, and fledgling businesses to raise money via small donations. The delegates
modeled their pages after one-another, highlighting their reasons for supporting Senator
Sanders, the work they did on his campaign, and their goal of spreading his message or
building “the movement” at the convention. One delegate concluded his page by stating
that he wanted to “carry [Bernie’s] message to the Democratic National Convention…in
order to be able to reach out to more Democrats in the interest of our nation’s future.”
Another wrote that she needed the financial support in order to “put in our 18 to 20-hour
days of fighting for progressive values.” None of these pages referenced Hillary Clinton
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or Donald Trump. They raised money from their friends and family, their extended social
networks, and from Sanders supporters they had never met. Delegates who could afford
to do so donated money to help their co-delegates get to Philadelphia. Many delegates,
after reaching their own goals, shared the pages of other delegates with their own
networks to help them raise funds to attend. Using the Facebook group, delegates made
plans to split single hotel rooms with two or three other delegates, many of whom were
people they had never met in person. In the end, the campaign did cover portions of many
delegates’ hotel bills directly, though some delegates did not realize this until they went
to check out of the hotel and found their bills lower than expected. The comradery and
collaborative sense of purpose present as delegates dealt with the logistics of convention
travel continued as the delegation worked to organize political actions for the convention.
A few weeks before the convention, Sanders’ campaign staff became concerned
that some of their delegations were going to be a problem on the convention floor and
attempted to put some structures in place to mitigate such behavior. The Director of
Delegates explained:
We had enough context from state party conventions in places like
Colorado and Nevada to know that there were going to be issues. Which is
why we tried to have a whip system in place to disseminate information
(Interview Quote).
The Sanders campaign notified its California delegation that it had selected several
members of the delegation to serve as “whips” for the state delegation, in order to help
the delegates with logistics in Philadelphia and on the convention floor. For the roles,
campaign staff had identified delegates who had experience in Party politics and
conventions who could be of help to more inexperienced delegates. When these names
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were floated in the delegate Facebook group, they were immediately rejected by the
delegation who saw those individuals as too focused on their own political careers to
properly represent the delegation. Instead, the delegates self-organized themselves into
groups based on regions—Northern California, Central California, and Southern
California—with each region electing its own leadership and whips. In theory, these
whips, which the delegation decided to call organizers, could help the delegation get
answers to logistical questions in advance of the convention, but the delegation’s
rejection of the campaign-assigned whips frustrated Sanders’ staff and created a
disconnect between the delegation and the campaign. The Director of Delegates for the
Sanders campaign said:
In California they pretended like the campaign didn’t exist. Which led to a
large number of problems at the convention. There were 5-10 states [in
2016 and 2020] that appointed their own whips, and we were like that’s
fine but we aren’t going to give information to anyone but the whips that
we appointed because we wanted people that were going to be responsible
(Interview Quote).
Recognizing that most delegates had no idea what to expect from the convention, one
organizer collaborated with a delegate who had been to several past conventions to create
a “Convention How-To” video for the delegation. It featured the two sitting next to each
other in chairs with the organizer asking the experienced delegate basic questions about
the convention. The video was posted to a private YouTube channel and distributed via
the delegation Facebook group. All of these organizing practices emerged on their own
with no interaction from the Sanders campaign or the Party.
During the weeks immediately prior to the Democratic National Convention in
Philadelphia, the California Sanders delegation discussed in its statewide delegation
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Facebook group the many potential actions they could take during the four day-long
event. The consensus amongst the delegation was that, beyond support for Sanders, they
would carry out modest protests against the use of military action abroad, the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), and controversial practices impacting the environment, such as
fracking. These were all seen as problem areas for Clinton, who was on the record with
support for fracking and military actions abroad. During the campaign, Clinton claimed
to oppose the TPP, but no one in the Sanders delegation believed her, especially after
Clinton loyalists on the DNC platform committee vetoed the addition of anti-TPP
language to the Party platform in the days preceding the convention.
While the main Facebook group continued to be the primary site for interaction
between the state’s delegation, other separate online groups emerged, including smaller
subgroups of the state delegation and a massive group called for all Sanders delegates
nationwide that one California delegate described as “completely unwieldy.” Another
group emerged when delegates, interacting in the national Facebook group, recognized a
shared interest in protest and civil disobedience, and formed a subgroup. Members of this
group referred to it as the “Coalition of 57,” after the number of states, territories, and
abroad Party organizations represented by the Democratic National Committee. These
members established a private Facebook Group for communicating with one another in
advance of and during the convention. Other small groups spun off to carry out specific
actions that were raised in the national group, ranging from creating anti-TPP signs that
would match across delegations, to designing and ordering neon green “Bernie” shirts to
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wear in protest during Clinton’s acceptance speech on Thursday night as a physical
representation of the lack of unity between the delegation and others at the convention.
Coming into the convention, the delegates were dealing with the logistics of the
convention independent of help from the campaign or Party and planning modest protest
activities for the convention at odds with the wishes of the Clinton campaign and the
DNC. The Sanders campaign also made attempts to discourage protest actions at the
convention, but one staff member admitted that “we probably had a greater tolerance in
2016 for some amount of like, letting the air out of the balloon [on the floor] than the
Clinton campaign and the people putting on the convention had.” For many California
delegates, supporting Sanders at the convention was a way to use their collective voice to
express publicly their dissatisfaction with Clinton and the DNC. The Director of
Delegates for the Sanders campaign explained the dissonance between the more raucous
delegations and those who were more experienced in Party politics:
It feels like before Bernie 2016 [delegates] always understood that they
are there as appointees and representatives of the campaign. I think we had
a lot of delegates in 2016 who viewed their role as ’I’m here to represent
the people who picked me to be here and if we don’t like what the
campaign is telling us then we’re going to default to doing what they’re
saying, not what the campaign is saying (Interview Quote).
In that sense, the collective identity the delegation had negotiated over the course of the
campaign had in some ways transcended support for Sanders and had become about
larger issues of representation, fairness, and democracy. As the delegates carried out their
plans in the context of a modern political convention, they selectively used technology,
combined with in-person meetings and word-of-mouth messaging, to enable and
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encourage participation in acts of citizenship in the context of a highly choreographed
media event.
Acts at the 2016 Convention
Coming into the convention, the California Sanders delegation had planned several
actions protesting core issues related to the environment (fracking), international affairs
(military conflicts abroad), and trade (the trans-pacific partnership, or TPP). They were
frustrated by the Party’s attempt at what they saw as “manufactured unity” (Interview
Quote). This section shows how the California Sanders delegation, sometimes in concert
with delegations from other states, carried out disruptive acts of citizenship that were
grounded in concerns about process, democratic ideals, and alienation from the political
system. It also shows how, despite planning and consensus around what acts of protest to
carry out or not carry out, events on the ground led to the almost unanimous adoption by
the delegation of tactics like booing, despite ruling those out in advance.
Antiparty Solidarity Outside the 2016 Convention
Three days before the convention, on July 22, two events took place that drastically
increased both the delegate’s motivation and feelings of justification for protesting the
Democratic Party. First, the selection by Clinton of Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia as the
Vice-Presidential nominee, who Sanders supporters saw as having almost identical policy
positions to Clinton. One delegate described Kaine as “completely off with all of the
values that we were focusing on including the [Trans-Pacific Partnership].” The Sanders
delegation felt that, given the constant rhetoric from the Party about Clinton-Sanders
unity and the fact that Sanders delegates made up 46% of the total elected delegates
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nationwide, their ideology, or at minimum their views around a few core issues, should
have been nodded to in Clinton’s pick for vice president. That same day, WikiLeaks
released email threads between Democratic National Committee operatives, including
Wasserman-Schultz, that supported Sanders’ long-standing accusations that the Party
preferred Clinton to Sanders and did not behave neutrally throughout the primary. For
Sanders delegates, these emails gave credence to the fears and theories about the Party
that they had been discussing in the previous months.
Most delegates arrived in Philadelphia two days later, on Sunday July 24, the day
before the convention started. By then, Downtown Philadelphia had largely been
transformed into a multi-block convention area. On Chestnut Street, cable network
MSNBC had setup a giant stage on which hosts, including Rachel Maddow and Chuck
Todd, were conducting interviews. Screens on both sides of the stage displayed a feed of
the station’s live broadcast. That same day, thousands of Sanders supporters marched
down Broad Street, the main artery leading from Center City Philadelphia to Wells Fargo
Arena, where the convention was to be held. Chanting slogans such as “Hell no, DNC,
we won’t vote for Hillary,” they carried props ranging from a giant paper-mache Bernie
to signs depicting upside-down Democratic Donkeys. The parade was led by a large
banner that said, “Help End Establishment Politics, Vote No on Hillary.”
By that afternoon, DNC Chair Debbie Wasserman-Schultz announced that she
would resign over the documents released by Wikileaks days earlier. At the MSNBC
stage in Old City, Sanders supporters cheered as they watched on the massive screens as
Sanders discussed the resignation with MSNBC reporters. It was in this environment of
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distrust and resentment that the California Sanders delegation would enter the national
convention the following day.

Figure 3: Bernie Sanders speaks about the DNC Leaks and party chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz. His
interview was broadcast at the MSNBC Stage at the 2016 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia.

Inside the 2016 Convention: A Voice for Sanders Supporters Outside the
Convention and Nationwide
California’s delegates at the convention organized their activities both in-person and via a
variety of media. Most used the Facebook application on their smartphones to
communicate with the delegation, but others had joined a national campaign channel
using Slack, a real-time group messaging application popular with software companies
and non-profits. Each morning, they attended delegation breakfasts at their hotel like the
one described earlier in this paper. As with the convention itself, delegates were offended
by the presumption about Clinton’s nomination assumed by speakers and Clinton
delegates at the first breakfast. Each day after the breakfasts, activists from the California
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Sanders delegation met separately to discuss the previous day and to discuss and debate
any actions they planned to take at the convention that night. A controversial topic among
the delegates was about whether to walk out during Clinton’s acceptance speech or not.
In the end, the delegation decided not to protest Clinton’s speech, though they did carry
out other actions. The Coalition of 57 also met several times during the convention.
Protesting Policy and Process
Members of the California Sanders delegation planned and executed a variety of planned
actions at the 2016 Democratic National Convention. Some of these were actions planned
around specific moments in the convention and others were spontaneous reactions to
issues of process and to perceived slights to Sanders or his delegation by the Party. On
the first afternoon of the convention, Congresswoman Marcia Fudge, chair of the
convention, opened the convention with the statement, “I am honored to accept this gavel
as permanent chair of the Democratic National Convention. And I am excited to put
Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine in the White House” followed by several sentences of
campaign rhetoric about Clinton and Kaine. Sanders delegates from around the arena,
including California, booed in protest for several minutes, forcing Fudge to repeatedly
pause her speech.
While some of the Sanders delegates that booed the mention of Clinton likely did
so because they truly opposed her nomination, most of the Sanders delegates interviewed
for this dissertation said the boos were in response not to Clinton herself, but to her being
presumptuously referred to as the nominee in advance of the roll call vote necessary for
her to officially be nominated. None of these delegates thought Sanders was going to win
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the nomination, but it was important for them that the DNC go through the motions out of
respect for Sanders, for the delegates who had traveled there, for those who had voted for
him, and for the process itself. One delegate described how she and others around her
felt:
We [hadn’t] put Bernie’s name in nomination yet. Nobody’s in
nomination yet. This is the Democrats, right? And we have two
candidates. One of whom raised all that money and got 13 million voters
with no SuperPac and with no corporate money. This was people power.
And instead of being proud of that, they did everything they could to shut
up and get us out (Interview Quote).
She described how two delegates she was with were uncomfortable with this initial
booing, but by the second day heartily joined her in booing military-related speeches.
Similar acts of spontaneous protests, like the one described in the opening of this paper,
broke out at delegation breakfasts and on buses. Attempts were made by Sanders and his
staff to reel in the California delegation. Several delegates recalled getting an email from
Sanders asking delegates on the floor to refraining from booing. On Tuesday morning, at
the start of the second day of the convention, Sanders spoke to the California delegation
at their daily breakfast:
“It’s easy to boo. But it is harder to look your kids in the face who would
be living under a Donald Trump presidency . . . .The political revolution
accomplished more than any of us here could have dreamed. What the
political revolution means is that we keep going. There is no state that will
play a bigger role than California.”
Most delegates I spoke to were not dissuaded by Sanders’ appeals. “I’m sure he was
directed to send [the email]” one delegate posited. Several delegates gave press
interviews explaining their actions. One explained how the California delegation
“stepped up to push forward when Bernie had to step back.” Another said she was
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grateful to Sanders but felt it necessary to protest politicians saying things she disagreed
with. Talking about single payer health care, she said “we have to keep on pushing. We
have a lot of work to do to convince people of this.”
The delegates’ commitment to their role as the voice of protest inside the
convention during the evening was reinforced by their experiences outside the convention
during the day. Delegates took part in both anti-DNC and issue-based protests that were
held outside the convention hall and at other landmarks in Philadelphia. While issuebased protests are commonplace at national Party conventions (Sobieraj, 2011), the
Sanders delegates were in the unique position to bring that protest inside the convention.
Further, the Sanders delegates could draw a direct link between the issues and Sanders’
priorities. When the delegates would encounter members of other Sanders delegations
and say they were Sanders delegates from California, they would immediately get hugs
and “thank yous” for their role in starting actions that other delegations could participate
in.
Inside the convention, some delegates protested by waving paper “No Fracking”
and “No TPP” signs. On the third day of the convention, security guards began attempts
at confiscating the “non-approved” signs upon entry to the arena and threatening to eject
people who held up such signs. On future nights, delegates used construction paper to
create folding signs that fit in their pockets but expanded to full size. Some delegates also
put electrical tape over their mouths to signify that the Party has silenced them in some
way, such as by confiscating a sign. One of the simplest and most effective actions
coordinated on social media was chanting over speakers they saw as having questionable
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backgrounds. Leon Panetta, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, was repeatedly
interrupted by chants of “no more war” that initiated in the California delegation. The
next day, when the delegates began the same chant for another military speaker, the
Clinton delegation erupted with chants of U-S-A leading to a verbal competition to be
heard in the arena.
The largest, and most visible act carried out by the delegates was their
participation along with many other state delegations in a “walkout” of several hundred
delegates immediately following the roll call vote on the second night of the convention.
This event, though perceived as spontaneous by most delegates who took part in it, was
in fact organized by the “Coalition of 57” described above. In the case of the walkout,
they planned it as a small group and, due to concerns about being found out, only shared
it with delegates outside the coalition via word of mouth. Eventually, they did send a call
to action to all nationwide delegates on a Slack channel, but only moments before the
walkout was to begin. After delegates left the floor, the Coalition had wranglers in the
hallways directing people out of the arena complex and into the adjacent media tent, a
temporary complex created so that mainstream media outlets could work and hold events
near the arena. Delegates sat on the floor of the media tent in an effort to “occupy the
media tent” and garner media coverage. The next day, the Coalition sent out a press
release identifying themselves as the organizers of the walkout and bemoaning the “unity
façade” of the DNC’s relationship with Sanders.
On the last day, several hundred Sanders supporters from around the nation wore
neon green “Bernie” shirts that they had custom made for the event. Their goal was to
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visually depict the lack of unity between the Sanders and Clinton delegates. In the last
part of the evening, staff dimmed the main lights in advance of Clinton’s speech and
turned on black lights, causing the shirts to glow in a smattering of neon all over the
darkened convention floor. While this looked like one of the more coordinated visual
events crafted by Sanders delegates, several of those involved in its planning reported
that the “glow-in-the-dark” effect was just a pleasant side-effect of choosing such a bright
shirt.
The California Sanders delegation also carried out subtle acts of resistance
throughout their time at the convention that were not visible to the audience. Each night,
they reported facing increased animosity from arena staff who tried to split the Sanders
contingent up and Clinton delegates who threw water at them, took their seats, and ripped
their signs. As such, the act of continued participation in the convention was itself an act
of resistance. The delegation’s elected organizers mobilized to have delegates save the
seats of other delegates when they got up to use the restroom or visit the food buffet. The
continued need to defend their space on the floor converted any member of the delegation
who was initially hesitant about protesting into a boisterous participant in the actions the
delegation was taking.
Using traditional organizing, combined with technology, members of the
California Sanders delegation led or participated in various type of acts of citizenship
during their time at the Democratic National Convention. Their continued vocal support
for Bernie Sanders, despite his concession and endorsement of Clinton, was an act of
civil disobedience, in that it highlighted in a tangible way for the media and those inside
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the convention the unity that did not exist. It was also the most visible way to protest
against the DNC’s support for Clinton throughout the primary, which did not lend itself
to signs or chants. Continuing to support Sanders was their way of saying that they
believed her candidacy was illegitimate. The walkouts created a spectacle for the cameras
and provided a sense of catharsis for the delegates immediately following the roll call
vote and the permanence of Clinton’s nomination. They also highlighted specific
issues—opposing fracking, the TPP, and military use abroad—that they knew would not
otherwise have been part of the convention.
Post-Convention: A Post-Bernie future?
Following the 2016 convention, interviews reveal that, for many of these former
delegates, the political consciousness that was activated for them throughout the
convention process continued beyond that election cycle. As early as the morning after
the convention ended, while still in Philadelphia, delegates and other Sanders supporters
began to discuss the way forward for their “post-Bernie” (Interview Quote) movement.
These conversations continued after the November election, as many of the delegates
weighed the prospects of #DemExit or #DemEnter, the former being a denunciation of
and departure from the Democratic Party, and the latter being an active decision to stay in
the Democratic Party and try to change it. A delegate I spoke to who had been involved
in the Coalition of 57 explained:
“The majority of us stayed in the Democratic Party. Some left. We pushed
for people not to leave. There’s too many obstacles to bringing a third
party and being viable. Right now, we’re trying to take over the California
Democratic Party.”
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Consistent with the above statement, a minority of the delegates interviewed for this
dissertation completely left the Party or fully disengaged from it. One delegate who had
been a Democrat for decades did say she would do [her] part to keep progressive but will
never be part of the Party directly again” (Interview Quote). Another delegate said his
experience at the convention “put to bed any hope I had of doing something just in the
Democratic Party.” Within six months, both of these delegates joined a newly formed
national organization “Draft Bernie for a People’s Party,” created by a former Sanders
staffer with the aim of creating a new third party led by Bernie Sanders. The organization
re-branded itself “Movement for a People’s Party” after Sanders declined to be involved.
It continues to hold events with the goal of “a new major people’s party free of corporate
money and influence” (Movement for a People’s Party, 2021).
Most delegates interviewed for this dissertation chose #DemEnter, committing to
activism aimed at making the Party more internally democratic and pushing it to the left.
For them, the former was the means to the latter. One delegate called for “making the
party responsive to the people, the working class, and minorities in a way that goes
beyond platitudes and staged media presentations” (The Press Enterprise, 2016). Dozens
of Facebook groups changed their names and purpose from narrowly focusing on the
Sanders campaign to continuing Sanders’ “political revolution” beyond 2016. For
example, the Facebook group “Bernie 2016 - Highland Park” changed its name to
“Berniecrats of America - Highland Park.” The usage of “Berniecrat” amongst activists,
which had previously been narrowly focused on support for Sanders, expanded as
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activists started using it to collectively organize toward bringing about change within the
Democratic Party by supporting progressive Democrats who shared Sanders’ priorities.
In January 2017, many former delegates in California turned the #DemEnter
discussion into action, running in local Party elections to become assembly delegates to
the California State Democratic Party. The assembly delegate elections, and other
political activities carried out by former 2016 delegates are discussed at length in the next
chapter. What many of the former delegates did not expect in early 2017 was that they
would have the opportunity to run for Sanders delegate again three years later, as Sanders
ultimately entered the 2020 presidential race and subsequently won the California
primary, providing his campaign with an even larger statewide delegation than the one he
garnered in 2016.
Activation and Organizing for the 2020 Convention
In August 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the DNC held its first virtual
national convention. Though the convention was based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
concerns about spreading the Covid-19 virus meant that only a skeleton crew of
campaign staff, logistics personnel, and Party leaders were actually in Milwaukee. For
years, scholars and pundits had been critiquing modern political conventions as “scripted
infomercials” (Karabell, 1998, p. 3). In 2020, this was more true than ever, as the
delegates, effectively the only remaining source of potential disruption inside modern
conventions, had been almost completely removed from the Party’s public presentation.
As such, compared to the raucous convention of 2016, the 2020 convention was
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meticulously planned and executed by the DNC and the Biden campaign, working in
concert with the Sanders campaign.
The virtual format drastically narrowed, if not eliminated, the capacity for the
type of public protest actions that Sanders delegates had engaged in from the floor of the
2016 convention. But even absent these changes brought about by the pandemic, the
disruptive potential of the delegation from California, as well as that of other delegations,
was reduced in 2020, as many of the factors that led delegates to act in 2016 had been
minimized. This next section discusses how differences in the primary campaign and preconvention period brought about a mediated experience for delegates that was less
contentious and also more carefully controlled by the Party and the Sanders campaign.
Combined with a modified delegate selection procedure and a substantial push for
decorum from the Sanders campaign, these factors contributed to a 2020 delegation
whose collective identity, while ideologically similar, lacked the visceral anger toward
the Party that characterized the 2016 delegation. Further, the broader Democratic
electorate, which had been divided in 2016, was extremely united in its desire to get rid
of Donald Trump (Seitz-wald, 2019). Together with the virtual convention format, these
factors limited the motivation among delegates, as well as the opportunity, to carry out
protest actions around the 2020 Democratic National Convention. It also contributed to
their decision to engage in targeted activism aimed at Party leaders in the months leading
up to the convention.
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Activation
Compared to the activists who eventually formed the 2016 Sanders delegation, most of
the activists who formed the 2020 delegation had more experience in Party politics. Some
were long-standing progressive Party activists who had attended conventions in the past.
Others had entered Democratic Party politics as a response to the election of Donald
Trump. One delegate explained how she “sat and watched in horror as Donald Trump got
elected” and then subsequently got involved in Party politics (Interview Quote). Even
those who had been politically activated by Sanders’ first presidential campaign had now
been active for four years. Many had chosen to enter the Party at the state or local level
and, as discussed at length in the next chapter, had been working to push the Party to the
left. As such, the activists who would eventually compete to be 2020 delegates had
personal experience with the political potential, as well as the limitations, of both
disruptive protest activity and incremental political activity.
In some areas of the state, fissures had also arisen between Sanders activists
working within the Party, including on local and statewide campaigns, and an extremely
vocal “#DemExit” contingent that was very active on social media. One activist
characterized certain members of this latter group as “conspiracy theory live-streamers”
due to their constant posting of extreme, far-fetched, anti-establishment content. These
conflicts fractured some of the online communities that had formed during the 2016
Sanders campaign. The disagreements also forced activists working within the Party to
articulate and defend their decision to do so. As a result, activists who were newly
activated during the 2020 campaign entered a network of experienced Sanders supporters
that had already negotiated their own relationship to the Democratic Party.
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The 2020 delegate experience
The involvement of the Sanders campaign was also more substantial in 2016, especially
early in the ‘invisible primary’ period. As discussed above, activists who become
delegates are typically heavily involved with the campaign. The 2016 campaign had been
narrowly focused on early states, leaving room for early supporters in California to selforganize as they saw fit. By contrast, the 2020 Sanders campaign was on the ground early
and with specific campaign strategies. As a result, the 2020 delegates experienced less of
an organic, democratic experience of politics and more “controlled interactivity”
(Stromer-Galley, 2014, p. 2) in their campaign work, linking some of their political selfefficacy to their success in carrying out specific campaign goals. But beyond differences
in campaign work, the 2020 battle for the Democratic nomination was less contentious
and settled months earlier than in 2016. Further, the post-primary period was
overshadowed by the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2016, much of the collective delegate
experience took place in the post-primary period as delegates organized for the
convention and planned protests. Instead, the same period in 2020 was overwhelmed by
the lockdowns brought on by Covid-19, a shared disgust with the Trump administration’s
handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, and a strong push by Party leaders and politicians,
including Sanders, for unity heading into the general election. Whereas 2016 Sanders
delegates had a shared, mediated experience of what they saw as blatant injustices on the
part of the Clinton campaign, the DNC, and the media, the experience of 2020 delegates
lacked the same controversy and by extension, failed to produce the same solidarity built
around shared grievances associated with the Democratic Party.
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A less controversial nominations battle
The 2020 Democratic primary was less contentious for a variety of reasons. At a
structural level, the unusually large number of candidates—-more than 20 at one point—
muddied the progressives versus “the establishment” dichotomy that was so prevalent in
2016. Further, many of Sanders’ priorities—marijuana legalization, radical
environmental protections, $15 minimum wage—had since become more mainstream
among Democrats (Stein, 2016b). Progressive Party activists were split between Sanders
and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren, with some progressives blaming Sanders’
post-primary actions for Trump’s win in 2016 (Obeidallah, 2019). While major
progressive organizations had almost all supported Sanders in 2016, they were now split
between the two candidates (e.g. Working Families Party, 2019). Among the activists
who would eventually be the 2020 delegates, there was certainly a preference for Senator
Sanders, but also an acceptance by some that a Warren candidacy would also chart a
more progressive direction for the Party and the country.
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Figure 4: Twitter conversation between progressives about Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren.
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That said, as the race became more competitive and debates pitted Sanders against
Warren, as well as against more moderate candidates, discourses among these would-be
delegates became more complex.
Whereas Sanders delegates in 2016 could easily point to broad, ideological
differences between Sanders and the parallel antagonists of Hillary Clinton and the
Democratic Party “establishment”, the 2020 delegates had to critique and differentiate
Sanders from moderate candidates, the Democratic Party “establishment,” as well as
Warren. Because Warren’s call for “big structural change” aligned with many of Sanders’
goals, discussions about Warren were less about values than about either implementation
of policy toward shared values or about electability. Sanders delegates also found
themselves defending Warren from a media that many of them they still saw as aligned
with “corporate Democrats.” Beyond these differences in the makeup of the candidates,
the relatively unprovocative invisible primary and nomination contests, augmented by
deliberate procedural changes made by Party leaders, provided less fodder for antagonism
toward both the Party and the eventual candidate, former Vice President Joe Biden.
When Sanders entered the 2020 Democratic presidential primary it produced both
excitement and consternation among Democrats. His 2016 supporters were energized.
Many in California encouraged their networks, as a show of force, to donate to Sanders’
campaign immediately following his announcement. However, many moderate and longstanding Party activists feared that if Sanders were to lose the nomination, it would
reignite the intraparty conflicts of 2016 (e.g. Clift, 2019), while if he were to win the
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nomination, he would be uncompetitive in the general election against Donald Trump
(e.g. Martin, 2019; Merrilees, 2019). The former concern was validated by some specific
events early in the campaign. The first months of Sanders’ 2020 campaign involved both
a public fight with the Center for American Progress (Golshan, 2019), a prominent
Democratic Party think tank, and the hiring of communications staff known for their
scathing critiques of the Democratic Party and support for Jill Stein in the 2016 general
election (Chait, 2019). By October 2019, there were over 20 candidates in the race and
six debates had been held with no clear frontrunner emerging. News stories detailed
concern among Party leaders that a lengthy primary period was inevitable and would
inhibit the Party’s efforts in the general election (Linskey & Viser, 2019). For Party
leaders concerned with intraparty conflict, the wide-open field did have a silver lining: it
limited accusations from the left that insiders were exerting outsized influence over the
invisible primary to the benefit of their preferred candidates. Reports that formerpresident Barack Obama had repeatedly discouraged Biden from running (e.g. Thrush,
2019) likely further constrained the emergence of any narratives that Biden had received
on early support from Party leaders.
The primaries and caucuses themselves were also relatively uncontentious. The
Iowa Caucuses were mired by technical problems that embarrassed the Party and
produced delayed results (Fazzini, 2020), but in the end only the most ardent of
conspiracy theorists saw this as a scheme by Party insiders to reduce Sanders’
momentum. After nomination contests in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada had been
held, Sanders had almost twice as many delegates (42) as Joe Biden (23) and Pete
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Buttigieg (24). At this moment, there was the potential for conflict to emerge between
Sanders supporters and the Party. With the South Carolina primary approaching and
Super Tuesday on its heels, many well-known Democratic politicians opposed to a
Sanders candidacy engaged in public handwringing that Sanders was unelectable against
Donald Trump (e.g. S. Collins, 2020; Pengelly, 2020). Some were quoted in mainstream
media articles about how the Party could strategically rebuff Sanders in the context of
hypothetical contested conventions (e.g. Siders, 2020). Reports also emerged that
powerful Democratic donors were considering forming a “Stop Sanders” Super PAC
(Lerer & J., 2020). On social media, Sanders supporters, including many 2016
convention delegates, began warning that the DNC and “the Democratic elite” were
trying to rig the election. However, rapid changes in the state of the race meant that
neither the concerns of those Party insiders nor those of Sanders activists came to pass.
In the four days before the South Carolina primary, candidates Tom Steyer, Amy
Klobuchar, and Pete Buttigieg all dropped out of the race and endorsed Biden,
strengthening his position as the leading moderate candidate in South Carolina and
providing him with momentum heading into Super Tuesday three days later. While this
raised some complaints about collusion in communities of former delegates and Sanders
activists, the intensity of their criticisms did not rise to the level exhibited by Sanders
supporters in 2016. Further, Sanders’ showing in South Carolina was unexpectedly poor
(20% of voters) and could not be easily explained away by supporters of other candidates
coalescing around Biden. Buoyed by extraordinary support from voters in the black
community, Biden walloped Sanders in South Carolina, winning 39 delegates to Sanders’
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15. On Super Tuesday, Biden won 9 out of 14 states, winning 698 delegates to Sanders’
603 and taking the overall lead by 100 delegates. Between Biden’s surge, Sanders’ loss of
momentum, and a global pandemic bringing about lockdowns less than two weeks later,
Sanders lost 9 of the next 12 contests, winning only North Dakota, Democrats Abroad,
and the Northern Mariana Islands. He conceded the race and endorsed Joe Biden on April
9 after his loss in the Wisconsin primary two days earlier eliminated any potential
comeback that he and his supporters were hoping would emerge from the late Rust Belt
primaries. Compared to the drawn-out battle between Clinton and Sanders in 2016, the
results of the 2020 nominations battle left little doubt as to the winner. Party leaders had
also made extensive procedural changes to avoid accusations that they had influenced the
process.
A “hands-off” Democratic Party
In the years preceding the 2020 presidential primaries, Democratic Party leaders took
deliberate steps at the national, state, and local level to build trust, diffuse potential
tensions, and reduce even the appearance of a rigged system in advanced of the 2020
nomination contests. This was not an insignificant undertaking. When running for DNC
chair in early 2017, Tom Perez argued that he was the “turnaround artist” necessary to fix
the committee’s structural problems, heal divisions among Party factions, and restore
trust in the Party (Berman, 2017). After winning the race over Keith Ellison, the favorite
of Sanders’ 2016 supporters, he visited numerous state Party organizations in an attempt
to increase goodwill and promote Party unity. In California, his visit coincided with the
Party’s state convention at a time when Sanders supporters had just entered the state
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Party in droves after running the table on local assembly delegate elections across the
state. His speech was thus met with a chorus of boos from those activists, many of whom
had been Sanders’ 2016 delegates. One activist explained:
We [booed] because Perez is part of the establishment that keeps on coopting the progressive movement. The corporatists have an ally with Tom
Perez. We felt like it was important to come and voice our discontent
(Dimeo-Ediger, 2017).
A 2020 delegate for whom this was her first state party convention remarked that Perez
himself “seemed fine” but was frustrated that “Obama got involved to stop Ellison from
winning. Why couldn’t [the Party] just give that to us?” (Interview Quote) These
conflicts make clear the uphill battle Perez faced toward his goal of increasing unity and
trust among Party factions. To that end, the DNC took numerous steps in the two years
that followed as it prepared for the next presidential election.
In advance of the 2020 primaries, the DNC scheduled twelve sanctioned debates,
twice as many as the number initially scheduled in 2016. These debates were held at
convenient times and saw high viewership. The DNC also updated its nomination rules
based on recommendations from its “Unity Commission”, a group made up of former
Clinton and Sanders representatives that had been tasked at the 2016 convention with
“review/[ing] the entire nominating process and recommend[ing] changes. . . . with a
specific focus on ensuring the process is accessible, transparent and inclusive” (Webb &
Crowell, 2020). These changes included reducing the the total number of voting
superdelegates and limiting superdelegate voting to only those scenarios where no
candidate amassed a majority of delegates in advance of the convention. In addition to
appeasing Sanders supporters who followed these proceedings closely, this change also
129

removed from daily election coverage the constant discussion of uncommitted Party
insiders who had the power to overturn the collective will of primary voters. The Unity
Commission also encouraged state parties to loosen their rules around Party registration
deadlines to allow independents to register on or near election day. This reduced the swirl
of complaints, amplified on social media in 2016, from independent voters in other states
that had wanted to support Sanders in the primary but were prevented from doing so
because they had missed registration deadlines. In California, it led to a new law that
allowed No Party Preference (NPP) voters, who at the time made up 25.9 percent of the
electorate, to change their Party registration or request a crossover ballot as late as the
day of the primary contest (Lauer, 2020).
Despite these efforts, Sanders’ supporters, including many of his 2020 delegates,
continued to regard the DNC and Party leaders as “the establishment” that they were
fighting against. However, the DNC’s efforts to be clear and transparent meant that
activist discourses criticizing the DNC were broad and lacked the specific evidence of
wrongdoing that had gone viral within activist communities and motivated the 2016
delegates to engage in disruptive action at the convention. In addition to the DNC, local
Party leaders also took steps to reduce conflict between moderates and progressives. As
president of a Democratic Club in the San Fernando Valley explained:
“We’ve had a policy since 2016 where we don’t endorse in presidential
races because in 2016 our club had a debate—it wasn’t even an
endorsement it was just a debate—with a Hillary supporter vs a Bernie
supporter. One of the Hillary supporters who was our secretary actually
left the room, never to come back, with all of our club records from before
2016. So now we kind of try to avoid that. I try very hard to keep our eye
on the prize. . . . There can be a big split and traditionally how clubs
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fracture is rooted in these presidential primaries, so our club tries to stay
out of it.”
Other clubs either declined to endorse or raised their endorsement requirements such that
a larger percentage of members had to agree on a single candidate in order for the club to
endorse. Even absent such changes, achieving a simple majority of members was often a
difficult outcome in the context of the crowded field of candidates that existed in 2020.
Despite all of these efforts, some activists did complain about the last-minute
coalescing of candidates around Biden in advanced of the South Carolina Primary, as
media reports speculated that even former President Obama had played a behind-thescenes role in clearing other moderate candidates from the field (Schneider, 2020). One
delegate accused the DNC of “backroom broked deals to anoint one another.”

Figure 5: An anti-DNC Tweet by a 2016 Sanders delegate in response to the surge of support by Party
leaders for Joe Biden in advance of the 2020 South Carolina Democratic Primary.

At progressive Democratic Club and Our Revolution meetings leading up to the
California primary, activists implied that Warren was strategically staying in the race
longer in order to help Party leaders blunt Sanders’ momentum. However, discussions of
131

these efforts did not provoke the same aggrieved charges of a “rigged system” that had
been levied in 2016. Indeed, throughout the early primaries many of those same activists
similarly had been calling on Elizabeth Warren to drop out and clear the progressive field
for Bernie Sanders. Further, following Sanders’ concession there was a rapid strategic
pivot, sometimes reluctantly, in activist circles from discussions of nominating Sanders to
instead, electing Biden and subsequently pressuring his administration to pursue
progressive policies.
A “unifying” post-primary period
Following the primary, Sanders’ 2020 delegates also saw less intraparty conflict in the
period between the primaries and the convention than their predecessors in 2016 had
seen. This can likely be attributed to numerous factors, ranging from the absence of a
Wikileaks-style bombshell about Biden to the outsized impact of the Covid-19 pandemic
on all aspects of social and political life in the U.S. and worldwide. Even absent Covid19, the lack of post-primary conflict was bolstered by a collaborative effort by various
actors, including progressive organizations, DNC leadership, prominent elected officials,
as well as both the Biden and the Sanders campaigns, to promote unity across the
ideological divisions in the Democratic Party in order to defeat Donald Trump in the
general election. While 2016 saw similar efforts made in response to the disunity that
was on display both in advance of, and during the convention, such efforts in 2020 began
earlier and with more coordination.
The organizational progressive left certainly coalesced around Biden earlier and
more emphatically than they had around Clinton. For example, in 2016, MoveOn.org, the
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7-million-member online progressive organization endorsed Sanders in advance of the
primary and then, rather than emphatically supporting Hillary Clinton, ran a “united
against hate” campaign opposing Trump during the general election (Garofoli, 2020b).
By contrast, in 2020, MoveOn members did not reach the necessarily threshold to
endorse a candidate in the Democratic primary but did then endorse Biden in advance of
the general election (Stewart, 2020). Indivisible endorsed Joe Biden in the general
election (Indivisible, 2020a) even after their political action committee, Indivisible
Action, had ranked him 8th (the lowest in their ranking) in their primary scorecard
(Indivisible, 2019).
Leftist organizations such as Our Revolution, Justice Democrats, RootsAction,
and the Sunrise Movement aimed at achieving more comprehensive policy change—
Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, wealth taxes—that Biden simply did not
represent, did not formally endorse Biden, nor did they oppose him. Many had
committed, via a unity pledge released prior to the primaries, that, regardless of the
nominee, they would work together to defeat Trump following the Democratic primary
(Indivisible, 2020b). These organizations carefully threaded the needle of encouraging
electoral support for Biden while simultaneously developing and publicizing plans for
how they would lobby and pressure his administration beginning in January 2021 (e.g.
@justicedems - Justice Democrats, 2020). Independent progressive organizations that
emerged from the ranks of the 2020 Sanders campaign either focused directly on electing
Biden or on amassing Sanders delegates in order to influence the Party platform and rules
committee (Otterbein, 2020b).
133

Sanders, Biden, and their respective campaigns also worked together to avoid a
contentious post-primary period. In his concession speech on April 9, Sanders both
encouraged his supporters to continue amassing delegates in remaining nomination
contests so as “to exert significant influence over the Party platform and other
functions,”’ while also committing to working with Biden “to move our progressive ideas
forward” (Grullón Paz, 2020). Within weeks, Biden and Sanders announced that their
campaigns had formed six “unity task forces”—climate, criminal justice reform, the
economy, education, health care, and immigration—tasked with making
recommendations to the Party platform committee at the convention (Sprunt, 2020). In
July, Biden and Sanders released a 110-page report containing policy recommendations
from all six task forces. Describing the report, Sanders said:
“Though the end result is not what I or my supporters would have written
alone, the task forces have created a good policy blueprint that will move
this country in a much-needed progressive direction and substantially
improve the lives of working families throughout our country” (Bradner,
Saenz, Arlette, Mucha, Sarah, Sullivan, Kate, & Simon, 2020).
In effect, Sanders was telegraphing to his supporters that their concerns—their voices—
were being heard and acted on by Biden and the Democratic Party leadership via formal
channels. In a virtual conference call with his delegates following the report’s release, he
urged his delegates to “engage in coalition politics with the goal of defeating Trump,”
while working to “make sure that a Biden administration is the most progressive
administration in modern American history” (Otterbein, 2020a). This legitimation of
Biden’s nomination by Sanders, combined with near-universal support for Biden from the
organizational progressive left, likely helped reduce, though certainly did not eliminate,
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negative discourses about the Democratic Party and Joe Biden in advance of the 2020
national convention.
This difference was evident in the social media activity of the 2020 delegates.
Some delegates explicitly advocated for Biden. For example, Amar Shergill, a staunch
Sanders supporter and chair of the extremely pro-Sanders Progressive Caucus of the
California Democratic Party, followed Sanders’ concession and endorsement of Biden
with a tweet encouraging a “process of compromise” among Democrats. Karen Bernal,
the former chair of the Caucus who had helped lead anti-Clinton and anti-DNC protests
as a member of the 2016 Sanders delegation, held back public criticism of Joe Biden. In
fact, she barely acknowledged Joe Biden. She instead focused her social media activity
on advocating for a progressive vice-presidential nominee, opposing the Party platform
for excluding support for Medicare for All, and pushing for progressives to formally lead
the state’s delegation.
In California, many of the public unity activities discussed above actually
preceded the formal processes for electing convention delegates. Accordingly, these
activities likely influenced who among Sanders supporters chose to compete to be part of
the 2020 delegation. For Sanders’ most anti-establishment supporters, including some of
his 2016 delegates from California, both Biden and the Democratic Party represented
“the establishment” that Sanders had continued to rail against in his 2020 campaign
rhetoric. As such, Sanders’ embrace of Biden and goodwill actions toward the
Democratic Party amounted to a betrayal. As a result, some activists who may have
attempted to run for delegate in order to show support for a more antagonistic Sanders,
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instead disengaged from the process. A 2016 delegate who ran one of the local activist
networks discussed earlier in this chapter disparagingly referred to Sanders as “some
political revolutionary” and called the Sanders-Biden unity task forces “as useless as the
platform [Sanders] hoped to influence with his delegates” (@LaurenSteiner - The Robust
Opposition, 2020). Also, the fact that it was becoming increasingly likely that the
convention would be virtual, also may have discouraged protest-minded activists from
pursuing a spot in the delegation.
Still, some of Sanders’ more anti-establishment supporters remained focused on
their goal, long supported by Sanders, of transforming the Democratic Party from within.
Unfortunately for some of them, the Sanders campaign, which had maintained a laissezfaire approach to delegate selection in 2016, had taken steps to influence the makeup, and
by extension the activities of, its 2020 delegation. They instituted a new delegate
selection process, that, combined with the unity activities above, produced a delegation
whose members, while certainly outspoken, were less focused on anti-Party activity than
those that led protests at the 2016 convention.
A hands-on approach to the 2020 delegation
Despite the narratives of insurgency about the 2016 Sanders campaign, some of its
staffers were more loyal to the Democratic Party than the raucous delegates who
protested on the floor of the convention. Many were frustrated by the constant and
indiscriminate way in which Sanders delegates, particularly those from California, had
disrupted the 2016 convention.
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As it became clear that Sanders would again have a sizable delegation to the 2020
convention, these same staffers, who had returned for the 2020 campaign, instituted
practices to weed out the most militant anti-Party activists from the pool of potential
delegates. As early as January 2020, the campaign setup an online interest form through
which would-be delegates could sign up to be included on their local caucus ballot. This
interest form asked whether activists had worked on the 2016 campaign and if they had
previously been delegates. It also asked applicants to include links to their own social
media accounts as well as relevant groups they managed or regularly participated in.
With California’s delegate elections approaching in May of 2020, many activists
who had been delegates in 2016 found that the Sanders campaign had excluded them
from the ballots, effectively blocking them from running. One 2016 delegate who in 2020
had volunteered hundreds of hours for and contributed the maximum legal amount to the
Sanders campaign, expressed his frustration on Twitter and found other delegates, both in
California and nationwide, who had similarly been removed from from the pool of
potential delegates.
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Figure 6: Tweet by a 2016 delegate who failed to secure a 2020 delegate position due to new restrictions by
Sanders campaign staff.

That same week, the Sanders campaign distributed to delegates a five-page
document that included a social-media policy, a code of conduct, and a non-disclosure
agreement. Each section made clear that delegates who violated the enclosed rules could
face “disciplinary action, including but not limited to… removal from the delegation.”
The social media policy aimed to codify for delegates a variety of discursive
norms aimed at reducing personal attacks on speakers and instead focusing on
“differentiat[ing] the senator from his opponents on the issues.” Delegates were told to
“avoid online arguments or confrontations” and to “be respectful when addressing
138

opposing viewpoints or commenting on the opposition.” Further, it asked that they
“refrain from making negative statements about other candidates, Party leaders,
campaigns, campaign staffers, supporters, news organizations or journalists.” It required
delegates to apply “necessary skepticism,” prior to posting, as to whether their post, if
amplified by news media, would “compromise Bernie Sanders’ message, credibility or
reputation” or “risk your standing as a delegate.” It also instructed them to forward any
media outreach to campaign staff, rather than responding in their capacity as individual
delegates. At the same time, the policy encouraged delegates to “share campaignapproved content on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms.”
The contents of these documents made clear that the Sanders campaign aimed to
avoid the combative tenor of the 2016 convention and influence the collective message of
his supporters during the convention. Within hours, the document was circling in activist
networks on Twitter and Facebook with activists accusing the campaign of “muzzling
delegates.” A change.org petition signed by several 2016 delegates accused the Sanders
campaign of censorship and stifling the free speech rights of delegates who would be
attending the convention to “represent Bernie voters.” Numerous comments by former
2016 delegates echoed these feelings in signing statements, highlighting an ongoing
tension between whether delegates represent Sanders voters or the Sanders campaign.
For the staffers who distributed the policy document, the uproar on social media
actually validated their original impetus for taking a more hands-on role in managing the
delegation membership. A Sanders campaign staffer who helped manage delegates in
both 2016 and 2020 explained:
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“You’ve got all these people who say they want to be more involved in
strategy around the convention. And then you distribute this document and
say ‘don’t share this’. And then it’s online within hours. So, from that it’s
clear to us that they’re not ready for [more involvement]” (Interview
Quote).
Coordinated Activism in Advance of the Convention
In the end, only 43 members of the 2016 California delegation were part of the 323member 2020 Sanders delegation. As discussed at length in the next chapter, many
delegates and other Sanders activists who had entered Party politics in 2016 were now
established Party activists who had engaged in Party politics as staunch progressives.
Some had even run for office as Democrats. In the period leading up to the convention,
most at least tacitly supported Joe Biden, even if they simultaneously highlighted the
need to lobby his future administration toward progressive ends (Irby, 2020). Despite this
support for the presumptive Democratic nominee, many 2020 delegates still used their
position as delegates to engage in coordinated activism aimed at pushing the Party to the
left. However, unlike in 2016, the acts carried out by 2020 delegates were largely
coordinated by a coalition of progressive organizations working to target the enthusiasm
of delegates toward the specific goals of increasing the prominence of progressive
representatives and ideas at the convention. Given that the virtual convention format
would not allow delegates to leverage the large audience of a traditional convention to
highlight progressive goals, they instead sought concessions from the Party, leveraging
the exigency for unity that preoccupied Party leaders and the Biden campaign heading
into the general election.
The activism of Sanders delegates from California sought to achieve several
goals. First, they sought to install progressive leaders at the head of their statewide
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delegation. They also, along with Sanders delegations from other states, aimed to
influence Biden’s vice-presidential selection, the content of the convention, and the
Democratic Party platform. Because these goals aimed to influence decisions that would
be made in advance of the convention, most delegate activism in 2020 took place in the
months and days preceding the convention rather than during the convention itself.
The Delegation Chair
As it had in 2016, the California Democratic Party hosted, this time virtually, a statewide
delegation meeting. If the 2016 meeting was a harbinger of the disunity of the national
convention, the 2020 event similarly paralleled the controlled environment that would
characterize the 2020 national convention. As discussed above, the state delegation
meeting in 2016 saw Sanders delegates protest the nomination of California’s governor,
then Jerry Brown, as chair of the delegation, a Party tradition when the office is held by a
Democrat. In 2020, that same tradition pointed to Governor Gavin Newsom as the
presumptive chair of the delegation. Two weeks before the meeting, the California
Sanders delegation began connecting online via a reactivated national “Bernie Delegates
Network” that had been spearheaded by Normon Solomon, a California delegate, former
journalist, and progressive activist. His organization, RootsAction.org, partnered with
Our Revolution, and Progressive Democrats of America (PDA) to sponsor the 2020
nationwide “Bernie Delegates Network.” In California, this network of activists aimed to
install progressive Congressman Ro Khanna, who had been a national co-chair of
Sanders’ campaign, as chair of the statewide delegation. They argued that, because
Sanders had won more pledged delegates (225) in California than Biden (172), a
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progressive should lead the delegation. However, they would need commitments from
almost 50 unpledged delegates—Party leaders, elected officials, and their supporters—in
order to influence the vote for chair.
These organizations, along with the California Nurses Association—which
clashed regularly with Newsom over single payer health care—mobilized their networks
of supporters. They encouraged progressives throughout California to contact their
congressional representatives, who were also voting members of the California
delegation, and encourage them to commit to voting for Khanna over Newsom. 110
Sanders delegates, along with these organizations, signed and published a letter endorsing
Khanna over Newsom (RootsActions.org, 2020). On social media, the Sanders delegates
made similar asks to their personal networks of progressives. Their efforts garnered
traction in the media, with several major California newspapers publishing articles
highlighting the progressive push for Khanna (e.g. Garofoli, 2020a).
For the leaders of the California Democratic Party, the election of the governor as
Party chair in advance of the national convention was typically a perfunctory part of the
delegation meeting. They were not accustomed to competition and lobbying around the
delegation chair election. However, given the noise coming from progressives and a
desire to avoid intraparty conflict, they were forced to address the issue (Wildermuth,
2020). Leading up to the vote, conversations took place between state Party chair Rusty
Hicks, Newsom, and representatives of both the Biden and Sanders campaigns. In the
end, Newsom stepped aside in favor of a three-person “unity slate” that included Khanna,
alongside Oakland Congresswoman Barbara Lee, who had supported Kamala Harris in
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the primary but was well-regarded by progressives as the only Congressperson to oppose
authorizing the Bush administration to use force to respond to the September 11, 2001
attacks. The third co-chair was Hilda Solis, a member of the Los Angeles County Board
of Supervisors who had served as President Obama’s secretary of labor. While Newsom’s
office and the California Democratic Party hailed the unity slate as “reflect[ing] the
diversity and dynamism of our great state,” progressives and Sanders delegates saw it as
a flexing of their increasingly strong political muscle.

Figure 7: A tweet by a 2020 Sanders delegate celebrating the creation of a "unity slate" at the head of the
2020 California delegation to the Democratic National Convention.

Karen Bernal, the former chair of the Progressive Caucus of the California
Democratic Party, who had worked with the delegates network to help organize delegate
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support for Khanna, explained that “[the unity slate was] less a show of unity and more a
recognition by the establishment that the progressive movement is ascendant.”
The Vice-Presidential Nominee
The California Sanders Delegation also contributed to the attempt by the nationwide
Bernie Delegates Network, to influence Biden’s vice-presidential selection. The
Network’s strategy was similar to the one employed to influence the delegation chair.
After Biden announced that he planned to select a woman to fill the role, Sanders
delegates lobbied online for the arguably long-shot candidacy of Ohio’s Nina Turner, as
well as for former California Congresswomen Barbara Lee and Karen Bass. Within
activist circles, Bass, who then served as chairwoman of the Congressional Black
Caucus, generated the most online conversation and emerged as the strongest contender,
especially following a New York Times report that Bass was included in the final pool of
candidates in consideration by Biden’s team. Leaders of the Bernie Delegates Network
distributed a Google Form through which delegations from around the country could
express support for Bass. (Bernie Delegates Network, 2020). In early August, a letter,
signed by 300 delegates, was sent to the Biden campaign. The press was also notified of
the letter, as numerous reports about Bass’ support among progressive delegates
immediately emerged in publications including The Nation (Nichols, 2020), Politico
(Otterbein, 2020c), and Fox News (McFall, 2020).
For Sanders delegates, this coverage in the mainstream press meant that, despite
lacking the platform of a traditional convention and having less total nationwide
delegates than in 2016, media outlets were using them as a proxy for those progressives
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whose support for the Democratic Party was not guaranteed. One 2020 delegate who had
also attended the 2016 convention commented that “in some ways, even though we have
less Sanders delegates this time around . . . we have more leverage than we did in 2016.”
As online discussion of Bass increased among the broader public, delegates used their
platform on social media to both promote Bass and also to counter accusations from some
Democrats that her long-standing interest in U.S. policy toward Cuba was not a reason
for her disqualification from consideration.
The Network also employed the same tactics to express their opposition to Susan
Rice, former national security advisor to the Obama Administration, who was also
reportedly on Biden’s shortlist for vice president. The delegates saw her, due to her
previous comments supporting the Iraq War as well as her role in the Obama
Administration’s 2011 military intervention in Libya, as problematically hawkish. A
group of nationwide Muslim delegates also formed a separate network to oppose Rice. In
a letter cross-published by the network on Medium.com and the Daily Kos, a California
delegate expressed his hesitation with Rice, saying that “Susan Rice’s track record here is
deeply concerning. We need leadership that departs from the Washington consensus
that’s created endless wars” (Ahmad, 2020; @MuslimDelegates, 2020).
Beyond opposition to Rice, some delegates also posted on social media and wrote
letters opposing Biden’s consideration of both U.S. Senator Kamala Harris and
Representative Val Demmings, highlighting law enforcement decisions they made as
Attorney General of California, and Orlando Chief of Police, respectively (Bernal &
Shaughnessy, 2020). Despite these concerns from progressives, Biden selected Harris as
145

his vice-presidential nominee on August 11, 2020. While there was some disappointment
amongst the 2020 delegates, most were “not surprised” given that “it didn’t really go with
[Biden’s] strategy to pick a progressive” (Interview Quote). Amar Shergill, a Sanders
delegate and chair of the California Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic
Party which counted many other delegates among its membership, made clear that the
selection of Harris, was not a major sticking point for progressives in the context of the
2020 election:
We know that Donald Trump is a threat to the country and our job as
progressives is to defeat him, to elect Joe Biden and then to engage in the
advocacy program to get things done and that doesn’t change whether its
Kamala Harris or somebody we were looking for like Karen Bass to be the
Vice-Presidential Nominee, or Barbara Lee or anybody else (Sogomonian,
2020).
For many Sanders delegates, that advocacy would not wait for Biden’s election. On the
same day that Harris was announced as the vice-presidential nominee, hundreds of
Sanders delegates from around the country cast ballots opposing the 2020 Democratic
Party Platform.
The Party Platform
On June 24, 2020, the DNC announced what most delegates had been expecting for
weeks—that they should plan on casting their votes and participating in the convention
remotely. Given that there would be no convention floor from which to engage in visible
public protest, Sanders delegates aiming to use the convention itself as a medium for
activism during the convention itself were limited to doing so via their role as voting
delegates.

146

On July 27, several weeks prior to the convention, the DNC’s platform committee
met and approved the Party’s tentative 2020 platform. Aspects of the meeting were
contentious, as the committee rejected an amendment by a minority of progressive DNC
members who were pushing for inclusion in the platform of support for Medicare for All,
a core priority of both Sanders and progressives (E. Collins, 2020).
On the day of the vote, the head of the Nevada statewide delegation distributed to
the Bernie Delegates Network an online petition through which they could pledge to vote
against the Party platform for its exclusion of Medicare for All. The petition highlighted a
range of points, from the ongoing pandemic to racist and discriminatory practices of
private health insurance companies. By the end of the day, 360 delegates had signed
(Otterbein, 2020a). Sanders, via a spokesperson, admitted that he planned to support the
Party platform, but stopped short of encouraging his delegates to do so:
“Senator Sanders believes that the Democratic Party Platform should
advocate strongly for Medicare for All, and that of course is a major
reason why we fought so hard for the nomination. The senator appreciates
that, amid a deadly pandemic which is creating a national health
emergency, his delegates understand that now more than ever we must
guarantee health care as a human right.”
After two days, the number of signatories had doubled to over 700 delegates. As word of
their opposition spread throughout progressive circles, Progressive Democrats of
America, in collaboration with several multi-issue and health-care-specific advocacy
organizations also launched a petition to allow supporters of Medicare for All who were
not delegates to express their dissatisfaction with the Party platform (Progressive
Demorats of America, 2020).
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Figure 8: Tweet by the Bernie Delegates Network Twitter account encouraging progressives to sign a
petition demanding the inclusion of Medicare for All in the 2020 Democratic Party National Platform.

At a traditional convention, voting on the platform is a part of the regular business
carried out on the floor of the main convention hall. For the virtual convention, delegates
instead had several days in advance of the convention to submit their vote. The Bernie
Delegates Network encouraged those participating in their effort to oppose the platform
to hold their votes and submit them together on August 11th. In the days that followed,
several prominent progressives, including Ro Khanna, head of the California delegation,
and Rashida Tlaib of Michigan, announced that they also had opposed the Party platform.
Overall, the opposition by Sanders delegates to the Party platform had mixed results, and
also further highlighted the increased control afforded to Party leaders by the virtual
convention format.
While their petition had in the preceding weeks briefly brought the issue of
Medicare for All and the platform into the news media, coverage of the issue following
their collective “no-vote” on August 11th was basically non-existent. Instead, mainstream
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media coverage was largely focused on the announcement, made that same day, of
Kamala Harris as the vice-presidential nominee. While it cannot be confirmed that the
Biden campaign chose August 11th to announce Harris in order to compete with the
platform vote, it is documented that the Biden campaign toiled meticulously over the
vice-presidential selection and the crafting of its strategic rollout for months (Allen &
Parnes, 2021; Corasaniti, 2020). Further, on August 17, during the first night of the
convention, when the vote typically would have taken place, the Party simply reported
the overall result—the platform had passed—rather than the vote totals. In fact, to the
consternation of many Sanders delegates, the Party did not release the vote totals (3562yes, 1069-no, 87-abstain) until August 24, four days after Biden accepted the nomination
on the final night of the convention.

Figure 9: A tweet by the Bernie Delegates Network Twitter account criticizing delays by the DNC in
releasing vote tallies from the vote on the 2020 National Party Platform.
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The lukewarm response from the media to the opposition of the Party platform
highlights the difficulties delegates faced as they tried to identify additional opportunities
to leverage their role as delegates. This led them to instead use the convention as an
opportunity to build solidarity amongst progressive activists.
The Virtual Convention
The Democratic Party held its virtual convention across four days from August 17 to
August 20. For Sanders delegates, the convention itself offered little to no opportunity for
activism that leveraged their position as delegates. Even the outdoor protests that
preceded the convention in 2016 were an impossibility given safety concerns related to
Covid-19 and delegates being spread out across the country. Given these constraints,
Sanders delegates instead used the occasion of the convention as an opportunity to build
progressive solidarity and engage in discussion about future strategy. For example,
during During Sanders’ 10-minute speech on the first night of the convention, many
California delegates on social media began using the hashtag #BecauseOfBernie to
highlight the ways in which, over the previous four years, their involvement with
Sanders’ campaigns had awakened them to major progressive issues. Delegates did
engage in some critique of the Party, largely around the selection of speakers. The
decision to give Republican and Former Ohio Governor John Kasich a lengthy speaking
slot during prime time on the first day drew the ire of delegates, who pointed out that
Republicans were more represented than true progressives.
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Figure 10: A Tweet by a progressive criticizing the Party's decision to give Republican John Kasich a
lengthy speaking slot at the 2020 Democratic National Convention.

Other topics occasionally emerged that prompted a response from delegates. For
example, RL Miller, a Sanders delegate, DNC member, and chair of the state Party’s
environmental caucus, tweeted her disdain for a news report revealing that the DNC had
quietely removed language from the Party platform calling for the elimination of fossil
fuel subsidies.
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Figure 11: A Tweet by RL Miller, President of the Environmental Caucus of the California Democratic
Party, criticizing the DNC for removing from the National Party Platform language in support of the
elimination of subsidies for fossil fuel companies.

Despite these occasional critiques, the majority of public discourse by delegates
focused on progressive solidarity. For some delegates, this extended beyond the
discursive space that surrounded the official convention. A modest group of the
California delegation’s more radical delegates, independent of major progressive
organizations, used the two days prior to the DNC convention to launch a progressive
virtual convention: “The People’s Assembly - Building Beyond Bernie.” One of the
organizers explained the impetus for the event:
“A number of us Bernie delegates decided about a month [before the
convention] that instead of being frustrated with our lack of agency as
delegates and the DNC platform that we could take this little window of
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time as delegates to act affirmatively, positively. We decided that we
should get together with grassroots activists working outside the
Democratic Party to put forward our own grassroots-driven agenda [in the
form of] a weekend of action addressing key issues that have been emitted
or are inadequately addressed in the DNC platform.”
The People’s Assembly featured two full days of programming aimed at developing
strategies and building solidarity for the progressive movement in California and beyond.
It also showcased new, more radical progressive groups not generally included in the
broader Democratic coalition. Organized entirely on Zoom and streamed on Facebook
Live, YouTube, and Twitter, the event featured a combination of panels, discussions, and
speakers. Speakers and panelists included politicians, including Congresswoman Barbara
Lee, Congressman Ro Khanna, and former San Francisco Supervisor and 2020 Sanders
California political director Jane Kim, as well as to topical experts, including academics
and experienced activists. With the goal of directly “elevating the voices of the
grassroots” (Interview Quote) event organizers encouraged anyone interested in
participating to login to the Zoom meeting and engage as an active participant. To expand
the event’s reach, they also live-streamed both days on Youtube, Facebook Live, and
other streaming platforms.
On both days, the Assembly’s morning and afternoon sessions began with
speeches by progressive politicians. Some focused on maintaining enthusiasm and
motivating activists toward the next phase of the movement. To that end, Ash Kalra, a
Democratic Assemblyman from San Jose, spoke broadly about movement politics and its
relationship to the Democratic Party. On Zoom, Kalra spoke in front of a large poster that
carried the headline “Fight the Power” over a silhouette of Bernie Sanders. California
Sanders supporters would immediately recognize the poster from a March 1, 2020 rally
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that featured both Sanders and hip-hop group Public Enemy. He espoused the importance
of local and state-level politics as a means to “root out the corruption that prevents us
from having healthcare as a human right. . .a green new deal. . .and allows people to die
in prison from Covid-19.” He also repeatedly espoused the importance of getting the
“monster out of the White House” and then immediately holding the Biden
administration for following through on the progressive policies “that sound great on
placards and sound great in campaigns” but often fail to become enacted as policies
following elections. Other speakers, such as Jane Kim, provided activists with specific
actions they could take to support impending legislation—largely at the state level—that
would move the needle on their progressive priorities, including the elimination of cash
bail, enacing a millionaire’s tax, and combating efforts to limit the workplace benefits of
workers engaged in the gig economy.
Similarly, topics for panel discussions were largely focused on specific
progressive goals. For example, a session called “The People’s Budget” focused on
rethinking municipal budgeting in the context of recent activism aimed at reducing
funding for traditional police activity while another focused on forging a pathway to
single payer healthcare. These sessions followed a similar format, with panelists—
including delegates employed in the medical field—outlining the history of the issue,
including recent progressive successes and failures, as well as potential steps activists
could take going forward. For example, the healthcare panel discussed SB-562, the failed
attempt by progressive State Senators at passing a single payer in California, and reasons
it had failed to pass despite Democratic majorities in both statehouses. They then
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discussed the dual obstacles of a Biden presidency and the ongoing Newsom governship
to enacting single payer nationwide and at the state level, respectively.
Beyond speakers and panels, the People’s Convention also highlighted in realtime several small, coordinated protest events taking place simultaneously at locations
throughout California. One protest, focused on social justice, was held at Bruce’s Beach,
where in 1927 the City of Manhattan Beach had used eminent domain to seize a blackowned beach resort, a move formally acknowledged as racist by the City in 2007.
Similarly, a protest focused on criminal justice reform was streamed live from Soledad
prison in central California. One of the organizers of the Assembly explained how
connecting directly to activism happening on the ground allowed the Assembly to
“elevate the voices of the grassroots” who often lacked a direct line to Party activists, let
alone those in power.
One of the more lengthy and contentious sessions was entitled—“Should I stay or
should I go: A Bernie Voter Ponders the Democratic Party.” This panel, which saw
engagement from several delegates in the audience, placed panelists from organizations
committed to working within the Democratic Party—Lawrence Taylor, the president of
People for Democratic Reform, and Judith Wells, the chair of the Nevada delegation that
had spearheaded the recent push for opposing the Party platform—in conversation with
those committed to third parties—Nick Brana, founder of Movement for a People’s Party,
and Laura Wells, a Green Party organizer and member of the Democratic Socialist of
America.
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Figure 12: An ad posted on social media by organizers of the 2020 People's Assembly.

As with the #DemEnter and #DemExit conversation that took place among
activists after 2016, this panel forced activists to articulate not only their relationship to
the Democratic Party, but also the challenges associated with decisions to either leave or
stay in the Party. For those advocating leaving the Party, they were forced to articulate—
or try to articulate—their vision for achieving the radical structure change necessary for a
multiparty system despite the entrenchment of the two-party system. For those committed
to working within the Party, they articulated strong critiques of the Party’s “antidemocratic elements” while outlining a vision for change—that combines simultaneously
pursuing goals as large as winning the Democratic nomination and as small as garnering
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progressive representation on local Party committee seats—and answering questions
from audience members who were concerned that such efforts were futile. The next
section dives more deeply into the efforts of such activists in California to enter the Party
and change it from the inside.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined how activists in 2016 took their first step into the Democratic
Party, attempting to use it as a vehicle for bringing about a more progressive society via
the election of Senator Bernie Sanders. I argued that early on, the absence of a formal
Sanders campaign organization allowed them to self-organize volunteer activities, plan
and interact at local events, and engage together in the flexible, unmoderated online
communities that emerged around the 2016 Sanders campaign. Via these shared
experiences, discourses, and actions, they began to develop a collective identity as
“Berniecrats,” inside the Democratic Party but separate from what they saw as its more
“establishment” activists and leaders. These early efforts provided them with a sense of
their own political efficacy and a sense of both independence from and ownership of the
Sanders campaign.
As they ran in delegate elections and then self-organized their delegation for the
convention in Philadelphia, they developed and practiced democratic ideals that fed back
into their existing expectations of democracy and politics. As they collectively
experienced the primary, these ideals were challenged by what they saw as unfair
treatment of Sanders by the Democratic Party. As tensions between the Sanders
campaign and the Clinton campaign rose, these delegates developed a collective narrative
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about the campaign, framed around a shared protagonist in Bernie Sanders, with Clinton,
the mainstream media, and the DNC increasingly as antagonists.
As they planned for the convention, their online communities became spaces to
engage in horizontal voice, collectively making decisions that linked their ideals to
specific strategic actions—-instances of vertical voice—that they planned to carry out
both inside and outside the convention in Philadelphia. Once they arrived inside the
convention, the real-time nature of social media provided them the ability to coordinate
specifically-timed actions on the floor and to provide supporters outside the convention
with real-time coverage of aspects of the convention that were normally not included in
convention coverage by journalists. These delegates saw themselves as the voice of
protest against what they viewed as both the antidemocratic practices of the DNC and the
unfair antagonism experienced by Sanders and his supporters. In many ways, this
collective identity came to transcend their support for Sanders, as they ignored calls by
him and his campaign staff to limit their public actions critiquing the Party and the
Clinton campaign.
Following the convention, as Party leaders made commitments to explore
modifying Party procedures, including the role of superdelegates, for future nominations,
many delegates felt a sense of success that, they had not only highlighted publicly their
grievances with the Party, but also moved the needle on modifying structures that would
allow for future progressive challengers to compete for the nomination. This identity and
sense of success informed their online conversations about whether or not to #DemExit
the Party following the convention. Most delegates chose to move beyond presidential
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politics, to #DemEnter the Party and, alongside longstanding progressive Party activists,
try to change it from the inside.
I then argued that in 2020, four years of the Trump presidency, combined with the
Covid-19 pandemic, the virtual convention, a less delinquent Democratic Party, a more
hands-on Sanders campaign, and a more critical delegate selection procedure, impacted
not only the makeup of the delegation, but also its capacity to develop a collective
identity as a delegation, let alone one that saw itself as wholly in opposition to the Party.
Accordingly, in 2020, the activism of delegates was for the most part, more discriminant
and centered on political goals—opposing the Party platform, lobbying for a progressive
delegation chair and vice president—outlined by several progressive organizations who
had taken it upon themselves to organize a national “Bernie Delegates Network.” These
acts focused on achieving both real and symbolic concessions from Party leaders in
advance of the convention. That said, the 2020 delegation also revealed fissures among
Sanders movement as to how they should continue to pursue change within the
Democratic Party. As such, a smaller, anti-establishment group of delegates developed,
many members of whom had still aimed to use the convention as an opportunity for Party
critique. As there was no convention floor through which to reach the broad audience of
the Democratic Party electorate, members of this smaller, anti-establishment group, many
of whom had been vocal 2016 delegates, instead used the convention as an opportunity to
use horizontal voice not for planning imminent vertical voice actions, but instead for
building progressive community in the form of the “People’s Convention,” providing
mobilizing information for smaller actions statewide and promoting dialogue about
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progressive issues. The next chapter returns to those 2016 delegation members who chose
to #DemEnter the Party and explores the strategies they took for making their voices
heard inside the formal structures of the California Democratic Party.
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Chapter 4: Inside the Party: From Mobilization to Incrementalism
In 2018, Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, a Democrat and 26-year veteran U.S.
Senator, twice failed to secure the endorsement of the California Democratic Party (CDP)
in her bid for a fifth full term (Dayen, 2018). First in February, when approximately 3200
Party delegates were endorsing for the primary, she only garnered the support of 37
percent of delegates, while challenger Kevin de Leon, supported by most of the Party’s
progressives, secured 54 percent. Neither achieved the necessary 60 percent required by
state Party rules to win the endorsement. Because California’s “top-two” primary often
results in general election battles between candidates of the same party, Feinstein was
again facing de Leon in the fall campaign. Concerned about another embarrassing
endorsement debacle at the CDP executive board meeting in July, Feinstein encouraged
the approximately 330 executive board members to vote “no endorsement.” In the end, de
Leon won the endorsement with the support of 65% of the executive board members.
Feinstein received 7% and 28% voted “no endorsement.” Yet, in the general election, she
defeated de Leon 54% to 46% (Cadei, 2018), largely by maintaining support among rankand-file Democrats in major metropolitan areas.6
There are several potential explanations for Feinstein’s failure to earn the Party
endorsement that she had secured in all of her previous Senate races. Her moderate

Exit polls showed Feinstein with 63% of the Democratic vote to de Leon’s 34%. Those
same polls showed de Leon performed significantly better among Republicans compared
to Feinstein, and slightly better among independents (CNN Politics, 2018). Journalists
attributed de Leon’s performance among Republicans to both the effort he put into
campaigning in non-Democratic areas of the state as well as a strong disdain for Feinstein
among Trump-supporting Republicans following the Brett Kavanaugh Senate hearings
(Cosgrove, 2018) .
6
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views, including her long-standing support for the death penalty and opposition to single
payer health care, had over the years become increasingly at odds with the political
priorities of California Democrats (Nilsen, 2018). In 2017, she had also frustrated many
Democrats, especially progressives, with her early attempts at cooperation with President
Trump. However, another likely factor is a major shift to the left that took place in the
demographics of the voting delegates of the CDP since she last won the Party’s
endorsement in 2012. After Bernie Sanders’ loss to Hillary Clinton in the summer of
2016, many of his supporters, including a large contingent of his former convention
delegates, blamed the loss on the overwhelming support Hillary Clinton had received
from the Democratic Party leadership (T. Anderson, 2017). Rather than exit the Party in
protest, many made the choice to enter the CDP, choosing to use their voice to increase
their influence over state, and by extension national Party leadership and priorities. The
entry of new progressives was encouraged by, and augmented the size of, the already
existing progressive contingent that has long existed within the state Party.
This chapter explores the internal, and ongoing fight between progressives and
liberals to control and influence the priorities of the CDP. Arguably one of the more
liberal state parties in the nation, this conflict is largely between the Party’s more
traditionally embedded members and its more radical contingent. This fight also shines a
light on representation as one of the quandaries of governance in CDP politics, as the
state delegation is composed of a combination of elected politicians and their appointees,
county-level Party committee members, and assembly district level delegates, all of
which have their own claims to representative legitimacy. Elected politicians have
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successfully won a vote of the entire electorate in their jurisdiction and county-level
committee members have won a vote of the entire Democratic electorate in their
jurisdiction. Assembly delegates, which almost all of the new progressive delegates were,
have won a caucus-style election very similar to the convention delegate processes
discussed in the previous chapter. These processes are discussed in detail in the next
section. The first two groups can claim they better represent the actual Party in the
electorate better than assembly delegates because they have faced the will of the voters.
Assembly delegates can claim they represent the true grassroots and are uncorrupted by
the top-two primary process, which favors moderate politicians in many districts and
requires significant financial resources, or by the ideological compromise associated with
years of working within the Party as an organization.
The chapter focuses on attempts by progressive activists to influence Democratic
Party politics across three activist goals and related strategies to achieve those goals.
They pursued the first goal, getting formal representation in the Party, by formally
entering running for and winning state delegate positions, seats on central committees,
and seats on the state Party executive board. This allowed them to formally enter the
Party through a combination of statewide and local on-the-ground and digital organizing
strategies for contesting Party elections that, especially in rural areas, often only saw
participation by Party regulars. These newly minted delegates then organized, alongside
long-standing Party progressives, towards the second goal of installing a progressive
chair at the head of the state Party. While ultimately unsuccessful, the race reveals the
potential, as well as the limitations, of the networked mobilization strategies that these
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delegates had used to facilitate their entry to the Party. Lastly, delegates moved beyond
engaging Party elections, aiming to increase the prominence of progressive ideas in the
CDP’s formal and informal discourses, including resolutions and the Party platform. For
many former Sanders activists, especially his former convention delegates, this required
them to negotiate whether the identity they had developed in opposition to the
Democratic Party was at odds with a move from trying to “take over the Party” to a more
incremental experience of Party politics.
Organizing for Formal Representation within the State Party
In California, two weeks before Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, the CDP held
biennial local elections—Assembly District Election Meetings, or ADEMs—to elect
1120 delegates to the California Democratic State Central Committee and 80
representatives to the CDP executive board. Across the state, many Sanders activists,
members of the Progressive Caucus of the CDP, and other energized progressives
organized to win a plurality of the available positions (Cadelago, 2017). For many Party
activists who had been involved for years, this influx of self-proclaimed “Berniecrats,” as
well as some new activists motivated by President Trump’s election victory, effectively
“came out of nowhere” (Interview Quote). For progressives activated during and in the
aftermath of the 2016 presidential election and the long-standing activists who had
worked with them, it was simply the next step in a series of actions aimed at pushing the
Democratic Party to the left. Specifically for those activist groups who collectively saw
the act of running for delegates as part of a larger opposition to the Democratic Party as
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an organization, winning these elections effectively formalized their decision to enter the
Party and attempt to change it to reflect their own open and participatory ideals.
The next section first outlines exactly what ADEMs are and how progressives
were able to effectively organize around them to achieve formal representation in the
CDP. They did this using a combination of on-the-ground and digital field strategies at
the local level, leveraging entry points in rural communities and underorganized districts,
and creating web properties to effectively create momentum by presenting dozens of
local races as part of a statewide and national movement to “take over the Democratic
Party.”
Assembly District Delegates
The CDP State Central Committee is comprised of between 3200 and 3600 delegates 7
(California Democratic Party, 2020). Approximately one-third of these delegates are
elected officials and their appointees, while another third are members of county-level
central committees. The remaining third are registered Democrats that are elected in
Assembly Delegate Election Meetings (ADEMs) held every two years in January. The
CDP provides support for local Party leaders to hold these meetings in its 80 assembly
districts across the state. Via this process, Democrats elect a total of 1120 (14 per district)
Assembly District Delegates (ADDs) to the Democratic State Central Committee (DSCC)
and 80 delegates (1 per district) to the CDP Executive Board (E-Board). ADDs can vote
on resolutions and other Party business at the annual state convention, as well as in

Because a number of delegate positions are held by politicians and their appointees, the
total number of delegates varies depending on the number of Democrats elected
throughout the state.
7
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elections for executive level state Party positions which include a chair, male and female
vice chairs, secretary, and controller (financial officer). E-board members conduct
business between conventions and also vote to elect California’s representatives to the
Democratic National Committee (DNC). While the state Party bylaws require that all
registered Democrats be notified of their respective election meeting, participation by
most of the general public in these meetings is uncommon. In fact, the average Democrat
in California is likely unaware that these positions exist or that, as a registered Democrat,
they have the opportunity to vote on them. Typically, those people whose engagement in
Party politics extends beyond regularly voting in major elections are those who would
participate in an ADEM.
Because the pool of potential voters in an ADEM is very large—all registered
Democrats in a given district—but participation is low, the opportunity exists for activists
to mobilize voters from outside the usual suspects of local Party activists in order to win
these elections. In effect, the 14 candidates who show up to an ADEM with the most
supporters win the delegate positions. This type of popular election lends itself to the type
of mass, populist organizing that Sanders supporters had used to mobilize support during
the 2016 Democratic presidential primary. A cursory examination of the progressive
success in the 2017 ADEMs reveals how the same loose networks of supporters that in
2016 flooded non-scientific online polls with Sanders votes and packed thousands of
supporters into rallies and campaign events across the country created momentum around
the ADEMs at the regional and statewide level.
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Further examination, however, reveals how the organizing strategies and roles of
progressive activists and movement actors around the ADEMs varied from district to
district depending on the existing Party infrastructure and whether or not progressives
had seen success in the ADEMs in the recent past. It also reveals how, despite this
variation, a small group of individual activists worked in concert to aggregate districtspecific “mobilizing information” (Lemert, Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hackett, 1977)—
time, location, etc.—and progressive candidate details from across the state into an easily
shareable web portal that could be shared across social media platforms and allow for
organizing in statewide or location-agnostic social media properties. This allowed
relevant mobilizing information to simultaneously be disseminated throughout the
statewide and local online progressive communities that had formed throughout the 2016
presidential primary.
Local Organizing
In the weeks following Hillary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential
election, many progressive online communities, particularly those that had emerged
around Bernie Sanders’ presidential run, were extremely critical of the Democratic Party.
One common thread amongst activists was the idea that not only had the Democratic
Party leadership steered the primary process towards Clinton’s nomination, but in doing
so they had ignored “the people” and put forth an unpopular candidate out of touch with
working people whose grievances Trump had leveraged. The hashtag
#BernieWouldveWon echoed through these online spaces, often alongside media—video
clips, op-eds, etc.—featuring pundits critiquing the Democratic Party or hypothesizing
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that Sanders may have fared better in the upper midwestern states of Wisconsin,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania where Clinton had faltered. As progressives nationwide
were looking for ways to mobilize the energy they had directed toward the Sanders
campaign, many in California began discussing in Facebook groups and blog posts the
upcoming ADEM elections.
Activists motivated toward Party change saw these elections as a means to
“#DemEnter,” a social media hashtag used by activists advocating for entering the Party,
getting involved in campaigns, building connections, and “tak[ing] as many elected
positions as possible within the Democratic Party” (Interview Quote) These activists
aimed to create a formidable progressive bloc within the Party’s formal institutions. One
self-proclaimed socialist with no experience in Democratic Party politics, who had
attended the 2016 Democratic National Convention as a Sanders delegate, wrote and
shared a post on medium.com entitled, “#DemEnter-It’s Time for Progressives to Take
Over the Democratic Party.” He called on those who had left the Party to return and
“bring that necessary infusion of progressive values that we need to ensure that this wave
isn’t just a flash in the pan” (Skolnick, 2016). Similar articles and related discussions
took place on many of the Facebook pages, Whatsapp groups, and Slack channels that
had formed during the 2016 primary. The ADEMs were also a topic at the local meetings
and in the online fora of other progressive groups, including local chapters of both the
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) and the newly-formed Our Revolution, a loose
network of local activist groups that grew out of Sanders’ 2016 campaign infrastructure.
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These activists were not the first network of progressives to consider using the
ADEMs as a potential means to gain influence and push the Party to the left. A wave of
progressive activists, many of whom had been activated by the 2004 presidential primary
campaigns of Howard Dean and Dennis Kucinich as well as the anti-Iraq war movement,
entered the CDP following the 2004 presidential election (Larimore-Hall, 2014). In 2005,
many of those activists were instrumental in forming the Progressive Caucus of the CDP,
which is discussed at length later in this section.
Several of the leaders and members of the Progressive Caucus that were in place
after the 2016 election had been part of that previous wave of activists. Because of their
support for the Sanders campaign, their networks overlapped with the online networks of
newly mobilized activists discussed above. These veteran Party activists encouraged the
newcomers to leverage their networks to get the necessary attendance at the individual
ADEMs for a progressive sweep. For activists frustrated with the 2016 election, the idea
of flooding Party events with outsider progressives dovetailed well with the rhetoric of
“the establishment” versus “the people” that had been deployed in the Sanders campaign.
RL Miller, a Progressive Caucus member, the chair of the CDP Environmental Caucus,
and an unabashed climate activist known within the Party for clashing with Governor
Jerry Brown, published an article in the California Politics Blog of The Daily Kos
entitled “How to Be a Party Insider: Win California ADEM Elections” (Miller, 2016). In
it, she outlined for newcomers the ADEMs process and also cited tangible ways in which
she, in her years as an ADEM, has pushed the Party to the left on climate issues. To
aggregate support in the ADEMs, she advised progressives to strategically form slates of
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candidates that were both ideologically similar but racially, ethnically, geographically,
and culturally diverse enough to turn out different networks of supporters.

Figure 13: A post inquiring about the ADEMs by a Sanders supporter and 2016 DNC delegate from rural
Northern California.

Figure 14: A post by San Francisco Berniecrats recruiting Sanders supporters to run for ADEMs.

By the early December deadline for ADEMs to declare their candidacy,
progressive slates had been formed in almost all of the state’s 80 assembly districts. The
process for organizing slates varied across districts. In some areas, the netroots-era
progressives who remain active in the Party began organizing around ADEMs in 2005
and have continued to do so in the years that followed (Larimore-Hall, 2014). In those
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areas, new entrants reached out to existing progressives or vice versa. In many cases, the
Sanders campaign had already brought these activists together months earlier during the
2016 primary election. In other areas, individuals or progressive groups took up the
process of building slates themselves. For example, in East Contra Costa County, 40
miles inland from San Francisco, the local Our Revolution Chapter organized the entire
progressive slate from within its network. A local activist explained:
I got pulled into ADEM through Our Revolution on the progressive slate. I
was asked by an Our Revolution member to join that slate. [They were]
100% leading the charge. . . . They’re able to bring in different kinds of
people. You don’t have to be a member of your local young Dems chapter
anymore. You could be someone who wasn’t even registered as a
Democrat and Our Revolution will find you and then from that teach you
why this matters. (Interview Quote)
Karen Bernal, a former chair of the Progressive Caucus, explained how the experience of
self-organizing the Sanders delegation at the 2016 DNC Convention in Philadelphia had
prepared new activists for the ADEMs. For activists who had formed slates and
campaigned to be convention delegates in 2016, this process was a familiar one
(Interview Data).
In advance of that convention, Bernal had been elected by her fellow delegates as
the statewide leader—an unofficial position—of the California Sanders delegation. The
collective identity she and other Sanders delegates built in advance of and during the
convention, combined with her experience as chair of the Progressive Caucus, allowed
Bernal to serve as a trusted organizer to activists who had a collective distrust of the Party
and its processes. The trust she had built with new activists across the state allowed her to
recruit and support activists—many of whom were hesitant to get directly involved with
the Party—in areas of the state that had not yet formed a progressive slate. The activists
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she reached out to were able to serve as trusted organizers that could reach out to their
local networks and find additional candidates. In effect, she, and other activists like her,
enabled acts of horizontal voice between experienced and new activists. In those
conversations, they emphasized the potential for new delegates to help progressives win
an upcoming race for state Party chair, discussed at length later in this chapter, as a
means to bring rapid, radical change to the state Party. In most districts, this influx of
new candidates resulted in the formation of progressive slates, under a variety of names,
such as “Progressive Labor Slate,” “Revolutionary Progressives,” and “Rising Tide.”
Once slates were formed, activists had a month to organize supporters to attend
and vote for them at the ADEMs. In many ways, this new wave of post-2016
progressives was building on the strategies of those netroots progressives, supported by
new organizations like Our Revolution as well as local progressive Democratic clubs,
which regularly organized around ADEMs but had seen renewed attention following
Sanders’ 2016 presidential run. The California Nurses Association, a progressive labor
union focused on pushing for single payer healthcare, also mobilized its substantial
membership to support progressives at the 2017 ADEMs (Petterson, 2017). Our
Revolution encouraged supporters to attend caucuses in each of the 80 assembly districts.
In an interview with The Hill, Shannon Jackson, the executive director of the national
arm of Our Revolution, explained that this was the first step in a larger process to
“transform the Party” (R. Wilson, 2017). According to Jackson, between the national
organization and local chapters, Our Revolution sent 100,000 emails and 40,000 text
messages to support 800 Sanders supporters running for delegate seats throughout the
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state. Activists used social media to educate and encourage their local networks to
support their slates. In the month preceding the ADEMs, activists created websites,
Facebook pages, and Facebook events to promote their slates, inviting their friends to
“like” the pages and to expand their reach to include friends of friends. Typically, these
included slogans such as “Unbought, Unbossed!,” logos of progressive organizations, a
statement of priorities, as well as photos and bios of candidates. In many cases, these bios
highlighted work on the 2016 Sanders campaign as a means of legitimizing candidates as
sufficiently progressive.

Figure 15: A slate card for the Revolutionary Progressives slate, running in Assembly District 12, in the
northern Central Valley.
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While many of those who were running for delegate were doing so from a critical
perspective on the Democratic Party and a desire to change it, they had inherently made
the strategic decision to pursue progressive change by working within the Democratic
Party. In order to win these elections, they often had to convince their friends and family,
many of whom were not members of the Democratic Party, either because they had never
been or because they “#DemExited” after the 2016 primary. A newly elected Assembly
delegate who had participated in the protests inside the 2016 Democratic National
Convention explained how they encouraged many of their peers who had “#DemExited”
the Party after Sanders lost the nomination to “see that they can move [the party] more to
the left as more of a progressive Party.” He explained how he used Nancy’s Pelosi’s
statement following Clinton’s loss that “people don’t want a new direction” for the
Democratic Party as a way to motivate progressive to attend the ADEMs and “fight for
change.”.

Figure 16: A tweet by a Sanders supporter debating whether or not to rejoin the Democratic Party in order
to vote in the 2016 ADEM elections.

As mentioned above, certain districts had seen organizing around ADEMs by
progressives for years, managing “an ongoing slate that people get added to, and gets re174

evaluated each delegate election” (Interview Quote). Progressives in these districts
already had networks of supporters who were accustomed to attending ADEMs every two
years to support their slates. As a result, these areas had seen ongoing progressive
success. In other areas, slate members and outside groups, were organizing from scratch,
or with support from outside groups like Our Revolution or National Nurses United. The
districts where progressives saw the most gains were those where the local Democratic
Party was either disorganized or less engaged in state politics.
Leveraging Entry Points
In many districts, especially those with robust Party organizations, putting together a slate
was only a first step in what would be a competitive and sometimes frustrating electoral
process. One delegate from San Francisco described the weeks leading up to the election:
We worked our tails off. Phone banks, twice a week, four hours a day.
Batch texting. Online outreach. Facebook messaging. Forms set up for
pledged votes. Donation pages. Printed slate cards. We went to all the
Democratic Party clubs in the district, events, progressive clubs. We
hosted events the day before. Gave speeches…“” (Interview Quote)
Despite that labor, the competitive San Francisco district in question only saw the success
of 4 members of the progressive slate. By contrast, rural areas of the state, or those
suburban areas where the existing Party organization was minimal, offered an entry point
for progressives. One delegate from a suburban district that saw a progressive sweep at
the ADEMs explained:
But our [district] wasn’t super contentious. We had less than 300 votes vs
like AD14 which is over 1000. I felt [ours] was all Our Revolution
members and…maybe a few from unions.
Activists were also able to find like-minded candidates to run—and supporters to back
them—in rural areas where the local Democratic Party often struggled even to find 14
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potential delegates, let alone hold a competitive election. An interviewee from Nevada
County in the Sierra Nevada foothills explained how she won her delegate position “by
simply showing up and raising her hand” (Interview Quote). In many rural areas, Party
activists were stunned by the influx of new activists at ADEMs that were typically
sparsely attended. A long-standing delegate from Auburn County described the huge
influx in new participation:
The place was crowded with people - they were people I’d never seen
before and actually that was a good thing, like hey now we’ve got some
people here. Now I have to compete. I had to stand up and give a speech
and ask people to support me and they said, ‘are you a progressive?’ and I
go ‘what’s a progressive - I’ve been a liberal all my life what do you call
that? I guess I’m one of those.’ I found out later that I didn’t qualify
because I supported Hillary Clinton and I didn’t support Bernie Sanders
but besides the point - I got reelected again (Interview Quote).
Local and Statewide Mobilization Strategies
On the January 2017 weekend in which ADEMs were held, the Twitter accounts of
numerous individual activists and progressive organizations called on people interested in
“help[ing] shape the Democratic Party” (@Delight, 2017) and “ridding California’s
Democratic Party from its corporate democrats” (@TheTrojanLeft - University of
Southern California Progressives, 2017) to attend the ADEMs. The discussion sections of
progressive slate Facebook pages were filled with photos of enthusiastic voters in line at
the ADEM locations, as well as ad hoc updates about parking, transportation, and on-site
logistics.
Local Mobilization
Again, the ADEM experience of would-be-delegates and their supporters varied
significantly between locales. In many urban and suburban assembly districts with robust
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Party institutions, many insurgent progressives entered the ADEMs with a distrust in
Party processes and saw it as their role to increase transparency at the events themselves.
In real time, they documented the lines, evaluated the process for voting, and pointed out
what they perceived to be bias and antidemocratic irregularities. In San Francisco,
activists highlighted how allies of Assemblymember David Chiu bussed in and provided
breakfast for local supporters who would vote for his preferred candidates, or how Party
social events were scheduled concurrently at the same location, to increase participation
by local Democrats that many progressive activists viewed as symphathetic to ‘the
establishment’. One self-described ‘Berniecrat’ running for delegate in San Francisco
described how he and other activists “walked the line, [and] fought to prevent line-cutting
and proxy voting” (Interview Quote).
In a district in central San Diego, the ADEM received attention from progressive
social media accounts across the state. Attendees documented and accused the local
ADEM convener, Richard Duquette, who was also on the County Democratic Central
Committee, of numerous irregularities, including threatening to disallow voting by those
asking for hardship waivers on the suggested donation8, and taking the ballots home for
the evening prior to announcing tentative results. Activists called out Duquette on social
media and posted photos of him leaving with the ballots despite objections by local
volunteers. A copy of a complaint filed with the state Party and written by a local
volunteer who had been assigned specifically to assist in ballot counting made the rounds

The Democratic Party asks ADEM attendees for a non-mandatory $5 to help cover the
costs of running the election.
8
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on social media and in articles published by the Ocean Beach Rag (Porter, 2017), a local
online newspaper, and progressivearmy.com (Payne & Roberge, 2017). Despite these
irregularities, the progressive slate eventually won all 14 seats in that district. Two weeks
later, at a meeting of the County Democratic Central Committee, progressive activists
showed up and used their collective voice to protest Duquette’s run for Northern Vice
Chair of the County Democratic Central Committee. He was soundly defeated in the vice
chair race and subsequently resigned his position as a member of the Central Committee.

Figure 17: A Twitter conversation accusing a San Diego ADEM convener of tampering with ballots.
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Figure 18: A video, posted on Twitter, of a San Diego ADEM convener departing with uncounted ballots.

Similar progressive organizing took place in assembly districts across the state.
But there was also organizing happening focused on the state as a whole. A small group
of activists aggregated information about local ADEMs online to help mobilize
supporters and to create a sense of collective momentum around the ADEMs.
Statewide Mobilization
Because of the federated nature of assembly district slates, it would be a stretch to say
that there was a coordinated statewide system to organize turnout for ADEMs. That said,
they were efforts to aggregate local efforts and create systems to make participation and
mobilization easier for progressives. Members of the Progressive Democrats of America
and the Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party created a site,
progressiveslates.org to aggregate district slates on a single site for the whole state. The
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similarly constructed site that actually took off, however, was created by a motivated
Sanders activist in Central California who built a website, adems2017.vote, that allowed
users to enter their home address, find out their district and the location of the election
meeting, and look at progressive slate cards and bios of progressive candidates on a
single website.
The effort to aggregate these slates into a single website was not without its
critics. Because of the disparate ways in which slates were formed, activists had
attempted to vet the credentials of the candidates and slates on adems2017.vote to weed
out those who they thought were co-opting the progressive mantle. Bernal, based in
Northern California, worked with a Southern California activist in an attempt to verify
that those looking to be included were indeed sufficiently progressive. An activist from
Courage Campaign, a statewide progressive advocacy organization, explained how his
organization encountered blowback after sharing adems2017.vote via their mailing list
and social media properties.
There isn’t one person driving – or there’s not one person organizing [the
creation of progressive slates]. Each region is complicated and does their
own thing – and in a lot of places I’ve noticed – especially in safe blue
places – everybody like, fought each other about who’s the fucking
progressive slate which is so ridiculous. When that adems.vote thing went
out – if you didn’t know the people putting the site together and had some
separation/degrees of connection separation…We pushed that website out
through Courage and we had all these people in LA of all places being like
‘what these candidates aren’t actually progressive where did you get
them’. Its so silly and so I can’t say that we have [coordination] – its a real
mess all around. (Interview Quote)
But for the average progressive, adems2017.vote served as a universal portal for wouldbe delegates and other progressive activists to push out to their networks on social media.
Other activists added to these efforts.
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One Sanders supporter who was running for delegate and had experience in film
and television production created and published on YouTube an easily shareable
educational video, “ADEM 2017 Elections Explained” (Liberman, 2016) which laid out
the importance of ADEMs with links to adems2017.vote. Think-pieces and articles
linking to adems2017.vote and rallying activists to either run or vote in ADEMs appeared
in long-standing national and local blogs. In a piece published in the well-known liberal
blog, The Daily Kos, entitled “Walk the Walk: How Downtrodden Progressives Can Win
in 2017…Starting This Weekend,” Los Angeles activist Ken Franklin (2017) explained
how after the 2016 election, he toyed with the idea of #DemExit[ing] the Party for a more
progressive third Party, but at a pragmatic level, he saw the ADEMs as the “ticket in” for
progressive activists “to operate more officially within the Party” and get a foothold for
their ideas amongst “the establishment.” The websites and blogs of local Democratic
clubs, as well as advocacy organizations also published articles about the ADEMs and
linked to adems2017.vote. For example, a medium.com post by the San Francisco
Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA San Francisco, 2017), which
typical endorses a very small number of Democrats for elected office, encouraged its
members to “deliver the ‘Rank and File’ of the left to the polls,” providing specific
“mobilizing information” (Lemert et al., 1977, p. 721) about the San Francisco ADEMs
and linking to both adems.vote and the “ADEM 2017 Elections Explained” YouTube
video.
As discussed above, the 80 ADEMs in 2017 were distributed across two days (one
weekend). Because of this, activists participating in ADEMs on the first day used their
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social media networks to build momentum for ADEMs taking place the next day. On
sites including Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter, they posted photos of themselves
posing with slate cards, of unexpectedly long lines, and of vote tallies.

Figure 19: A photo, posted on social media, of voters waiting in line at an Assembly Delegate Election in
Northern Sacramento
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Figure 20: An ADEM ballot posted on Twitter by a Sanders supporter.

New Progressives Enter the Party
After a weekend of voting, progressives claimed to have taken 600 of the approximately
1200 delegate seats to the Democratic State Central Committee. In an interview with the
social media-based NowThisNews.com, Bernal, then the chair of the Progressive Caucus
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of the State Central Committee explained that “[after the 2016 election] we knew that
right away the next step was going to be the inside fight. To have Berners join the fight
on the inside of the Party.” Having been drawn into Democracy for America and state
Party politics herself after the 2004 election, Bernal knew the importance of maintaining
the momentum from moments of heightened progressive excitement to achieve change in
the state Party. Bernal credited the surge in progressive success at the 2017 ADEMs to a
combination of traditional strategies for on-the-ground organizing supplemented by
strategic use of digital media to educate and mobilize supporters. She explained:
Technology being what it is, we have a lot of tools at our disposal that we
didn’t have five, ten years ago. That being said, nothing is going to replace
having relationships in your community. . . .One phone call at a time. One
door knock at a time. One on one outreach. Those are the things that win
elections. Many of the people that turned out for our Berners were people
that remembered him during the primary days.
The vice chair of the progressive caucus sent out an email to its members arguing that the
progressive turnout in ADEM elections was a mandate for change in the Party. On social
media, the new delegates and their supporters reveled in their win as the first step in
turning the momentum of the Sanders campaign toward making the Democratic Party
more progressive. The same activist who had created the “ADEM 2017 Elections
Explained” video created another YouTube video, “Berner Earthquake” (Liberman,
2017) that touted the progressive wins across the state and was shared amongst networks
of progressive activists.
On the Monday after the elections, RoseAnn DeMoro, the head of the California
Nurses Association that had pushed so hard to recruit and support progressive delegates
tweeted an image of blue California bears superimposed over photos of two progressives
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who would be engaged in Party leadership battles in the coming months: Keith Ellison,
who would carry the progressive mantle to the race for Democratic National Committee
Chair in February 2017, and Kimberly Ellis, who was competing with California Party
Vice Chair Eric Bauman to lead the California Democratic Party as its new chair.
DeMoro used a hashtag that was picked up by many new delegates, #SeeYouInSac,
referring to the upcoming California State Party Convention in May 2017 where the
election between Bauman and Ellis would take place.

Figure 21: A tweet by California Nurses Association president RoseAnn DeMoro, using the hashtag
#SeeYouInSac, and depicting both Keith Ellison and Kimberly Ellis. This tweet foreshadowed the
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upcoming battle between Kimberly Ellis and Eric Bauman in the race for chair of the California
Democratic Party.

The state convention and the election for Party chair would be the first major
event through which the newly elected progressive delegates could attempt to leverage
their new formal voice in the state Party. For these activists, the ADEMs had in many
ways been an expression of their identity in opposition to the Party as an organization,
leading them to utilize organizing strategies aimed at leveraging existing networks of
critical progressives to build popular momentum. But their success was also specific to
these single events that are essentially low-participation popularity contests that can be
overwhelmed by a barrage of disaffected registered Democrats turning out to vote. The
limits of those affordances would be tested in the race for state Party chair which would
be a very different contest, with a relatively small, finite pool of potential voters.
Pushing for a Progressive Party Chair: 2017 and 2019
When I walked into the California Democratic Party State Convention in Sacramento in
May of 2017, I was greeted by a chanting group of activists wearing matching hot-pink
shirts with the phrase “Unbought, Unbossed” superimposed on a silhouette of the familiar
“California Republic” bear from the California State flag. Beneath the bear was the
hashtag #ImWithKimberly, referring to Kimberly Ellis, the progressive underdog in the
upcoming election for Party chair, whose insurgent run for chair had upset many Party
regulars. The supporters of her opponent, Eric Bauman, did not sport matching TV shirts,
but all carried bright yellow signs highlighting his constituencies, such as “Labor for
Eric,” “Grassroots for Eric,” and “Young Dems for Eric.” The other politician
prominently presented by activists at this convention was Bernie Sanders, despite having
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been defeated in the 2016 Democratic Primary a year earlier, and not currently on any
ballot at the California convention or elsewhere in the U.S. On the floor as well as outside
the convention were groups of activists wearing well-worn Bernie Sanders hats, pins, and
shirts. From their additional pins, signs, and t-shirts, it was clear that those in Sanders
gear almost exclusively supported Kimberly Ellis in the chair’s race.

Figure 22: Kimberly Ellis (left) and Eric Bauman (right), both candidates for California Democratic Party
Chair, speak to the 2017 California Democratic Convention.

The previous section outlined how progressives worked to win formal
representation by becoming delegates to the State Central Committee of the California
Democratic Party in the January 2017 ADEMs. Just four months later, in May 2017, the
retirement of State Party Chair John Burton presented these newly minted delegates with
the rare opportunity to vote in an open race for a new state Party chair. One long-standing
progressive Party activist explained how capturing the chairpersonship is the primary
opportunity through which delegates can rapidly change the Party:
Honestly man, as a delegate, you get like four votes. You get to vote for
chair, you get to vote for [endorsements of] candidates in your
district…but honestly in the two years you’re a delegate, you really just
vote on chair. . . . [If progressives could] get a chair elected, the chair
could then be in a powerful position to hire more progressive staffers, a
progressive director, all that shit, which could completely change the
187

culture and the systems within the Democratic Party. So…you only have
one vote, but it is the most important fucking thing (Interview Quote).
That vote was to be held at the 2017 California Democratic State Party Convention in
Sacramento in May 2017, which served as the first official event through which the
newly elected progressive assembly delegates could make their presence heard. The Party
chair election was also the culmination of a 2.5 year campaign spearheaded by
progressive supporters of Kimberly Ellis to challenge Eric Bauman, the current Party vice
chair and president of the Los Angeles County Democrats, for the top leadership position
in the state Party. This section first provides background on the Party chair position,
including the dynamics of previous races for chair, the unique dynamics of the 2017 race,
and the candidates involved. It then outlines the strategies and tactics of the Ellis
campaign throughout 2015 and 2016 and how those tactics changed after the election of
Donald Trump and the interest in ADEMs by a new wave of progressive activists became
clear. It then outlines the tactics employed by new and long-standing progressive
delegates attempting to use their numbers to install Ellis as a progressive figurehead to
lead the California Democratic Party. Beyond that, the section also outlines how the
chair’s race, which Ellis ultimately lost by 62 votes, also served as a platform to raise
issues, build solidarity for the progressive wing of the Party, and to publicly critique the
Party’s election procedures. It concludes by describing how, two years later, these new
progressives had to re-orient themselves to the political realities of the next race for chair,
using their time at the 2019 convention also to focus on mobilizing support for Bernie
Sanders’ 2020 presidential run, to influence the committees that approve and enforce
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Party rules and procedures, and to push for progressive candidates to represent their
issues on the Democratic National Committee.
Background on the CDP Chair Race
For long-standing progressives in the California Democratic Party, the idea of a
progressive chair had historically been out of reach. When Kimberly Ellis declared for
the race in October 2015, the Party had seen only two chairs in the previous two decades.
Unlike both Bauman and Ellis in 2017, both of these prior chairs were well known
politicians. When the Progressive Caucus was formed in 2005, Art Torres, a former tenyear member of the California State Assembly (1974-1982) and State Senate (1982-1984)
was in the ninth year of what would eventually be a 12-year tenure at the head of the state
Party. When he stepped down in 2009, progressives considered fielding a candidate for
the position, but the entry of former San Francisco politician John Burton into the race
made such an attempt a non-starter. Burton had served for 16 years in the state assembly
(1964-1974, 1988-1996), ten years in the U.S. House of Representatives (1988-1996),
and 7 years as the president pro tempore of the California State Senate (1998-2004). As
an institution in his own right, he cleared the field of all potential challengers (Capitol
Weekly, 2015).
Prior to Burton’s entry into the race in 2009, Bauman, who would eventually face
Ellis in 2017, had considered pursuing the chair position, but ultimately had to wait eight
years for a chance to compete. A former registered nurse and union member, Bauman had
been involved in the leadership of local and state Party institutions for decades. As both a
Democratic Party and gay rights activist, he served as president of the Los Angeles
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Stonewall Democrats (1994-2001) and was the founding co-chair of National Stonewall
Democrats (1995). At the time of the 2017 race, he was serving both as president of the
Los Angeles County Democrats, the largest county Party in the state, and as male vice
chair of the state Party. The influence he developed over these years led LA Weekly in a
2011 article to describe him as a “kingmaker” in Los Angeles politics (Aron, 2011). Ellis,
while certainly involved in the Party, was not part of the inner circle of the Party as an
organization. She had minimal experience in the formal institutions of the state Party, at
the time serving on the finance committee and as recording secretary of the African
American Caucus. However, Ellis was an up and comer in progressive circles of the
CDP, serving from 2010 to 2016 as executive director of Emerge California, part of a
nationwide advocacy group aimed at training and supporting progressive women to run
for office. In that capacity, she was the first African American woman to head a statewide
Emerge organization. She also previously served on the Community Development
Commission in Richmond, California. Beyond the differences in their activist
backgrounds, their differences in age, race, and demeanor also created a significant
contrast. Bauman, 58, was by his own admission a physically intimidating white man
with a Bronx accent and a brash personal style. He often played up his roots growing up
in the Bronx borough of New York City as the reason for his hard-knuckled political
style and his laser focus on winning elections. Ellis, 43, by contrast, was a stylish African
American woman who spoke with a populist tone about “the people,” organizational
culture, and inclusivity. All of these factors made it easy for activists and journalists to
see the chair’s race as a battle between “old school” and “new school” Democrats (e.g.
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Willon & Mehta, 2017), although the actual dynamics of the race were much more
complex.
Ellis Campaign Pre-Trump
The Ellis campaign, and its rhetorical transformations over her 2.5-year run, exemplify
the difficulty of running a change-focused, outsider-themed campaign in a context where
it is inherently necessary to court activists who have by definition chosen to be insiders.
Further, by what many insiders consider the most important metric of state Party
success—percentage of Party officials in elected office—the CDP was one of the most
successful in the country and difficult to critique on that front. Ellis launched her
campaign with an initial focus on structural issues, including lack of diversity within the
Party. In September of 2015, Kimberly Ellis declared herself as a candidate for the May
2017 election for Chair of the California Democratic Party (Flores & Zapien, 2017). Over
the previous year, she had been recruited by progressive Party activists looking for an
alternative to Bauman, who was considered by most Party insiders to be the presumed
successor to John Burton. The president of the Los-Angeles-based East Area Progressive
Democrats, the largest Democratic Club in California explained:
I helped recruit [Ellis] to run for the office of chair of the Party in part,
because the climate of repression inside the Party was so ferocious that we
had to look outside the ranks of the Party to find a candidate who was
willing to stand up against Eric Bauman, and Kimberly was willing and
took on that rather heroic role (Interview Quote).
In a tweet, she linked to a site on CrowdPAC.com, a fundraising site that claimed it
existed “to give politics back to the people.” Soon after, in October, she launched a
website emploring visitors to support a “new kind of politics” in the Democratic Party by
donating to her candidacy. The site featured a YouTube video montage of supporters
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holding signs featuring a social media hashtag, #ImWithKimberly (ImWithKimberly,
2015). The testimonial of these supporters highlighted how Ellis would create a
Democratic Party that would “represent us all” and “inspire a new generation to join us
old timers and fight for our progressive values.” To the average Democrat, the
testimonials in the montage showcased a diversity of age, racial, and sexual diversity. But
the target for this message was not the average Democrat, but rather the 3200 delegates to
the California Democratic Party who would be voting for Party chair 19 months later at
the State Party Convention. For those in the know, the video showcased Ellis’ support
from progressives within the Democratic Party, including Hilary Crosby, who had upset
the race for state Party controller two years earlier. Over the course of the next 19
months, many of these same activists, as well as others, made the case for Ellis at events
throughout the state and on numerous social media platforms, using the same “I’m With
Kimberly” signs and using the #ImWithKimberly hashtag.
Within the circles of California Democratic Party politics, it was well known that
Bauman planned to seek the chairmanship in 2017, though he did not officially declare
until December 16, 2015, three months after Ellis (Cadelago, 2015). When he did declare,
he leveraged his years as a Party leader in a variety of ways to immediately establish
himself as the clear front runner. In an email announcing his candidacy, he touted the
support of female vice chair Alex Gallardo-Rooker, Reggie Jones Sawyer, the chair of
the Legislative Black Caucus, and state board of equalization member Fiona Ma, a wellknown San Francisco politician. He also had support from Susie Shannon, a regional
chair and co-founder of the Progressive Caucus of the CDP, making clear that he was
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both able and planning to compete with Ellis for progressives. In addition to these
individual endorsements, he also listed the endorsement of the New Frontier Democratic
Club, a decades old Los Angeles-based Democratic Club founded by African Americans.
Seven days later, he used his regular spot as head of the Los Angeles County Democrats
on the local TV program “Charter Local Edition” to discuss his candidacy (Pomerance,
2015). Bauman focused on his Party experience, repeatedly touting his decades of
“winning elections.” In a YouTube video disseminated as part of his campaign launch, he
said he was the “most visible Party officer around the state” and warned against disunion
within the Democratic Party going into the 2016 elections (Bauman, 2015). In general,
his rhetoric focused on growing the Party by contesting and winning more races around
the state, rather than on internal Party concerns or ideology. By February 2016, Bauman
announced on his website that he had “pledged support and endorsements from more than
550 official state Democratic Party delegates,” and was on his way to the 1600 necessary
to win the election (Fleming, 2016a).
An examination of Ellis’ speeches, candidate statements, and other campaign
materials reveals that the first year or her campaign was focused not on economic policies
popular with the emerging Sanders crowd, but on progressive organizational change and
on flagging relationships between the Party and constituents. The themes of Ellis’ early
video testimonials continued as she and her supporters argued that she would make the
Party more racially diverse and increase excitement amongst young voters and voters of
color. Ellis repeatedly contrasted the supermajority of Democrats in elected office in
California with the increasing number of voters in California choosing to register as “no
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Party preference” as a sign that the Party as an institution was failing to connect with
voters (Fleming, 2016b). These early campaign activities took advantage of her
experience advocating for women as the executive director of Emerge California. For
example, in February 2016, she spoke at One Billion Rising North Bay, a Santa Rosa
based chapter of the international organization focused on reducing violence against
women (One Billion Rising North Bay, 2016), and also was featured on the San
Francisco-based podcast “See Jane Do,” in which she was interviewed by local feminist
Elisa Parker (Parker, 2016). Her first endorsement from a Party organization came in
April 2016 from the Democratic Women of Monterey County (Wu, 2016). In her
candidate statement asking for their endorsement, she highlighted her strong support from
the women’s political community (Ellis, 2016). The California Nurses Association was
also supporting Ellis and sponsoring events that allowed her to showcase her vision for
the Party. With these various events, she was slowly picking up some support from
institutional players connected to the Democratic Party.
However, the dynamics of garnering support necessary to win a race for Party
chair was very different from those of an assembly delegate race. While running for
assembly delegate offers progressives the advantage of being able to recruit from a large
pool of potential voters for a low participation election, the race for Party chair is the
exact opposite. The pool of voters for the Party chair election is limited to the 3200
delegates discussed above. As such, a run for Party chair involves intense fundraising,
direct and in-person campaigning, and one-on-one outreach to the finite number of
delegates that decide the outcome of the election. Essentially, it is an exercise in
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horizontal voice across the entire delegation. As discussed above, approximately 2/3 of
the delegates that vote for Party chair are elected officials, their appointees, and members
of county central committees. As Party activists—progressive or otherwise—many
delegates have both a respect for and a predisposition towards leaders who “show up and
do the work.” Bauman’s decades of Party leadership gave him a headstart in that he was a
familiar face to most of these delegates, as well as to many elected assembly delegates.
On his website, ericbauman.com, he touted more endorsements from across the
Democratic political spectrum, including Speaker of the California State Assembly
Anthony Rendon, a centrist by California standards, and liberal Kevin de Leon, the
California Senate pro tempore. In February 2016, when asked about Bauman’s early
delegate lead, Ellis said, “I’m not worried about numbers right now…numbers can
change,” (Fleming, 2016b). However, three months later at the state convention in May
2016, a year out from the election, Bauman claimed to have received pledges from 800 of
the approximately 1600 delegates necessary to win the election. As such, in order to be
competitive, Ellis’ campaign organization and her supporters needed a catalyst to help
turn the momentum created by Bauman’s experience and name recognition. The catalyst
would come in two parts. The first was Donald Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton in
November 2016. The second was the influx of progressive assembly delegates that
entered the Democratic Party in January 2017. This combination of factors would push
Ellis to adopt a decidedly leftist tone and more aggressive, anti-institutionalist critique of
the Democratic Party in the final six months of her campaign.
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Leveraging Critical Narratives of the Party
After Donald Trump unexpectedly defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential
election, pundits and media nationwide began critiquing the Democratic Party for both
underestimating the Trump campaign and being disconnected from voters (e.g. Dovere,
2016). A week after the election, the Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic
Party held a debate between Bauman and Ellis, in which Ellis capitalized on the ongoing
critiques of the Democratic Party—specifically that it was not democratic enough or
progressive enough:
I believe in telling hard truths and facilitating difficult conversations, and
the truth of the matter is that the Democratic Party, as an institution, is not
as small d-democratic as we’d like to believe it to be. It’s time for us to
build power in others, not consolidate and collapse power. We need to
show we are listening by our actions, not just our words (Global Voices
for Justice, 2016).
Around the same time, progressives began to criticize Bauman for connections between
his consulting firm, Victoryland Partners, and lobbyists in the pharmaceutical industry
who had opposed a recently failed bill that would have lowered the cost of prescription
drugs (Matier & Ross, 2016). Citing the corrupting relationship between Party officials
and special interests, Ellis called for increased rules and transparency within the Party to
prevent conflicts of interest in the interactions between Party officers and lobbyists (Cal
Coast News, 2016). Ellis’ rhetoric and vision resonated with progressives. One longstanding progressive activist explained how:
Kimberly Ellis came along and was like fuck this I’m gonna run and be
chair because we can no longer allow people to run as Democrats when
they’re not actually Democrats. It’s not a winning strategy. Our people are
still suffering. We still have the highest poverty rates. We still have all
these problems (Interview Quote).
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As Ellis’ message was lining up with Party critiques taking place after the 2016 election,
organizing was ramping up around the ADEMs. As discussed in the previous chapter, a
contingent of long-standing progressive activists worked to recruit many disaffected
Sanders activists to “take over the Democratic Party,” first by stacking the race for Party
chair and installing a progressive at the head of the Party. Progressive organizations like
Courage Campaign pushed out legislative scorecards through a wide network of
organizations, arguing that a change at the delegate level and in leadership was necessary
to stop the state Party from endorsing “corporate democrats.” One delegate who also
worked for a progressive organization explained:
We had—all the organizations that were really progressive have email
lists—we blasted all of our list telling people to go elect progressive
delegates who can then support Kimberly. . . A lot of our donors
contributed to her campaign, and she used that to hire volunteers to phone
bank and call delegates (Interview Quote).
On January 6, 2017, the day before the ADEMs began, Ellis pushed out a message to her
supporters to vote for delegates who would “help shape the makeup of the California
Democratic Party.” After their success in the ADEMs, the wave of progressive assembly
delegates entered the California Democratic Party in January 2017. Many long-standing
progressive delegates had already been supporting Ellis’ campaign since she declared in
October 2015. However, the influx of new, progressive, assembly delegates in January
2017 made winning the race a potential reality. One progressive activist explained: “It
was like this huge wave, so for the first time ever a bunch of activists getting elected to
the state Party which the whole machine was so terrified and pissed about [be]cause now
they’d have to like do democracy.”
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Despite Ellis’ support for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders in the 2016
presidential primary election, most progressives, including the large contingent of
Sanders supporters, found her views on politics and the Party to be in line with their own.
By the time these new ADEMs arrived, long-standing progressives had already been
introduced to Ellis via the Progressive Caucus of the CDP or at their local progressive
Democratic clubs where she received widespread support. An important factor for many
delegates, was that her run was against the establishment. One new activist, who had also
been a convention delegates for Sanders, explained why he was supporting Ellis:
We are all coalescing around Kimberly Ellis, who is the non-establishment
candidate, and she’s actually brought people on that were Bernie delegates
onto her campaign and she’s willing to open up the Party where the Party
right now you have to be deep in the Party to have any kind of say or be
on any kind of committee. She wants to open that up, she wants to take big
money out of the Democratic Party. She wants to take corporate money
out of the Party. She’s not taking any corporate money in her campaign
either (Interview Quote).
Sanders himself, as well as Our Revolution, endorsed Ellis, providing legitimacy to her
candidacy among the Sanders contingent. Long-standing progressives in the Party were
already familiar with Ellis. Some had helped recruit her to challenge Bauman and
championed her candidacy over the previous two years. The environment of Party
critique that emerged after Trump’s victory allowed her to tap into many of the same
issues that Sanders leveraged to resonate with progressives. Further, the support she
received from National Nurses United, who had aggressively supported Sanders due to
his support for single payer healthcare, provided legitimation with progressives, who
increasingly used the issue as a litmus test for progressive credentials. In a November
2016 debate with Bauman, Ellis argued that the race for chair was not about either of
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them as individuals, but about “where we are as a party, what we stand for, what our
values are, what we are willing to stand up and fight for…” and also “new voice, vision,
and perspective” (Global Voices for Justice, 2016). She also began to invoke the rhetoric
of “the people” vs “the establishment” that had been such an integral part of the 2016
Sanders campaign. The Democratic Party, she argued, has “taken the people for granted.”
In a radio interview discussing both Clinton’s 2016 loss and the race for Party chair, Ellis
explained:
the system, the establishment, the Democratic Party, and really the
Republican Party as well, are out of touch with its base and the people that
make up its party. . . . Many of us who have been members of our parties
for decades feel like our party as an institution has lost [its] way. We have
forgotten who we are and what we stand for. We have forgotten the values
and the principles that we hold so dear. In many respects its about power,
consolidating power, and money. And that is not where the people—not
just of our parties—but of this country are right now. And as a result, we
saw that played out. We saw people vote not just—and again, sexism and
racism absolutely played into [Clinton’s loss]—as well as the system, the
institutions of power, both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party
not seeing that and/or completely ignoring it and thinking that we could
squeeze this one out. And we saw very clearly on Tuesday that we could
not (Kemp, 2016).
Further, she highlighted her “500 unique and individual donors, most of which have
come in at $100 or less” (Global Voices for Justice, 2016). Just as Sanders had touted his
small-dollar donations, Ellis also used them to represent her connection to “the people”
rather than to corporate donors.
Ellis’ critique of the Democratic Party and anti-establishment rhetoric resonated
with many progressives, particularly those who had in 2016 engaged for the first time in
party politics. In the final six months of the campaign, Ellis travelled the state making her
case to delegates and working to counter Bauman’s long list of Party and union
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endorsements. Ellis racked up the endorsements of numerous players in the progressive
space. She also had the endorsement of nine, mostly rural, county central committees
(Ellis, 2017b), the delegates of which were dominated by the progressives who had ran
up numbers in those areas during the 2017 ADEMs. Dozens of Progressive Democratic
Clubs, such as the San Diego Progressive Democrats and Wellstone Democrats of
Sacramento endorsed her in the early months of 2017. National Nurses United also began
a major push for Ellis. Further, many of the new progressive delegates who had come
from local chapters of extraparty organizations like Our Revolution and Indivisible made
clear to their groups the importance of the Party chair race and created momentum for
Ellis on social media. The national arm of Our Revolution endorsed Ellis, highlighting
her platform to “detangl[e] California’s political ties to corporate money” (Wildermuth &
Garofoli, 2017). As each endorsement came in, the groups that had already endorsed her
would blast out updates on social media to excite their constituents about Ellis’
momentum (San Diego Progressive Democratic Club, 2017).
Beyond mobilizing delegates and organizations, progressives in California also
highlighted, and in some cases hosted, several debates between Ellis and Bauman. The
Progressive Caucus of the CDP hosted their first debate in San Diego on Nov 19, 2016.
At a January 2017 debate held in Cerritos and hosted by the Humbert Humphrey
Democratic Club and Yes We Can Democratic Club, the debate moderator asked each
candidate to describe the purpose of the California Democratic Party (Global Voices for
Justice, 2017). Ellis called for laying out progressive principles and holding Democratic
elected officials accountable to uphold them in office:
200

I believe that one of the main functions of the California Democratic Party
as an institution is to move forward in a bigger, better, bolder way our
progressive values as Democrats. I believe it is the responsibility of the
California Democratic Party to make sure that every elected official who
wears the banner of Democrat, who comes to this party to get our
endorsement, who comes to this party to get our money, who comes to this
party to get our sweat equity, knocking on doors, phone banking, out in
the trenches…if you are a Democratic elected official in the state of
California it is your responsibility to be beholden not to the special
interests in Sacramento, it is not your job to focus on protecting your
incumbency, it is not your job to focus on protecting special money
interests, it is your job to do the will of the people of California.
In contrast, Bauman focused on the Democratic Party as a big tent of competing interests
that work together to win elections:
The California Democratic Party as an entity is the place where grassroots
progressive activists, elected officials, labor unions, and all the people that
make up the big tent of the Democratic Party get to come together. . . .
And you see in California we’ve been doing it right. Its the one place in
the country where we keep electing more Democrats. Its the one place in
America where we’re passing progressive legislation. It’s the one place in
America where wall-to-wall Democrats control the state.
He also highlighted his belief that Party members share core, but not all values:
We share a core set of values. And in our party being a big tent, we have
some members of our party in elected office who probably strap their guns
to their waists when we’re not looking, and we have others who probably
don’t think marriage equality should be the law of the land, and we surely
probably have a few that have questions about reproductive choice and a
few other issues not to mention.”
Down the stretch of the campaign, his rhetoric focused on building on the state Party’s
existing electoral successes in order to fight Donald Trump, who he referred to as the
“orange haired monster” (United Democrats of the San Gabriel Valley, 2017). He
described the California Democratic Party as a “big blue beacon of hope” for the rest of
the nation, that could provide the “roadmap back to power [for the rest of the country].”
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Further, he explained that Democrats needed to “embrace three core pillars: that we are
the party of the big tent; the party of bold ideas; and the party that is building the future.”
Ellis turned Bauman’s embrace of the Party’s electoral success into a critique of
its ability to enact real change under the current leadership. She argued that other state
parties could blame Republicans for their inability to move forward progressive
legislation, but in California the Democratic Party was to blame. Ellis argued:
“Let’s talk about the supermajority that we have - I would like to remind
us that we had a supermajority a few years ago. The question for then and
for now - what are we doing with it? What are we doing with this
supermajority now that we hold all of the houses? What are we doing as it
relates to getting money out of politics? What are we doing to make sure
we close the loopholes in proposition 13to make sure we redirect those
funds back to our public education system? Yes, California does some
things good, and we still have work to do.””
Progressives rallied around Ellis’ critique of the Democratic Party, organizing numerous
events for Ellis across the state (2/19: Fresno; 2/22: Orange County; 3/12: Upland; 3/13:
Los Angeles; San Francisco, 3/20) to “kickoff” the final five months of the campaign in
the new year. At these events, she touted herself as a “battle tested warrior to lead the
resistance,” (Steiner, 2017) linking herself to the term now associated with popular
opposition the Trump administration and said her campaign would “redefine what it
means to be a Democrat.” At these events, and on her website, she presented a sevenpoint plan focused on prioritizing Party organizing (Evans, 2017), strategically deploying
resources, and pushing for long-term growth in the Party across the state. She also
specifically highlighted the need to “lead through coordination” with organized third
parties, “rather than be threated by their efforts or dismissive of their longevity. We need
to lead with open mindedness, leverage energy and enthusiasm, find common ground—
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not reject them.” To that end, she started to use in her own campaign the
“#SeeYouInSac” hashtag that had emerged around the ADEM elections.

Figure 23: A tweet by Kimberly Ellis following a meeting with the College Democrats of UC Irvine.

As the convention approached, the basic narrative that many Ellis supporters
pushed was that Bauman was a Party insider whereas Ellis was an organizer. There was
pushback from some progressives on this narrative. Indeed, interviews revealed that some
long-standing progressive Party activists who had supported Sanders in 2016 were
backing Bauman in the race for chair. In the Daily Kos, David Atkins, a progressive Party
activist since the 2004 Dean Campaign, argued that progressives who try to “throw out
everyone in the old guard” do so at their peril (Atkins, 2017). He acknowledged the
“constant conflict between those who advocate making change by pushing aggressively
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from the outside, versus those who advocate pushing hard more quietly from the inside,”
but argued the latter was more expedient in bringing about change. He cited numerous
times the Party had benefitted on progressive issues from Bauman’s connections with
legislators. The Bauman campaign worked to highlight this narrative. His campaign sent
out a mass email to Democratic activists and club mailing lists containing a letter of
support from Hilda Solis, President Obama’s former secretary of labor, signed by a who’s
who of female politicians from all over California (Fresno County Democrats, 2017). The
letter highlighted Bauman’s role in unseating Republicans in prior campaigns and said:
We applaud Kimberly Ellis and EMERGE for all the incredibly important
work they do for women candidates—let’s be clear about that. But for this
job at this time, Eric is our choice.
One assembly delegate and self-described “Warren Progressive” who also leads a
Democratic club in Ventura County explained how, he, and most of his club, supported
Eric Bauman, given the strong relationship that most had with him as the chair of the
Democratic Party in nearby Los Angeles County. While some long-standing
progressives, particularly those closer to the Party leadership, were certainly privately
debating the benefits of experience vs ideology, the progressive caucus and its many new
members were active on social media promoting Ellis’ #ImWithKimberly campaign and
organizing other progressive events for the weekend of the 2017 California State
Convention. On Twitter and Facebook, progressives highlighted the existence of
appointed delegates as antidemocratic, encouraging elected officials not to “instruct
[their] delegates for CDP chair. Let them decide who to support!” Others lamented the
lack of a true secret ballot, arguing that, because the processes called for the votes
eventually being made public, there were pressures on delegates to maintain loyalty to the
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powerful out of fear of political retribution down the line. The #SeeYouInSac hashtag
also saw a resurgence in the week before the convention, as progressive activists used it
to create a sense of momentum for the Ellis campaign and the convention as a whole. The
hashtag was also used by activists—both delegates and critics of the Democratic Party—
to organize events outside the convention around specific issues and related critiques of
the Democratic Party.
The Convention and the Ellis Campaign
Going into the convention, Ellis had a lot of momentum with progressive assembly
delegates. These delegates were able to provide visible support for Ellis around the
convention center and in the general session. Some progressive activists worked to
introduce Ellis to any delegates who had not yet had the opportunity to meet her
personally. Given that most delegates arrived on Friday, and the vote was not until late
Saturday, activists saw the first 24 hours as their final push to garner support for Ellis.
That said, many of the new progressive entrants to the Party did not have the insider
relationships to support Ellis in her campaign by interacting one-on-one with longstanding delegates. As discussed above, delegates elected in assembly districts only
comprise 1/3 of the total Party delegates that vote in the election for chair. As with the
“superdelegates” at the national level, many progressives saw the one third of delegates
comprised of Party leaders and elected officials (PLEOs) and their appointees as a means
for members of “the establishment” to put their finger on the scale of the chair election.
One activist explained the difficulties that challenger candidates face in garnering
support from those delegates.
205

I mean [in a traditional campaign] data’s really helpful…when you’re
running for office. You can walk up to someone’s door and know ahead of
time who’s in the household, how old they are…whether or not they’re a
Republican or a Democrat. You actually don’t have that kind of nuanced
information when you’re running for CADEM [positions] because you
don’t always know who the PLEOs are gonna be…I mean you hope that
you can talk to the elected official and the elected official is going to direct
the PLEOs to vote the elected official’s conscience and sometimes they
allow the PLEOs to vote their own conscience but not usually and you
hope that you’re able to sway those elected officials.
One progressive delegate who also worked for a progressive advocacy group felt that
most minds are made up by the time of the convention. He explained:
The convention is a dog and pony show. They do these like,
protests…where a candidate will walk around the convention—you know
50 of their volunteers or staff with their signs to show—its a pissing
contest, you know. . . .[but there may be some] conversations there to be
had. By the time of the convention the work has been done. I mean, most
of its behind the scenes and so when you get to the convention all you
really have time for is – ‘oh you’ve never met Kimberly Ellis and you’re
still undecided – you should just meet her and let’s talk. Let me see if I
can introduce you to her’ There’s some of that, but that’s it (Interview
Quote).
Despite many votes being solidified in advance of the convention, there were some
undecideds and in my observation, they often shared a similar profile—certain delegates
who leaned progressive and had been involved in the Party since well before the recent
influx of new progressives. Many of these delegates told me they valued Bauman’s
experience and his knowledge of the inner workings of state and Party politics. One such
activist, who had been a Sanders delegate at the 2016 DNC convention and remained
undecided on the chair’s race until hours before the vote, told me he was leaning toward
Bauman due to his experience, despite being excited by the surge of excitement around
Kimberly Ellis. A friend of his who was a Bauman supporter spent over an hour on the
first day of the convention lobbying him personally to support Bauman as well, citing the
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need to balance ideological concerns with the experience necessary to lead the largest
state Party in the country. In the end, the activist ended up supporting Bauman. In my
limited observation, the tactic of trying to identify and convince persuadable delegates at
the convention was employed to a much larger degree by Bauman supporters. That said,
it is possible—indeed likely—that some long-standing progressive Party activists with
intraparty relationships were indeed attempting to persuade their peers to support Ellis.
However, a large contingent of progressive delegates were engaged in other more visible
public activities.
The activist who told me that delegate support is largely cemented prior to the
convention suggested that the main tactic delegates can employ at the convention itself is
to “make a shit ton of noise” (Interview Quote). Indeed, many progressive delegates
certainly did just that. Prior to the start of the program on Friday evening, activists held
protests both outside and in the halls of the convention center, chanting “hey hey, ho ho,
corporate dems have got to go.” As DNC chair Tom Perez attempted to make a speech,
protestors in the audience, many with Kimberly Ellis signs, repeatedly interrupted with
calls for single payer health care. At many moments, the audience could no longer hear
Perez. Many seated delegates in the audience, who had applauded Perez when he was
introduced, looked at each other in exasperation, many rolling their eyes at the
commotion coming from the delegates with pink Ellis shirts or Bernie gear. These
repeated interruptions eventually led outgoing Party chair John Burton to tell the
protestors to “sit the fuck down, please” and show “some fucking courtesy” (T.
Anderson, 2017). During the morning general session on Saturday, Party leaders,
207

including Nancy Pelosi and Gavin Newsom, made speeches to the convention hall,
protestors again in the audience, many with Kimberly Ellis signs, repeatedly interrupted
with more calls for single payer health care. Newsom’s speech received particularly
fierce ire from progressives, likely because of his recent decision to endorse both Ellis
and Bauman (Tavares, 2017). On Twitter, delegates expressed frustration that the
speeches, mostly by elected officials, focused too much on Trump, impeachment, and
Russia, and not on policy issues.
While there were numerous events around the convention aimed at Ellis
supporters, they seemed aimed at creating solidarity and excitement rather than at
reaching undecided delegates. Indeed, there were so many progressive-focused events
that one could largely choose to ignore all Party-sponsored events in favor of spending
time with like-minded progressives. After rallies on Friday, an active progressive
delegate could choose to attend a “Berniecrats Dinner” hosted by Wellstone Progressive
Democrats, Our Revolution, and Organize California, followed by an Ellis campaign
mixer at the Capitol Garage (Ellis, 2017a), a bar and restaurant across from the
convention. The latter event, a sea of pink Kimberly Ellis shirts, allowed supporters to
meet Ellis, take photos, and meet other supporters. Later that night, a group of
progressive delegates organized to crash a party hosted by the California Young Dems,
who had endorsed Bauman, carrying #ImWithKimberly and #BernieWouldveWon signs.
On Saturday, many progressive activists, including Ellis, went and joined a picket line
where a Communication Workers of America local was protesting against AT&T while
others attended a meeting of the Progressive Democrats of America.
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On Saturday afternoon, a few hours before voting began, the general session had
the attention of progressives, many of whom were livestreaming the convention on the
Facebook pages of Berniecrats of California and California for Progress. First, RoseAnn
DeMoro, president of the California Nurses Association, directly addressed the cheering
“Bernie supporters” as “the future of this party.” To loud cheers from the insurgents in
the audience, she called for the Democratic Party to have “vision, courage and a sense of
purpose,” arguing that neither “the status quo” nor “be[ing] more conservative in
conservative areas” were effective paths forward for the Party. She then called on
Democrats to unite behind SB562, the single payer healthcare bill that was that was
facing resistance from some Democrats as its way through the state legislature. In her
speech, she did not hide her contempt for many leaders who would not commit to single
payer, saying: “I listen to all the doublespeak on this issue and frankly I’m sick of it.”
Then, in a tone mocking those Democrats with more moderate healthcare goals, she said:
“I support universal healthcare,” and then respond to herself with “well then support
SB562. It’s the real deal.” She closed with a warning:
If you dismiss progressive values and reinforce the dynamic status quo,
don’t assume the activists in California or around this country are going to
stay with the Democratic Party. . . . I want the Party unified but we’re not
going to unify around the status quo, we’re not going to unify around
consensus about nothing. . . . Consensus for consensus sake is over. We’ve
lost and we’ve lost and we’ve lost. And we’re gonna win. We’re gonna
win and we’re gonna move this movement, Berniecrats, across the
nation.”
The new progressive delegates responded loudly, yelling and waving their signs. Soon
after, Bauman and Ellis made their closing speeches, Bauman again focusing on his
decades of Party work, travelling to “every corner of the state many, many times.” At this
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point, the Ellis campaign doubled down on her outsider standing, energizing her
supporters in the room, and likely those watching on progressive livestreams, perhaps at
the expense of any persuadable delegates that remained in the room. She was introduced
by Nina Turner, an out-of-state former Ohio Congresswoman and staunch Sanders
supporter, who called on delegates to “mount up and exert [their] power,” and, citing
Nelson Mandela, “make the impossible possible” by voting for Ellis. In Ellis’ speech, she
said the race was about the “heart and soul of the Democratic Party” and “remembering
that we are the party of the poor, the party of the working class.” She called for a focus
“not just on winning elections, but on winning back hearts and minds.” As she closed, her
supporters cheered loudly in the hall. They marched out and down escalators, posting
photos on social media of their noisy, hot pink wave as it headed to the rooms where the
vote for chair would take place.
Four hours later, Ellis’ supporters gathered in a large room inside the convention
hall to hear RoseAnn DeMoro announce that Ellis had lots by 62 votes. It was clear from
the silence that overtook the room that most in attendance had expected Ellis to win.
Conversations in the room varied from indignance over what they felt was an inherently
rigged process and attempts to highlight how well the campaign had done in what was
inherently an uphill battle. This range of feelings was exemplified by posts on social
media from those in the room. A progressive who had been active in the Party for several
years offered a more measured reminder on Twitter to the disappointed new delegates:
Peeps: We just made a huge statement in a race that never should’ve been
close. Stop bitching. Keep fighting. #CADEM17 #ImWithKimberly”

210

About an hour after the announcement, Ellis briefly came to greet supporters, letting
them know that her team “has serious concerns about the vote.”
Critiquing the Election
At the convention the following morning, it was clear that Ellis and supporters felt there
were legitimacy issues with the previous day’s vote. In advance of the vote, the Ellis
campaign had identified over 50% of those attending the convention as their pledged
supporters, or their proxies. As such, their primary complaint was not necessarily with the
count of votes cast, but with the eligibility of those who had voted.
Ellis called not for a recount but for “validating the votes.” Bauman’s acceptance
speech was repeatedly interrupt by boos and chants by Ellis supporters. One supporter,
after asking to be recognized during open discussion of proposed rule changes unrelated
to the chair’s race, proposed, to cheers from throughout the room, that the rules be
suspended, and Ellis and Bauman be elected co-chairs by affirmation. He was told that
the Party by-laws provided no means through which to suspend the rules.
Around mid-day, to chants of “Kimberly, Kimberly,” Ellis spoke to her supporters
in Cesar Chavez Park, down the street from the convention center. In a livestream
interview given to a Youtube-based citizen journalist as she headed to the park, reiterated
her call to “validate the votes” by making sure everyone who voted was credentialed and
eligible to vote. She invoked the imagery of the “smoke-filled rooms” of past Party
conventions and, as she had in the campaign, insisted the Party was not as “democratic,
truthful, transparent” as it claimed to be.
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One long-standing Party activist who worked for a California-focused progressive
advocacy organization held short from accusing Party insiders of rigging the election. He
did, however, explain how the lack of electoral transparency and financial incentives for
maintaining the status quo made it plausible to imagine.
I wouldn’t put it past the state Party that it was totally rigged. And I’m not
like, a conspiracy theorist. Its so easy. They control how the votes are
counted. They control where the votes are counted [and] who takes what
boxes where. I mean the whole thing is very easy to manipulate. And if
everyone’s like – what’s most important is that we win. They’re gonna do
whatever it takes to win. And win means making sure everyone gets paid.
The consultants stay. All that bullshit. Let’s just keep everything the way
it is. (Interview Quote)
In the months that followed, Ellis and her supporters attempted to put pressure on the
CDP to allow for various steps of independent auditing. As she interacted with the CDP,
she posted updates on her website that were shared widely within progressive circles
online, including by numerous local Our Revolution groups, progressive Democratic
clubs, the CDP Progressive Caucus, Sanders groups, and local chapters of the Progressive
Democrats of America.
Ellis and her supporters also attempted to keep progressives focused on the story
via media. As traditional media stopped covering the conflict shortly after the convention,
they used digital media to keep the story alive in online progressive circles. Much of this
advocacy took place in progressive blogs, online newspapers, and internet-based video
news programs. Ellis supporters published critiques in numerous online publications
critiquing the process. In the Spanish language newspaper, La Opinión, delegate Linda
Perez (2017) accused the state Party of negligence in eschewing a review of all votes,
pointing out that Bauman’s position as Party vice chair and president of the Los Angeles
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County Democrats gave him disproportionate access to the Party’s machinery of
operations. In an open letter to the California Democratic Party published in IndyBay, a
project of the San Francisco Bay Area Independent Media Center, delegate Joel Block
(2017) accused CDP staff of numerous procedural irregularities. These included,
announcing Bauman’s win on a Saturday night via the Party’s Twitter account, and
refusing to provide vote totals or any opportunity for delegates to act in any official
capacity to resolve the disputed results.
In the months that followed, Ellis gave interviews to progressive podcasters and
online media programs. On numerous occasions, she, and other progressive delegates
appeared on The Young Turks Rebel HQ, a left-wing YouTube channel to discuss the
status of the contested election. In the end, Ellis never conceded the race to Bauman, and
it is unclear what a forensic audit might have revealed. The Ellis campaign never went
forward with a lawsuit but maintained that there were legitimacy issues with
approximately 200 votes.
Ellis’ loss forced a decision on many of the new activists who had entered the
Party earlier that year. Many of them had been encouraged to run with the understanding
that they were doing so in order to “take over the California Democratic Party” by
installing Kimberly Ellis as party chair. When that attempt failed, it raised some of the
same questions about whether to exit the Party or remain inside in their new formal rules
to use voice to push the Party to the left with tactics that were less sweeping, and more
incremental. After the vote, a delegate who had also been a Sanders delegate to the 2016
convention, and ran a statewide “Berniecrats” Facebook page, told me:
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A lot of people over here don’t believe that it was a fair election because
of all the shitty things that have happened. . . . It’s hard to know what’s
gonna happen now to the Party. A lot of people may be leaving. I don’t
know. I don’t know what the right answer is. Its very disheartening. It
would [have been] great to be able to start raising money and running
against the establishment Democrats in multiple different races (Interview
Quote).
This delegate effectively abandoned the goal of taking the state Party over from the inside
after Ellis’ loss and did not reengage in Party politics until Sanders announced in early
2019 that he would again seek the Democratic nomination. A comparison of the 2017 and
2019 progressive slates for assembly delegate revealed that his decision was not unique.
While many “Berniecrats” did run for assembly delegate again in 2019, some had been
replaced on the slates by new activists, many of whom had been engaging in local
progressive groups over the previous two years. The leader of a local progressive group
in the Bay Area explained that “many of them did not know what they were getting into.
There was a lot of excitement in the beginning…and having to keep that up was going to
be difficult” (Interview Quote). RL Miller, who had written the Daily Kos article,
discussed above, that encouraged activists to run in 2017, inserted a caveat into her
updated post in advance of the 2019 ADEMs:
The California Democratic Party is in a transitional phase at the moment.
People form slates and run for Party delegate for all sorts of reasons
(notably, in 2017, to stack votes for the chair’s race). When I vote, I’ll be
voting for people who are not committed to any single person for Party
chair, but rather committed to building a better Party that can change
California and the world (Miller, 2018).
Her reference to an upcoming vote for Party chair is notable, not only in that it
discouraged entry into the Party by activists only interested in the race for Party chair, but
also in that it referenced a 2019 race at all, as Bauman had in 2017 been elected to a four214

year term. As it turned out, delegates would have the opportunity to vote, and Ellis would
have the opportunity to compete, for the chair position much sooner than expected.
An Attempt in 2019:
In late November 2018, just 1.5 years into his four-year term, Bauman would resign after
accusations of sexual harassment by numerous Party staff members and Party activists
(Willon & Mason, 2018). A new election would be held in May of 2019, but, the
structure of political opportunity would be much more difficult for progressives. First,
long-standing Party activists who had been caught off guard by progressives in the 2017
ADEMs were ready to compete in January 2019. While progressives still did very well,
they lost some ground compared to their wins two years earlier. Second, the campaign
saw multiple candidates competing, and those candidates were less clearly defined as
establishment vs progressive. The most moderate candidate, Rusty Hicks, the president of
the Los Angeles Federation of Labor, entered the race with much of the support Bauman
had received, as well as extremely strong support from across the labor movement,
arguably the strongest institution in California politics. Further, the race saw two
progressives competing. Ellis was challenged for the progressive mantle by Daraka
Larimore-Hall, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, the current male vice
chair of the state Party and former chair of the Santa Barbara County Democrats. In
interviews with supporters of both Larimore-Hall and Ellis, the consensus was that Hicks
was unbeatable from the start. One Ellis supporter recounted her disappointment over
Larimore-Hall’s run and the election as a whole:
We were really mad at [Larimore-Hall]. Even though he’s really really
qualified. But he’s not the revolution because he’s still a man. At least
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that’s how I felt about it. I don’t think that’s necessarily universal. Daraka
and Kimberly have very similar politics. And he’s just an inspired
speechgiver, its really amazing. I think we saw Kimberly’s candidacy and
what she stood for as being real change within the Party. And, even if
Daraka’s votes would have gone to Kimberly the results would have been
the same. Rusty won by a landslide which was really disheartening.
Her disappointment was echoed by others who felt the real opportunity for progressives
to lead the Party had been lost back in 2017. Many progressives certainly supported Ellis
or Larimore-Hall with their votes but had not campaigned to the degree they had during
Ellis’ initial campaign. As the next section shows, many had instead been working to
push the Party to the left in more incremental ways, by building progressive solidarity
and increasing the prominence of progressive ideas within the state Party’s formal and
informal discourses, including the Party platform.
Increase the Prominence of Progressive Ideas in the California Democratic Party
At an August 2017 regional meeting of the Progressive Caucus of the CDP at the
Sheraton Hotel in Anaheim, California, I observed as caucus chair Karen Bernal
welcomed delegates from the podium:
“Are there troublemakers in this room? Are you here to go along to get
along? Are you here to make trouble? Beautiful. You’ve come to the right
caucus. This is the original raucous caucus. Welcome to the Progressive
Caucus.” (Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party, 2017)
Each of Bernal’s prompts elicited a loud roar from the several-hundred delegates, a mix
of long-standing progressive Party activists and new activists who had entered the Party
via the January 2017 ADEM elections. I had seen Bernal rally up the crowd before,
always reveling in presenting the caucus as a team of radicals, inside an intransigent
institution, that would do what it takes to drag the rest of the Party kicking and screaming
towards their vision of progress. Unsurprisingly, this attitude was attractive to many of
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the new delegates who had come to find a home within the caucus. And indeed, the
Progressive Caucus certainly engages in some raucous protest actions and was an integral
part of Kimberly Ellis’ run for Party chair. But despite her revolutionary rhetoric, the
Progressive Caucus of the CDP also serves as an avenue through which activists engage
in some more mundane and institutional tactics for influencing the Party as an
organization.
Thus far, this chapter has discussed how activists organized to enter the Party as
assembly delegates and immediately had the opportunity to use their voices to try to bring
about a groundswell of support, for “taking over the Democratic Party” via the election of
Kimberly Ellis. Had Ellis won, it likely would have brought significant change to the
California Democratic Party as an organization. That said, such opportunities for a drastic
ideological change at the head of the Party are rare. Long-standing progressive delegates
to the CDP are accustomed to the limits of their role as delegates and Ellis’ loss made
clear that, while their numbers had grown following the ADEMs, they still lacked the
majority numbers necessary to bring change so quickly to the Party. As such, they, along
with many new progressive delegates, returned to their strategy of using their voices to
increase the prominence of progressive ideas within the Party as an organization. One of
the primary vehicles for exercising that collective voice is the Progressive Caucus of the
CDP, which, through in-person and online events, allows progressive activists to build
community, share information, develop strategic, consistent discourse for discussing their
issues. Via these processes, they also develop a collective identity as progressives within
the CDP that influences their choice of actions at statewide Party events, in their home
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communities, and in shared digital spaces. Beyond the caucus, activists also organize
strategically and independently to make their voices heard via formal resolutions and acts
of dissent at Party conventions and committee meetings.
The Progressive Caucus of the CDP
The influx of progressive delegates into the CDP in 2017 was by no means a completely
new phenomenon. As discussed above, the last year of George W. Bush’s first term saw
progressive activists across California become activated in Democratic Party politics
through a variety of avenues, including but not limited to, the anti-war movement, as well
as the presidential campaigns of Howard Dean and Dennis Kuninich. After the primary,
many of these activists became involved in the loose, hybrid (in-person and online)
networks of Democracy for America (DFA), Progressive Democrats of America (PDA),
and other “netroots” organizations that were emerging nationwide. Like the recent
Sanders supporters, many of these activists worked to gain formal representation in the
California Democratic Party by running for delegate to the CDP State Central Committee
via the ADEMs or by running for their local County Central Committee. At that time,
dozens of small organizations—local DFA and PDA groups, blogger networks, etc.—
formed loose networks around two larger groups, SoCal Grassroots and Take Back Red
California that would lead to the creation of a formal Progressive Caucus within the
California Democratic Party. In Southern California, SoCal Grassroots was a robust,
ideologically progressive organization that had grown out of the Dean and Kuchinich
campaigns. By contrast, Take Back Red California, based in Northern California, was
specifically focused on combatting the narrow funneling of resources by the state Party to
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candidates in reliably Democratic areas. They fundraised for, and lobbied the state {arty
to support, Democrats in parts of the state that had long been ignored by the state Party.
At the CDP State Convention in April 2005, activists from these organizations
came together for a meeting of an unofficial, unchartered, progressive caucus. The
meeting, attended by over 100 activists, was the most well attended caucus meeting at the
convention. Interviews and archival research reveal the early progressive caucus served
activists in a variety of ways. One of the co-founders of the caucus explained that it was
conceived as “an incubator for ideas, activism, and leadership, to impact the Party
platform” (Interview Quote). In a 2005 blog post, a leader of California for Democracy, a
statewide umbrella group of DFA chapters, outlined how the caucus was meant to expand
the left-wing of the Democratic Party. The post read:
The Progressive Caucus speaks to those people who have left the
Democratic Party because the Party was not meeting their needs, nor
adequately representing them. This caucus has a unique opportunity to
reach out to disenchanted Democrats, Greens, and Independents, and offer
them a home within the Democratic Party. The Caucus also provides a
voice for grassroots activists within the Party” (California For Democracy,
n.d.).
In 2009, the Caucus helped elect their first endorsed progressive to the five-person state
Party executive board. Hilary Crosby, who came up through Take Back Red California,
upset the race for Party controller, defeating Eric Bradley, a well-connected incumbent
(Larimore-Hall (2014)). Her win followed a grassroots campaign that saw her personally
organizing up and down the state calling both for increasing financial transparency within
the state Party and for grassroots fundraising as a means of countering the influence of
special interests in determining Party priorities.
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Given the fact that it has been around for fifteen years, the Progressive Caucus is
accepted within Party circles, but is by no means without controversy. Prior to the
creation of Progressive Caucus, the CDPs caucuses were traditionally formed around a
specific issue (e.g. the Environmental Caucus) or constituent group (e.g. the African
American Caucus). When it was created, many Party regulars were upset because the
establishment of an ideologically-based “progressive caucus” within the state Party
implied that the Party itself was not sufficiently progressive (Larimore-Hall, 2014).
Further, over the years, the Caucus has taken public positions that have drawn the ire of
Party leaders. Most infamously in Party circles, the caucus sponsored a resolution in 2011
encouraging a primary challenge to then-President Barack Obama, a controversy which
created uproar in the African American Caucus and nearly led to the official
decertification of the Progressive Caucus as an official entity within the CDP. In many
ways, the Caucus revels in its agitator reputation, with its leaders referring to it as the
“raucous caucus” (Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party, 2017) and the
“troublemaker caucus”. In conversations with Progressive Caucus members, elected
officials have conceded that the caucus, while at times frustrating, serves a purpose by
holding Democrats accountable and pushing on specific issues (e.g. McCarty in the July
25th virtual meeting and someone in Larimore Hall). That said, its inability to bring about
rapid change has at times frustrated its own members.
While the Progressive Caucus has consistently been since its inception the largest
caucus in the CDP, it saw significant attrition by those activists who entered following
the 2004 election and “didn’t see change as quickly as they would want, being disgusted
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with the process for all kind of reasons and leaving” (Interview Quote). Despite this
attrition, the durability of the caucus itself, its constant role as a link between progressive
activists and Party leaders, and the ability of its leaders to maintain its size by recruiting
candidates to run for delegate, all serve to create infrastructure for leveraging
progressives entering into the Party during moments of increased progressive activism.
Most importantly, the Caucus provides within the formal structure of the CDP a
space for activists–particularly new activists—that is unabashedly progressive. As
mentioned above, one of the goals of the Progressive Caucus of the CDP upon its
creation was for it to serve as “an incubator for [progressive] ideas, activism, and
leadership” (Interview Quote). To enable such an environment, its leaders and members
work together to develop progressive solidarity, community, and a collective identity that
influences and enables actions by both veteran and new Party activists. They do that by
serving as a networking environment for building community, and a conduit for
information sharing, while also allowing for the ongoing negotiation of a shared
progressive discourse and understanding of issues and priorities.
Community Building, Information Sharing, and Shared Discourse
To those strategic ends, the caucus utilizes a specific repertoire of organizing tactics.
First, the Caucus hosts public meetings for its members to engage in dialogue with its
one-another and collectively decide the election of its leadership. For example, at the
same 2017 CDP State Convention where activists were attempting to install Kimberly
Ellis as Party chair, the Progressive Caucus also held its own meeting. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, the large, general sessions of the 2017 CDP State Convention in
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Sacramento saw numerous interruptions by activists protesting the Party’s lack of
commitment to single payer healthcare and to environmental issues. If there was any
doubt in my mind as to which activists were making the bulk of that noise, it was
abundantly clear upon entering the meeting of the Progressive Caucus later that day. Prior
to the start of the caucus meeting, hundreds of Caucus members in hot-pink Kimberly
Ellis shirts and Bernie gear were clustered together engaged in loud discussion. For
activists who had just entered the Party, this was their first in-person meeting, and the
Bernie gear served as a means of identifying themselves to like-minded progressives.
Many Ellis supporters also wore Bernie pins or hats along with their hot-pink Kimberly
Ellis shirts, signaling that Ellis was the pick for those ideologically aligned with Sanders.
At this lively meeting that lived up to the group’s “raucous caucus” nickname, the
Caucus was holding its own elections for its executive board and numerous candidates
made their case for caucus chair as well as other positions. Across candidates, numerous
themes arose, but the most consistent arguments made related to their support for Sanders
in 2016. Karen Bernal, running for another term as caucus chair after a two-year hiatus,
cited in her speech her experience as chair of the 2016 Sanders delegation to the
Democratic National Convention. Her opponent pointed to his time working for Bernie in
Iowa. Another candidate, running for central vice chair, claimed to have worked to
convince Sanders to run and explained how she “opened the Fresno office for Bernie
when he ran, and staffed it.” Across the candidate statements and beyond, the meeting
was a friendly space for Bernie supporters and those with critiques of the Democratic
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Party, many of which were still focused on the 2016 election. In general, the elections
were not contentious, as Karen Bernal was re-elected as chair after a ___ year hiatus.
Beyond determining their leadership, in-person meetings also allow the caucus
leaders and members to engage in dialogue and develop a shared discourse, as well
as activist capacity for understanding and discussion of progressive issues. In its
capacity as a statewide caucus of the CDP, the Progressive Caucus meets four times a
year—a full membership meeting at the annual state CDP convention and three regional
meetings throughout the year held alongside CDP executive board meetings. Speaking to
her membership, Bernal explained how the caucus “is quite famous [within the CDP] for
not allowing the cattle call that we see at all the other caucuses with lines of people
[waiting to make pitches to the caucus]. . . . We come for real talk about the issues.”
For example, at the same 2017 meeting where she was re-elected, Bernal insisted
that as progressives, “we will not be denied our issues” and unveiled a report entitled
Autopsy, Democratic Party in Crisis. The report was sponsored by RootsAction, a
progressive advocacy organization co-founded by a long-standing member of the CDP
Progressive Caucus. From the podium, Bernal outlined the report’s key critiques of the
Party on issues including, but not limited to, race, corporate power, mobilization, and the
military. Around the room, most audience members were nodding, while reading through
the individual copies of the report that had been distributed throughout the room. For
many of those in Sanders gear who were new entrants to the Party, these critiques were in
line with the reasons they had supported Sanders and subsequently ran for assembly
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delegate. The report shared with everyone in the room a vocabulary for critiquing the
Party in a constructive way.
There are numerous other examples of the Progressive Caucus organizing
opportunities for its members to engage in discussion and debate about policy issues and
also engage with political leaders and experts. The August 2017 regional meeting in
Anaheim focused on Single Payer Healthcare and a post-mortem of SB 562, a single
payer healthcare bill that had recently been stymied by Democrats in the state legislature.
Featuring a panel that included Progressive Congressman Ro Khanna, a representative
from a major trade union, and the director of government relations for the California
Nurses Association, the meeting outlined for grassroots activists both why the bill had
failed and also how they could best direct their energy toward establishing single payer at
the state level. Activists could ask questions and offer feedback while also learning how
to discuss the benefits of single payer and overcome objections by historically skeptical
groups such as labor unions. Khanna explained to activists that they needed to better
make the ‘moral and economic argument’ for single payer and develop rhetorical
strategies for discussing progressive policy. He implored single payer supporters to
engage head-on with those who oppose single payer on free market grounds. “This is not
a free market,” he said. “It is a market that has been captured and is actually enriching
people at the expense of competition.” In addition to this discussion of single-payer
healthcare, from 2017 to 2020, Progressive Caucus meetings saw similar extended
discussions about eliminating cash bail, increasing disclosure requirements around the
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funding of statewide ballot measures, abolishing the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency (ICE), and police violence.
Because the Progressive Caucus is limited to four in-person membership meetings
per year, its leadership and members have long relied on digital media for engagement
and communication throughout the year. Since its inception, the Progressive Caucus has
maintained an email listserv which remains an extremely active, albeit vociferous, forum
for member-to-member conversation about Caucus activity and progressive issues. That
said, this type of conversation is not for everyone. One activist who identifies as
progressive described the listserve to me as “a nightmare of emails and incessant
debates” (Interview Quote) that, among other factors, led him to leave the Progressive
Caucus and instead engage in progressive activism within the state Party in other ways.
The Caucus also employs other digital media tools, such as YouTube and Facebook, for
live-streaming its regional meetings, like the health care panel discussed above, and
facilitating member-to-member discussion. However, digital media—particularly social
media—allows the Progressive Caucus to serve as a hub for its leadership, members, and
external progressive actors.
The public Facebook page is managed by a member of the Progressive Caucus
executive board and features a mix of posts about California’s issues and related
progressive policies, and highlights of progressives engaged in electoral battles at the
local and regional level. The Facebook events page serves as a hub for connecting
activists to extra-party progressive organizations and their events and actions.
Examination of 124 co-hosted events on the caucus Facebook page, held from 2017225

2020, reveals a combination of Caucus events, such as regional and statewide meetings,
as well as approximately 100 “co-hosted” events with extra-party organizations,
including, but not limited to Our Revolution, NARAL pro-choice California, Tenants
Together, and Fight to Win Medicare for All. Granted, “co-hosting” an event on
Facebook does not necessarily mean that the Caucus put time and resources into the
planning and executing of these individual events. But at minimum, the Caucus events
page on Facebook serves to legitimate progressive organizations and their events and
connect delegates with tangible means to engage in local activism. These media allow the
Caucus to serve as a conduit for ideas from extra-party progressive organizations to enter
the Party via delegates that engage with these movement activities.
They also allow the Party to create linkages across geographies, both linking
state level activism to national issues and expanding the reach of local activists to
statewide audiences. Recently, the Caucus co-hosted a webinar focused on mobilizing
activists to support procedural reforms in the United States Senate, including the
elimination of the filibuster. The event, The Fight to Fix Our Senate, featured Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Jeff Markley and was sponsored by a who’s who of national
progressive organizations, including the Center for Popular Democracy, the Daily Kos,
the Communication Workers of America, the Working Family Party, the Sunrise
Movement, and Our Revolution. Of the twenty listed sponsors, the CDP Progressive
Caucus was the only state Party organization listed. In the presentation, Amar Shergill,
who succeeded Karen Bernal as Chair of the Progressive Caucus in 2019, highlighted
how obstacles to Senate reforms exist within the Democratic Party and are based at the
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state level. He criticized California Senator Dianne Feinstein’s opposition to such reforms
and highlighted the need for activists to apply public pressure to California Governor
Gavin Newsom to appoint a progressive Democrat to replace Senator Kamala Harris after
her (then speculative) ascension to Vice President of the United States.
“Right now there are PACS for centrists that are spending tens of
thousands of dollars to push their candidate so we’re going to need your
help to bring pressure on Governor Newsom…to nominate a progressive,
yes, but also someone that’s committed to getting rid of the filibuster and
making sure the Senate is run by the majority not minority obstruction. . . .
We’re going to push our social media platforms…but we’re going to need
your help to bring that pressure in California. And that’s right now. And
then we will turn around and help bring that pressure from California out
across the states to help all of you get it done wherever you are.”
The Caucus also works to connect local activists to statewide audiences. In September
2020, the Caucus hosted an event in which a panel of grassroots organizers who recently
moved into electoral politics were strategically addressing the recent movements for
police reform. A month later, it co-sponsored an online event, Let’s Win Progressive
Majorities on California City Councils, alongside several democratic clubs and
“Berniecrats” organizations based in the San Francisco Bay Area. These events serve to
educate and mobilize potential candidates and organizers in locales across the state. All
of these activities—meetings, learning opportunities, connections to external groups and
action opportunities, —allow the Progressive Caucus to help activate, recruit, and
leverage new activists in the maintenance of a durable community of progressives inside
the state Party. For those new activists, it also provides a clear path to learn Party politics
and increase their own political efficacy.
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Recruitment, entry points, and action opportunities
In discussing her experience as a progressive entering the Party in 2005, current DNC
member Susie Shannon remembered having to figure a lot of logistics out for herself.
“There was no comprehensive website,” she said. “No one knew about the ADEMs
meetings”. But for progressives entering the Party in 2017, the Progressive Caucus served
as entry point to understanding progressive action within the state Party. As
discussed earlier, one of the primary ways through which the Progressive Caucus
maintains the size, or volume, of its voice in the CDP is by helping local activists form
progressive slates. This involves curating progressive slates for ADEMs in districts
where progressives have, even between surges in activism, seen continued success.
During moments of increased progressive activism, the caucus also works to provide
resources to activists looking to form slates in districts where progressives have
historically been less active. An activist from Sacramento explained how Amar Shergill,
chair of the Progressive Caucus, also maintains a progressive slate in his home district
across elections:
Amar Shergill who is the caucus chair of the progressive caucus, he’s also
our leader in the slate. And he was actually pretty smart the way that he
selected folks to run with him. One, he wouldn’t take anybody that didn’t
fall in line with his values. . . .He selected people that are trusted
messengers within their community. So he got somebody in, including
himself, who is a trusted messenger in the Sikh community, I myself I’m
very trusted in [another] community in Sacramento - I was actually able to
register about 40 people in one day. . . .A lot of these people aren’t
organizers - and they also don’t trust the Party and electoral politics, but
they trust me and they trust him, and they trust the other delegates. So, he
selected people that all had a different demographic but also fell in line
with his values. That way there wasn’t any problems that would happen
like we would agree on the same issues, we’re all on a team, and we all
were able to vouch for new Democrats and old ones that were in our
communities to show up and vote.
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The relationships between the Progressive Caucus and extra-Party progressive groups—
Our Revolution, DSA, PDA, etc.—also allow for the recruitment of, and entry into
party politics by, potential activists. For example, one Our Revolution member from
east Contra Costa County in the Bay Area who ran for her local school board in 2016,
had such a negative experience with the local Party that she decided to run for delegate in
2019. She explained how, in addition to helping recruit and support progressives in their
delegate election, the Progressive Caucus—both in person, via its listserv, and via
Facebook and WhatsApp groups, provided a means for new activists to more quickly
understand Party processes and increase their efficacy. For her, the caucus also provided
solidarity inside a party that she viewed as an elite club to which she, despite winning her
delegate election, did not inherently belong. She said:
I don’t know if I would be even be able to stomach some of the things I’ve
seen in the Party if I didn’t have my fellow progressives to be like ‘that
was messed up’ you know to just have that kind of sense of community of
just look like what were continuing to do, or even like to celebrate look
what we were able to do.
Similarly, a delegate from Sacramento that had long avoided Party politics said that, in
recruiting him, a progressive caucus leader wanted him to understand the inherent
contradictions involved in an inside-outside approach to Party activism.
“He really wanted me to understand [that] you can equally hate people that
are in the Party, you can equally hate Party politics, you can even hate the
fact that you know its corrupt and treated like a corporation instead of an
electoral process. But you can still [get involved] and share your opinion.”
After being members of the Progressive Caucus, many delegates also choose to use the
Caucus as part of a ladder of engagement towards elected office or Party leadership
roles. For example, Liz Lavertu, a Sanders supporter who became a member of the San
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Diego Progressive Democratic Club and subsequently ran for assembly delegate in 2017,
successfully ran for an officer-at-large position within the Progressive Caucus. From
there, she ran a campaign for state assembly in a historically Republican area of San
Diego. While her campaign was unsuccessful, she succeeded in engaging with the
thousands of military families in her district that typically had minimal contact with the
Democratic Party. Another activist, Brandon Harami, supported Sanders in 2016,
founded the San Francisco Berniecrats, and became an assembly delegate in 2017.
Through his work as a delegate and in the caucus, he connected with Kimberly Ellis and
ran her second campaign for Party chair. That success led him to successfully run for Bay
Area Vice Chair of the Progressive Caucus. For motivated activists less interested in
leadership roles, the Caucus offers other opportunities. For example, a Sanders supporter
who also wrote #DemEnter blog posts, served as the moderator of a Progressive Caucus
meeting that focused on single payer healthcare.
Progressive Caucus members also often choose to join and engage with other
caucuses, such as the Environmental Caucus, the LGBT Caucus, or the African American
Caucus. As such, they are able to bring the shared discourse of the Progressive Caucus to
these groups. Further, some Party activists who identify as progressive are not members
of the Progressive Caucus and choose to focus their progressive activism primarily on
these other caucuses.
Other Progressive Insider Strategies
While the Progressive Caucus was certainly a vector for activity, progressive insider
strategies were not limited to members of the progressive Caucus. Regardless of which, if
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any, caucuses progressive activists are engaged with, there are numerous actions they can
take to increase the prominence of progressive ideas within the broader state Party. One
of the most common of these is crafting and lobbying for Party resolutions.
Resolutions
At the Resolutions Committee meeting of the 2017 CDP Convention, I watched as
Dorothy Reik, head of the Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains and a
member of the CDP Progressive Caucus laid into one of the committee chairs. The chair
was proposing changing the language of a proposed resolution, authored by Reik, to have
the Party endorse a ban on cash bail throughout California. “You can’t change it from
‘ban cash bail’ to ‘limit cash bail’. That’s not what we want. We want to ban cash bail. If
we say limit, then people are going to find ways to keep doing it.” Reik knew that getting
a resolution through the resolutions committee has little meaning on its own, except that
the CDP executive board will consider the resolution at its next meeting. By insisting on
the less fungible language, Reik and her co-authors were trying to force the board to take
a position on a difficult issue. Changing the language would have made it easier on the
executive committee by watering it down.
Some activists criticize spending resources on crafting formal resolutions, given
that neither resolutions nor the Party platform bind elected officials to vote in a particular
way. However, resolutions serve as a means through which grassroots Party activists can
collectively amplify their voice. Indeed, Party leaders may decline to pass a proposed
resolution, and elected officials may ignore those that do pass, the resolutions process
allows activists to articulate and argue for their priorities. For example, seventy
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progressive delegates in 2019 submitted to the CDP a two-page resolution “in support of
abolishing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).” While the resolution
failed to pass the full vote of the Party, it forced debate on the issue and provided the
opportunity for activists to articulate their claims beyond the reductive catch phrase,
“Abolish ICE” that had become commonplace nationwide amongst the left.
In other cases, progressives in the CDP see resolutions as an essential way to
engage in legislative influence. In the case of cash bail, Reik had been writing on blogs
and websites about cash bail for several years prior to submitting her resolution to the
CDP (e.g. Reik, 2016). Fourteen months after the passage of Reik’s resolution to support
the elimination of cash bail, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law a bill (SB 10)
replacing cash bail with a system based on risk analysis (this bill was overturned by
voters via Proposition 25 in the November 2020 statewide election (McGreevy, 2020)).
In some cases, it is possible to see the direct influence of resolutions on legislation. For
example, in May 2015, RL Miller, a progressive caucus member and chair of the
environmental caucus, authored a successful resolution calling on the state to divest from
fossil fuel investments in their major retirement funds and public university endowments
(Hirji, 2015). When California lawmakers passed a divestment bill later that year, it
included much of the language from Miller’s resolution.
Susie Shannon, a founding member of the Progressive Caucus, used the issue of
gay marriage to explain how issues that begin as resolutions can eventually make an
impact when added to the Party platform.
I had helped run the grassroots movement at the California Democratic
Party level on marriage equality, so we were all very excited for the first
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time it was going to be in our [national] platform in 2012. President
Obama had started off just supporting civil unions but not supporting
marriage equality and there was a lot of pushing within the Democratic
Party and outside the Democratic Party to move the Party at the national
level. You can see that basically, the White House really stepped up after
marriage equality made it into the platform in terms of pushing on
marriage equality and fighting for it and ultimately it was the court that
made the decision. You can see how the platform is so important…but
those of us that are fighting on the inside and even on the outside to make
sure that we have a platform that actually speaks to where we are as a
society, what we believe in as Democrats, what we think is important,
actually does make a difference in people’s lives and can be used to help
push legislation.
She similarly pointed to changes in the Party platform in the 1970s and 1980s related to
welfare programs. She argued that they ultimately provided language the Party used to
support President Bill Clinton’s effort to “end welfare as we know it” via the 1994
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. She regarded this series of events as
extremely unprogressive on the part of the Party. While this is an older example, there are
many contemporary examples of progressive activists disagreeing with the state and
national Party’s actions or positions on issues. The next section outlines strategies
progressives use to voice dissent at Party conventions and committee meetings.
Dissenting at Party Conventions and Committee Meetings
As discussed above, the work to increase the prominence of progressive ideas and issues
within the CDP is carried out by a variety of actors including, but not limited to, members
of the Progressive Caucus. At times, the same actors seek to vocally express dissent
related to actions or issue positions taken by the Party organization or elected officials.
For example, at the 2019 CDP State Convention in San Francisco, I could hardly hear
moderate candidates John Hickenlooper and John Delany over the angry crowd after they
argued that single-payer healthcare was “socialism” and “not good policy,” respectively.
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The crowd responded with boos, jeers, and the waving of signs in support of single payer
healthcare. There is also a contingent of progressives that regularly attempts to try to pass
resolutions in support of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement to
pressure Israel on human rights issues. While these never come close to passing, they
result in both protests and counterprotests on the convention floor.
In some cases, cross-cutting digital media groups can work to further particular
issues at state conventions. For example, an activist from rural Nevada County explained
how numerous chat groups that were formed during Kimberly Ellis’ 2017 campaign—
LGBT people for Kimberly, Women for Kimberly, Black People for Kimberly, etc.—
merged into a single large group called “One Chat to Rule them All’ after the campaign
was over. She explained how this group has remained durable and has been activated
towards progressive ends:
“When something’s happening [at the state convention], like for example
when the DNC told the platform committee…that they were rejecting
California’s proposal with regard to the way that gender is identified,
because they went back to “other,” which is really offensive to our trans
community because basically it dehumanizes them. It was that chat group
that said that the executive board would be voting on this, and we needed
people to speak to its rejection and we wanted to tell the DNC “no” that is
not something that we’re okay with. We will not dehumanize our trans
community and we want to tell the DNC that we reject their platform
requirement. That organizing tool, getting bodies in the room and being
able to say, “we need you down here right now” because many of us are
staying in the hotel where the meetings are happening.”9

In the end, the activists found out that Party by-laws prevented them from overturning
the DNC platform committee. The by-laws allow a state Party to add things to the Party
platform that are not in the national platform, for example if the national platform did not
have a poverty plank they could add one. But if the platform of the DNC has a specific
clause that is misaligned with a state Party then the state is out of compliance and its
charter can be revoked.
9
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Similarly, an activist from East Contra Costa County who became a Party delegate in
2019 explained how she prioritizes being present at other caucuses and committee
meetings that she identified as less progressive.
I would say first and foremost [my strategy] is just to take up space. What
I mean by that is ‘I’m here and the way that I think about the direction this
Party should be going matters.’ So, I joined the LGBT Caucus I joined the
veterans Caucus. I joined certain caucuses that have had more what I
would categorize as more centrist kind of leanings. Me being there is just
like ‘I am progressive, unequivocally a Berner, and I just want to sit here
so that you know that that we exist’ (Interview Quote).
While simply being present or participating at caucus and committee meetings may not
on its own be enough to move the needle on progressive ideas within the Party, all of the
activities discussed in this section should be viewed as part of a repertoire of political
action that is most effective when used together. Nowhere in the CDP is this clearer than
in the work of RL Miller and the Environmental Caucus.
In 2011, RL Miller, frustrated by the Democratic Party’s support for fossil fuels,
successfully ran for assembly delegate to the CDP. Two years later, she co-founded the
activist group Climate Hawks Vote, which works to develop and elect leaders that support
aggressive steps toward combating global climate change. The group regularly publishes
a scorecard ranking elected officials’ commitments to climate change, focusing not just
on legislative votes but also on public appearances championing the fight against climate
change. That same year, she ran for chair of the CDP Environmental Caucus, a position
she remained in until she was elected to the DNC in 2020. One of the primary ways
Miller and the Environmental Caucus have worked to push the Party to the left is by
pushing for Party resolutions and legislation to reduce the influence of fossil fuel money
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in the CDP and by extension, state institutions that can be influenced by the legislative
majority held by the Democratic Party.
In 2013, the same year she became chair of the Environmental Caucus, Miller
authored and attempted to pass a resolution calling for state agencies to divest from
investments in fossil fuels. The resolution failed. In the subsequent two years, Miller
worked with caucus members and other activists to approach Party officials in all 58 of
the state’s counties. Two years later, she introduced and successfully passed another
resolution, this time with the support of 20 county parties. In the following months, the
state Senate and Legislature both passed a divestment bill. While the bill was narrower
than Miller’s resolution—it focused on coal rather than all fossil fuels—it included
language taken directly from the resolution. When a legislative committee was waffling
on passing the bill, Miller brought activists to the capitol to meet with committee
members. After the bill and resolution passed, Miller touted their importance in forcing
Party members and elected to make the politically difficult decision to oppose fossil fuels
rather than solely supporting renewable technologies.
Miller has also seen success at reducing the influence of fossil fuel money via
negotiations with CDP staff and elected state officers. In 2016, she convinced Party chair
John Burton to ban political contributions to the state Party from oil companies. Because
this ban was an order that could easily be overturned by new leadership, she used caucus
meetings and digital media to remind activist to hold Party officials accountable not only
on maintaining the ban, but also on moving toward expanding it to exclude all fossil fuel
companies.
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Over the last four years, Miller has also used digital media at in-person events to
push politicians to commit to refusing political contributions by fossil fuel companies. At
the 2017 CDP State Convention, she carried around a large poster board with a pledge to
refuse fossil fuel money printed in the center. She collected signatures from dozens of
politicians, sharing photos online of politicians standing next to the poster. On social
media as well as sites like the Daily Kos, she highlighted politicians, including those
attempting to win races in traditionally Republican counties, who were willing to sign the
pledge. She also called out those politicians, including Gubernatorial candidates Gavin
Newsom and Antonio Villaraigosa, who were absent from previously requested speaking
time at the Environmental Caucus meeting, ostensibly because they did not want to be
confronted about the pledge.
Miller has also partnered with the Progressive Caucus and outside allies to try to
increase the prominence of climate issues at the national level. In August 2019, when the
Democratic National Committee held a meeting in San Francisco, she helped organize a
protest calling out the DNC for rejecting a resolution to hold a presidential primary
debate focused specifically on climate change.
This section has outlined ways in which progressive activists work to make their
voices heard within the state-level organization of the California Democratic Party. It
showed how the Progressive Caucus of the CDP serves to create and maintain a durable
progressive community within the Democratic Party. By enabling communication
amongst its members, the Caucus develops a collective discourse around the Party and
progressivism. Through participation in these structures and discourses, activists
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construct and maintain a collective identity that influences their goals and the actions
they organize to achieve them. This section also outlined how progressive activists use
formal mechanisms of the Party, such as resolutions, and acts of dissent, such as protests,
to both increase the prominence of progressive ideas within the CDP and to advance
progressive policies.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined efforts of progressive activists to enter the California
Democratic Party at the state level and to enact progressive change within the Party. I
first outlined how and why new activists organized to formally enter the Party in January
2017 via the ADEM elections. I then presented two ways in which the new ADEMs,
along with long-standing progressive Party activists, used voice in attempts to change the
Party from the inside by pushing for a progressive Party chair, and by working to increase
the prominence of progressive ideas inside the Party as an organization.
As activists organized for the ADEMs, I argued that, for those who had been
Sanders activists in 2016, their understanding of one another as “Berniecrats” remained
durable, as activists broadened their understanding of the term to encompass their
activism in support of Sanders’ priorities, not just of Sanders himself. This shared
identity was leveraged by long-standing Party activists working to recruit self-described
Berniecrats to compete for ADEMs positions throughout the state. I also argued that the
strategies for networked mobilization employed by these activists were informed by their
success using similar strategies in their 2016 delegate campaigns.
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The chair’s race showed how, years before the influx of delegates in 2017,
progressive activists within the Party were already working to recruit a progressive
activist, Kimberly Ellis, to challenge Eric Bauman in the state Party chair’s race. It
showed how her campaign strategy, which initially focused on her potential to bring
progressive ideas to the Party as an organization and diversity to its outreach strategies,
leveraged a climate of Party criticism among both supporters of Bernie Sanders and those
disappointed by Hillary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump. Ellis and her supporters
presented her candidacy as part of a broader movement for Party reform, engaging in
media activism to bring the conversation about the race for Party chair, normally of little
interest to those outside Party circles, into the public conversation. This strategy was
augmented by the mobilization efforts of groups like Our Revolution and by the
endorsement of Ellis by Bernie Sanders. These efforts brought national attention to the
race via coverage in legacy media and conversations in progressive social media
communities. Activists were thus able to link Bauman to a problem—an inaccessible
Party, more in touch with the needs of corporate leaders than everyday Americans, whose
strategic failings had led to the unexpected election of Donald Trump—and introduce
Ellis to activists as a potential solution. This strategy resonated with activists who ran for
assembly delegate positions in order to “take over the Democratic Party.” These new
delegates, many of whom had successfully used digital media to mobilize support for
their own delegate races, applied similar strategies in support of Kimberly Ellis,
culminating in a raucous showing at the 2017 CDP state convention where Ellis
ultimately lost to Bauman by 60 votes.
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This chapter also shines a light on the ideal opportunities, as well as the
limitations of certain strategies and tactics for networked mobilization in the context of
internal Party elections. In Chapter 3, we saw the would-be Sanders convention delegates
mobilize their large networks of Sanders supporters to help contribute to the “political
revolution” by supporting their slates at local contests in which participation was
typically limited to long-standing Party activists and their networks. In this chapter, the
ADEMs were structured identically, and again allowed those with large, online networks
to mobilize, this time to “take over the Democratic Party,” and find meaningful success in
many districts throughout the state. And yet, they were less successful in areas like San
Francisco and Los Angeles that featured strong Party organizations. This points to the
possibility that success in these elections, beyond the low-hanging fruit that was available
in certain 2017 districts, may require a more hybrid—both online and community
organizing—approach. Similar limitations were revealed in the race for Party chair. In
that case, the same type of networked mobilization, in which success largely depends on
turning out voters from a large pool of like-minded individuals, was limited by the fact
that only a few thousand delegates were eligible to vote in the race for chair.
Given the limited opportunities for additional activism aimed at quickly taking
over the Democratic Party, I argued that many activists, following Ellis’ loss, began
engaging in more incremental political action via the internal processes of the CDP. I
showed the Progressive Caucus of the CDP served as an entry point for many of these
new activists, providing them with primers on CDP processes and specific actions
through which they could learn internal Party politics. Following Bauman’s resignation,
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activists reoriented themselves to the difficult realities of the 2019 race for Party chair,
dividing their activism between supporting multiple progressives on the ticket, and
working on resolutions and rule changes aimed at increasing the prominence of
progressive ideas in the Party’s formal and informal discourses. The next chapter focuses
on similar multi-pronged strategies of progressives, this time focused on local progressive
groups. It outlines the repertories of strategies and tactics that exist across the universe of
progressive groups, and then explains how differences in their implementation manifest
around each group’s unique understanding of progressivism and its relationship to the
Democratic Party.
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Chapter 5: Local Activism and Its Relationship to the Democratic Party
The previous two chapters have focused largely on progressive activists leveraging
specific moments—political conventions, ADEM elections, an unusually competitive
race for State Party Chair—as opportunities for political activism aimed at critiquing the
Democratic Party and pushing it to the left. Chapter 4 also examined how the Progressive
Caucus of the Democratic Party serves as a vehicle for like-minded delegates to the State
Democratic Party to learn about and engage with the State Party toward progressive ends.
In those contexts, leaders of local progressive groups worked to recruit Kimberly Ellis to
challenge Eric Bauman in the Chair’s race and other local activists to run in local races to
become assembly delegates. To those ends, local progressive groups helped craft and
market slates of progressive assembly delegates aimed at leveraging progressive
networks at the district level. This chapter aims to dive deeper into the role that local
progressive groups play in developing activists and facilitating activism aimed at building
both a more progressive society and Democratic Party.
The groups that are the focus of this chapter are multi-issue activist groups that
identify foremost as progressive and also whose activism includes engagement with
Democratic Party politics. These include Party-chartered progressive Democratic Clubs
such as the East Area Progressive Democrats, Modesto Progressive Democratic Club,
and the Wellstone Democratic Reform Club. They also include chapters of Progressive
Democrats of America, Indivisible, Our Revolution, certain chapters of the Democratic
Socialists of America, local “progressive alliance” groups, as well as individual
independent local progressive groups, such as Alameda Progressives or FUN (Fremont-
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Union City-Newark) Progressives.10 While this is by no means an exhaustive list of the
progressive groups operating at the local level throughout the state, this selection of
players allows for examination of the varied ideologies, relationships with the
Democratic Party, as well as the strategies and tactics employed towards progressive
goals, that exist in numerous individual communities throughout the state.
Examining local progressive groups makes clear what sustained progressive activism
looks like outside the context of both major election cycles and the limited avenues
available to activists via State Party processes.
Local progressive groups are important because they are where activists learn
politics in a real and lasting way and, compared to the other venues in previous chapters,
it is where they are most regularly engaged. They are where activists are connected to
elected officials and candidates, educated on issues, legislation, and referenda, and
mobilized into actions. These groups are a primary avenue through which activists are
educated on the complexities of local, regional, and state governance as they exist in
internal Party structures as well as in representative bodies, such as city councils, school
boards, and the state legislature. They then have the opportunity to apply this increased
knowledge to influence local and state politics, as they endorse candidates and ballot
measures, and engage in activism aimed at holding elected officials accountable. The
local level is also where we see more nuance in the actions and priorities of progressives.
For example, Chapter 4 depicted how, at the state level, a critical mass of newly elected
delegates to the State Party helped self-described progressive Kevin DeLeon win the

10

For descriptions of these various groups, see the Research Design section>
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Party’s endorsement over incumbent Senator Dianne Feinstein in the 2018 California
Senate Race. This chapter explores variation in the priorities of progressives, examining
how and why, for example, the East Area Progressive Democrats, which counts among
its membership many of de Leon’s constituents, opted to endorse Feinstein over de Leon
in that same Senate race. It further outlines how, across these diverse local groups, acts of
progressive activism utilize a relatively universal repertoire of strategies and tactics
that activists choose from. However, these groups have distinctly different group
identities that they construct collectively that influence when and which tactics they
choose to deploy, as well as how they choose to deploy them. Local progressive groups
serve as discursive venues for activists to come together, building community through the
process of articulating diverse interests and experiences with the Democratic Party. These
ongoing processes of articulation allow them to collectively determine their group’s issue
priorities, relationship to the Democratic Party, and how they define progressivism. These
distinct identities allow individual activists to choose their ideal group, or groups, from a
menu of options with complementary worldviews about political issues, activism, and
what activism, as well as opposition, looks like in the context of the Democratic Party.
The tactics a group employs influences who joins that group in an ongoing process which
further contributes to and reinforces the group’s identity. Beyond group identity,
participation in these groups by individual activists contributes to their own ongoing
process of individual identity formation, as they negotiate and renegotiate what it means
to be a progressive, an activist and a Democrat.
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More specifically, this chapter 1) lays out several strategies common to
progressive activist groups, highlighting the repertoire of tactics employed by their
leaders and members as they work toward the goal of bringing about a more progressive
society and Democratic Party. It then explores how progressive groups, both explicitly
and via internal and public discourse, 2) define what it means to be progressive, 3)
articulate their relationship with the Democratic Party, and 4) assert those identities
through political action.
Strategies and Tactics
Across California, there are numerous progressive organizations working to broaden the
progressive movement and to achieve progressive change both in Democratic Party and
in the whole of society. While these groups are extremely heterogenous in their political
philosophies, memberships, discourses, and the activities they prioritize, there are certain
strategies, and associated tactics, that are relatively universal across groups. All of these
groups work to provide opportunities to leverage their membership toward political
action, endorse and support progressive candidates, and aim to hold political leaders and
candidates accountable. In order to pursue those strategies, they must also work to build
capacity for pursuing progressive goals through the development of activists and leaders.
Building Capacity for Progressive Action
The concept of capacity building in politics refers to the process of increasing an
organization or community’s ability to engage in collective action or other political
activity. Local progressive groups do this by working to develop and train activists.
These groups begin this process by serving as an entry point for new activists interested
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in getting involved in local politics. They also work to educate their membership and
their communities about progressive issues by building local progressive networks, and
by developing political leaders.
Serving as an Entry Point for New Activists
As discussed throughout this dissertation, activists become activated in politics in a
variety of ways. Just as the Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party
provides an entry point for newly elected progressive state-level delegates to understand
and focus their activism within the state Party, local progressive groups provide
opportunities for new activists at the local level. Through these groups, new activists gain
experience in politics outside of the ephemeral context of electoral campaigns.
Progressive groups also help recruit activists, activated by individual campaigns, into
more consistent progressive activism. For example, a college student now involved in her
campus Democratic club explained how, following an initial stint with a local
congressional campaign in her hometown, she was moved to sustained activism,
including her eventually run for assembly delegate, via her interaction with her local
Party club:
“The [local club] really showed me the ropes. They want to mentor young
people to help them get involved as much as possible because these
systems can become so unacceptable for students and for people of color
and all kinds of people who don’t have access to the kinds of resources
that everyone does. They really pushed me to get involved with the Party
as much as I could. I get emails from the Party. I’m sure I got an email
about ADEM, too.” (Interview Quote)
Similarly, a Sanders supporter who entered Party politics in 2016 and ran for her county
school board in 2018 explained how participation in local independent progressive
groups eventually led to direct participation in Party politics.
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I started to get involved in the Party really more on the outskirts… So it
was like through Our Revolution I was part of that organization, in East
County Indivisible, and then. . . . I decided to run for local office. Post2016 till today I’ve been really thinking about not just organizing by
trying to get people to sign the petition, but needing to work within these
systems, i.e. the Democratic Party, to ensure that what the masses want is
represented.
Local groups encourage this new participation in a variety of ways. When potential new
activists express interest, progressive groups aim to catalyze their interest by both
welcoming them to the community and by engaging them via an upcoming activity or
action. The San Diego Progressive Democratic Club makes a specific effort to engage
with new activists before exposing them to the minutia of monthly club meetings. To that
end, its leaders host a new-member orientation and social hour immediately preceding
their monthly general membership meetings. Via these events, new recruits meet leaders
one-on-one and then are introduced to other like-minded activists. At the meeting, they
see first-hand how these activists are working to turn their progressive ideals into action.
They can also volunteer for actions themselves—e.g. phone banking, door knocking,
voter registration—as sign up sheets are passed around during the meeting. Similarly,
Our Revolution Los Angeles (ORLA) asks new members to self-select into one of five
activism teams (e.g. media, research, community relations) that correspond to the four
suits, plus the joker, in a deck of cards. This selection also links activists directly to their
internal social media. On ORLA’s digital organizing system, which utilizes the Slack
platform, new members are automatically added to specifically-focused chat rooms,
called channels, based on their selected activism team. Using digital media for internal
organizing in this way is common among progressive activist organizations across
California.
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Most progressive groups use digital media to attract new activists and to help
them feel immediately connected and engaged. These groups attract, motivate, organize,
and leverage activists using a combination of public and private digital properties that
vary from group to group. While most progressive activist groups maintain a formal
website, in most cases these provide only basic information about bylaws, leaders, and
events such as regularly scheduled general membership meetings. Surprisingly, foregoing
a traditional website is not uncommon amongst progressive activist groups. Instead, the
most common and up-to-date digital property amongst all groups, even those with their
own websites, is the public-facing Facebook Page with an events calendar, photos, links,
and posts about meetings, actions, and other membership updates. Many groups also
maintain a private-facing means of communication for members, most often in the form
of a Facebook group, although Slack workspaces, or email-listserves are also common.
Participation in these groups typically requires an invitation or permission from a group
administrator. As a result, the conversation and debate in these groups is much more
candid than the discourse that takes place on public groups or pages. Adding new
members to these groups helps connect new activists with veteran members quickly, and
outside the formal agenda of general membership meetings. A 70-plus year-old activist
from rural Northern California who participates in his local Democratic Club, Indivisible
Chapter, and Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) Chapter explained how DSA
began using Slack after the organization saw an influx of members after the 2016
election:
“I resisted it at first - I come from an older organizing school. Most of my
organizing was done with paper. Its very much electronic now. So, I
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resisted Slack, but once I got on there its a very efficient means of
communication through DSA. We have an environmental justice working
group channel on Slack and then there’s a general and a random channel.
They’re all under the DSA auspices. Its an extremely quick way to contact
either the whole group or individuals about organizing.”
Indivisible chapters throughout the state also use private Facebook groups towards
similar engagement goals. To keep these groups focused on linking local community
members around shared progressive goals, these Facebook groups are limited to activists
living within the boundaries of the Indivisible Group’s congressional district (e.g. the
private Indivisible-33 Facebook group is limited to activists living in Congressional
District 33 in Santa Monica). These groups are thus less likely to be overwhelmed by the
intermittent influx of campaign operatives and volunteers organizing around state-level
and national campaigns. That said, in many counties there are also umbrella Facebook
groups (e.g. Indivisible Los Angeles and Indivisible Orange County) where activists can
learn about and sign up for a variety of events—campaign work, social gatherings,
protests, etc.—taking place over a wider geographic area. These catch-all groups can also
serve a purpose of group cross-pollination, as leaders of Democratic Clubs or Our
Revolution chapters often post their own events and meetings in these fora.
These various online and offline entry points all provide activists with
opportunities to get involved with progressive groups and campaigns within their
individual communities. The digital properties serve as entry points but also as a means
to engage activitists between meetings and actions. Also, because activist groups are
more durable than campaigns, they are able to take on an extended role in the
development of these newly onboarded activists, which they do by providing resources
and running events aimed at educating their members on local and statewide issues.
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Education
Many progressive groups see their individual members as the primary vector through
which they can communicate with their local communities. The president of the East
Area Progressive Democrats of Los Angeles (EAPD) explained how the club aimed for
its members to be “trusted ambassadors of facts” in their communities. To that end, most
progressive groups devote a portion of their monthly meeting agendas to a progressive
topic or speaker. Others organize standalone, issue-focused educational events for their
membership and the local community. These events follow a similar model: where we are
on the issue, how we got here, and how we move forward. For example, in January 2020,
Our Revolution East Bay, in partnership with the Coalition for Police Accountability,
hosted a “Criminal Justice Townhall” to educate their membership on both the history of
the criminal justice system in the U.S. as well as potential avenues and actions for
progressive reform. The panel included Bilal Ware, a historian from UC Santa Barbara,
Chesa Boudin, the District Attorney of San Francisco, a Democrat who had been
endorsed by numerous progressive groups, Jody Armour, a USC Professor focused on
race and legal decision-making, and Pamela Price, a progressive candidate running in the
technically non-partisan election to challenge the 12-year incumbent Alameda County
District Attorney. This event contextualized the criminal justice system as a product of
the country’s roots in slavery and white supremacy, and also explained the complex
power structures and political economy of the current criminal justice system. In the end,
they laid out the significant role that progressive district attorneys can play in bringing
about change in the criminal justice system and encouraged their members to get
involved in those campaigns.
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Progressive groups around the state also hosted similar events on issues including,
but not limited to, single payer healthcare, education, abortion rights, public transit, and
strategies for fighting hate. The Harvey Milk LGBTQ Democratic Club of San Francisco
used a portion of its April 2018 meeting to host a discussion with the co-founder of the
SF Public Bank Coalition, an activist organization focused on garnering support for a San
Francisco-based public bank. At the meeting, he highlighted detrimental aspects of the
City’s relationship with the private banking sector and their incongruence with
progressive priorities of racial, social, economic, and environmental justice. Such
educational activities serve to provide activists with a baseline understanding of
progressive goals, strategies and tactics, that can be utilized in progressive activity that
extends beyond their local progressive group.
These events also serve as opportunities to engage or partner with other local
progressive and issue-based groups with the aim of building durable progressive
networks and engaging their communities. For example, the EAPD co-hosted an event,
with several other Democratic clubs from the greater Los Angeles region, that included a
screening of a documentary focused on the history of non-violent voting rights activism
in the U.S. followed by a panel discussion drawing linkages to the history of the Antelope
Valley in Northeastern Los Angeles. The educative events of progressive groups
sometimes go beyond policy issues. For example, Indivisible of Auburn, located in the
Sierra Foothills in Northern California, co-sponsored an event with Field Team 6, an
activist group focused on strategically registering Democratic voters in “the most
flippable states and districts” (Field Team 6, 2020). The event, entitled “Overcoming
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Activist Fatigue,” aimed to provide activists with strategies for maintaining enthusiasm
and energy throughout “the political adversity and general chaos we face everyday”
(Indivisible Auburn, 2020). While some of these events link activists with community
members outside their individual group, progressive groups also engage in more direct
tactics aimed at network building and community organizing.
Network Building and Community Organizing
Consistent with previous research on Democratic Party activists in California (e.g.
Larimore-Hall, 2014), this research showed that leaders and members of local
progressive groups often wear more than one political hat and are involved in additional
local groups focused more narrowly on issues such as the environment, education, and
social justice. Some are also members of local county parties or hold local political
offices. As such, local progressive groups often serve as a nexus for members of likeminded issue-based organizations to come together under the broad banner of
“progressive.”
The president of the EAPD in Los Angeles explained how cross-network
collaborative political actions—letter-writing campaigns, advocacy, or lobbying—toward
shared goals helps “develop relationships of reciprocity, solidarity, and trust” that remain
durable across local community networks. These latent networks can then be mobilized
when political opportunities present themselves. For example, the networks that EAPD
members formed in the mid-2010s around the fight for a statewide ban on single-use
plastic bags is now able to be leveraged around an ongoing battle opposing the City of
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Glendale’s plans to both expand the size of a local landfill or build a local gas plant
within its boundaries.
Network building among progressive groups is also operationalized as the
breaking down of silos and building of loose networks of groups. Several leaders of the
Our Revolution-Wellstone Progressive Democrats of Sacramento described how they
worked with other progressive organizations to form a local progressive alliance, a “fluid,
countywide network” of progressive organizations, beginning with the creation of a
public calendar to showcase as much local progressive activity as possible in one place.
Similar networks have emerged in other areas of the state, including in the South Bay
Area and Orange County.
Applied Leadership Development
While the above categories of capacity building—onboarding new activists, education, as
well as network building and community organizing—are all tactics for training local
activists and developing leadership, there are also more explicit ways in which
progressive organizations work to build leaders. As activists participate in local
progressive groups over time, certain individuals grow their leadership skills, often
beginning with running small events and chairing committees. Such activists also often
take on formal roles in the campaigns of local candidates who they initially connect with
during group activities. In many cases, activists who develop as leaders within local
progressive groups use the skills and confidence gained from their experience to launch
their own bids for local office or for Party positions such as assembly delegate or county
central committee member. The president of the EAPD explained how the group
253

encourages individual members to “cultivate their own network of influence…to reach a
lot of the grassroots opinion leaders and community leaders in their districts.” One such
leader started with the group, moved through committee chair roles within the group, and
in 2022 is challenging a local Democratic Assemblymember for her seat. Numerous
progressive groups also funnel activists into leadership development programs sponsored
by the Party or by progressive organizations. For example, it is common for groups to
encourage female activists with leadership potential into the Emerge California program,
which until early 2017 was run by Kimberly Ellis, whose run for the Chair of the
California Democratic Party was a major focus of Chapter 3. The Emerge program trains
women to run for office and builds a network of women leaders across the state. An
officer at SF Berniecrats explained the Emerge program itself, as well as how the number
of progressives participating in the program increased after Ellis ran for Party chair.
“They get a lot of ‘libs’ (i.e. liberals) in there, they’ve got a lot of
progressives. A lot more progressives have been signing up for Emerge
since Kimberly ran for chair of the Party which I really think helped
inspire a lot of folks. The program is amazing, they really get into the
weeds of things for women. . . . Emerge is also very selective. They’re
going to pick people who they think would be good candidates.”
Promoting the Emerge program, as well as other leadership development activities, helps
build a bench of leaders that not only expand individual groups as they create new
committees and programs, but also increase progressive representation as those activists
pursue positions in public office and within the local and state Party structure.
All of the above activities—onboarding new activists, education, network
building, and leadership development—serve to build and maintain collaborative groups
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focused on progressive change. The next section focuses on how those groups leverage
that capacity towards progressive political action.
Mobilizing Effective Political Action
The ultimate goal of the capacity building efforts described in the previous section is to
mobilize effective political action on the part of those who have been trained. Progressive
groups do this first by serving as a venue through which local progressive actors—
candidates, issue-based organizations, campaigns, and other activists—can share
mobilizing information and engage in volunteer recruitment. Second, they organize and
cosponsor their own actions as determined and prioritized by their leaders and members.
Third, they export their capacity beyond their individual locales to support progressive
activity across their regions.
Mobilizing Information and Recruitment Opportunities
In many cases, progressive groups serve as a nexus through which campaigns can
connect with and recruit like-minded volunteers. It is quite common for a progressive
candidate or their surrogate, or a representative of an issue advocacy group, to approach
group leaders in order to place a recruitment pitch onto the meeting’s agenda. In some
cases, groups keep a standing item on their monthly agenda specifically for such
recruitment. The San Diego Progressive Democrats, for example, opened their February
2020 meeting with a parade of local candidates who were all running in the impending
primary, less than a month away. Each made their pitch and passed around clipboards so
that activists could sign up for volunteer shifts and help to carry their organizing plans
down the stretch of the campaign. Groups that endorse specific candidates will often have
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a formal mechanism, via their website, social media, or listserve, for helping those
candidates with ongoing recruitment from the membership. For example, in October
2020, Our Revolution Kern County used its Facebook group to help organize and recruit
activists to make calls in support of its endorsed candidates for various local offices.

Figure 24: An event listing posted on Facebook by Our Revolution Kern County. The group organized a
day of action in support of their endorsed candidate for mayor of the town of Arvin.

As mentioned above in the context of network building, many progressive
alliance groups have constructed community calendars that maintain, for dozens of local
progressive groups and candidates, information on canvassing, phone banking, protests,
public meetings, and other activities. These allow many single-issue organizations,
ranging from environmental groups to anti-fascist groups to animal rights groups, to
inform progressive activists about their events. That said, progressive groups also
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organize and co-sponsor their own actions in support of the issue priorities of their
communities and members.
Organizing and Co-Sponsoring Actions
Local progressive groups also organize direct actions around issue priorities specific
to their local communities. In many cases, these activities extend beyond electoral
campaigns. For example, the EAPD engaged in numerous activities as part of its yearslong opposition to a proposed expansion of a local landfill site in Glendale and then to a
subsequent proposal to build a biofuel power plant at the same site. These activities
included mobilizing members to participate in public comment processes, to attend local
meetings, and to canvass communities to build public opposition to the projects. The
group also crafted and distributed an online petition about the expansion, allowing them
to demonstrate local opposition to the project as well as collect the names and
information of like-minded supporters to use in future mobilization efforts. Other grouporganized actions are more mundane, such as registering voters at local events, such as
Farmers Markets and street fairs.
Such activities also provide opportunities to partner with and leverage the
capacity of other local groups towards shared goals. For example, the President of an
Indivisible Chapter in the San Fernando Valley explained how his group partnered with a
local Democratic Club to send postcards to voters highlighting progressive candidates in
advance of a major election. He explained:
“We write them, and the Club pays for the postage so we have postcard
parties once a week. We write them and when the time comes, we’ll tell
them how much we wrote and they write a check for the stamps. We use
postcards with their information on it, so it works out well for them, too.”
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Similar partnerships existed around progressive action in communities across the state. In
May 2020 the Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club of the East Bay Area mobilized its
membership, along with the followers of its Facebook page, to help the Berkeley
Tenant’s Union and the California Renter’s Council organize a two-part action to block
proposed changes to an upcoming bill in support of amending Berkeley’s Rent
Stabilization Ordinance. They provided activists with a template for emailing the
Berkeley Rent Control board and City Council in support of the measures, and then
provided talking points for activists to use during the live public comment period.
Similarly, the co-branded group Our Revolution / Democratic Socialist of America of
Santa Clarita mobilized its membership in November 2018 to attend a Santa Clarity City
Council Meeting to oppose repeated efforts by the city police to both criminalize
homeless people and cite street vendors operating in public spaces. Local events like
these allow local activists to pursue progressive policies and social change in their own
communities, but progressive groups also aim to provide ways for activists to work
directly toward regional and national political goals.
Mobilizing Local Activists to Influence National and Regional Politics
Sometimes, particularly during the Democratic Primary election season when urban,
highly Democratic areas have limited competitive races, progressive groups organize
and export their volunteer capacity to contests taking place outside their local area.
During the 2020 primary cycle, dozens of progressive organizations from throughout the
greater Los Angeles region all organized canvassing trips to Northern Los Angeles and
Ventura Counties to support Assemblywoman Christy Smith in her extremely
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competitive race for U.S. Congressional District 25, just north of the San Fernando
Valley. Their goal was to help maintain the Democratic Party’s majority in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Exporting capacity in that way is not limited to congressional
races. The EAPD strategically organized a volunteer trip to San Pedro, on the far side of
West Los Angeles, to support a progressive candidate in her race for a seat on the board
of the Los Angeles Unified School District. While the geographic area where that seat
was based was well outside of the area covered by EAPD, a victory there would have
changed the makeup of the board so that the majority would be held by those in
opposition to charter schools, with implications for the entire geographic area covered by
the LAUSD. Examples such as this reveal how progressive groups can strategically
mobilize their membership toward complex political challenges that require ongoing
engagement across election cycles.
Progressive groups also engage in political activism towards goals that go behind
mobilizing and engaging volunteer labor toward relatively traditional forms of political
organizing and collective action. They also engage in strategic activities and messaging
to influence electoral outcomes and build support for their policy priorities.
Increasing Public Pressure for Preferred Policies
Local progressive groups aim to influence electoral outcomes and the behavior of leaders
by engaging in strategic public communication with the goal of increasing public
pressure for their preferred policies. They do this not only by publicizing their
preferences on candidates and issues in advance of elections, but also by working to hold
candidates, elected officials, and Party leaders accountable.
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Taking Public Positions on Candidates, Legislation, and Ballot Measures
As discussed earlier in this chapter, local progressive groups work to both build their own
activist capacity and also to engage with the broader progressive community. Via their
internal and external networks, they work to disseminate strategic messages with the goal
of influencing electoral campaigns and contests. The primary way they do this is via their
formal processes for endorsing candidates and ballot measures. Just as they were
when Wilson [@-Wilson1962] first described organized groups of “amateur democrats”
in 1962, electoral endorsements remain a key function of local political groups. As in the
ADEM elections that were discussed in Chapter 3, many trusted local progressive
activists see it as their role to help their community with political decision-making
towards the goal of advancing progressive causes. Endorsement processes also create
incentives for elected officials to adopt positions that align with a group’s values and
policy priorities. In addition, the interactions between members and candidates builds
relationships that can be leveraged should a candidate get elected to office.
The endorsements made by progressive groups are not limited to candidate
endorsements. In fact, the ease with which the California constitution allows interest
groups in California to place statewide and local propositions on election ballots means
that voters are often asked to vote on numerous issues that they may have little familiarity
with. In reaching out to their communities, progressive groups have the opportunity to
influence persuadable voters who may be less flexible in the candidates they
support, but remain open to information about the issues presented in ballot
measures. For example, the 2020 primary ballot in Los Angeles County featured an
ultimately successful ballot measure that now allows the existing Sheriff Civilian
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Oversight Committee to develop a plan for reducing jail populations and incarceration
rates. Our Revolution Long Beach endorsed the measure, and also hosted a representative
of the measure’s sponsor, Reform LA Jails, at its monthly meeting. Similarly, Our
Revolution / Wellstone Democrats of Sacramento endorsed and held local and statewide
phone banks in support of Proposition 21, an eventually failed ballot measured that would
have increased rent control protections for tenants throughout the state.

Figure 25: An event listing on Facebook posted by Our Revolution / Wellstone Democrats of Sacramento.
The group organized a phone bank in support of Proposition 21, which would have increased rent control
protections for tenants throughout the state.

In the months preceding the 2020 primary, almost all progressive groups were
engaged in endorsement processes. While the efficacy of a group’s endorsement depends
on a lot of factors—its level of influence, the political makeup of the geographic area,
etc.—the formal means through which endorsements are carried out is relatively
consistent across groups. In most cases, a candidate seeking a progressive group’s
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endorsement presents herself before the membership at a regularly scheduled meeting.
Candidates generally seek endorsements from progressive groups for two reasons. First,
they aim to tout the group’s support as evidence of both local activist support and also
their own progressive credibility. Second, they hope that the endorsement will provide
them with support—media outreach, fundraising opportunities, and volunteer labor—
from the group’s leaders and members.
A request for endorsement generally begins with a pitch from the candidate,
followed by a question-and-answer period, in which the membership queries the
candidate about their background and issue positions. These interactions pressure
candidates to articulate progressive positions and get them on the record so groups can
hold them accountable in the future. In February 2020, I saw incumbent Congressman
Alan Lowenthal, who had represented California’s 47th District (Long Beach, South Los
Angeles, North Orange County) for the previous eight years, attend the monthly meeting
of Our Revolution Long Beach (ORLB). At this point in the campaign, the group had
already endorsed one of Lowenthal’s opponents, Peter Mathews, who had made repeated
critiques of Lowenthal’s acceptance of money from companies and representatives of the
oil and gas industry. Lowenthal took questions for fifteen minutes, during which ORLB’s
membership questioned him about these accusations. Lowenthal did not deny the
accusations but pointed out his 98% lifetime rating on climate and environmental issues
from the League of Conservation voters. ORLB’s members also questioned Lowenthal, a
Jewish man, on the specifics of his support for Israel. In the end, ORLB decided to
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endorse both Lowenthal and Mathews in the primary, and Lowenthal in the subsequent
general election, where he easily defeated his Republican challenger.
Many progressive activists want to find out how non-incumbent candidates
will conduct themselves if elected. They want to feel confident that endorsed candidates
they hold the line on progressive issues rather than make deals to satisfy donors or
corporate-funded legislative colleagues. Some groups are even more explicit in
communicating their priorities, asking candidates to complete questionnaires about
their personal background, political past, and issue positions, in advance of being
considered by the membership via a formal endorsement process. For example, the
Richmond Progressive Alliance asks about a candidate’s previous runs for and
experiences in political office, priorities if elected, and whether they plan to refuse
corporate campaign contributions.
Once endorsements are made, they are communicated to the broader public via a
variety of media. As discussed above, candidates themselves communicate endorsements
they receive via their social media accounts as well as via printed campaign
communication.
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Figure 26: A statement by Fatima Iqbal-Zubair touted her endorsement by the Progressive Democratic Club
(based in Central Los Angeles) in her run for State Assembly.

Most candidates also feature a list of endorsements on their website. When
viewed in the aggregate, these endorsements can reveal a great deal about a candidate’s
intraparty support. In a 2020 Los Angeles City Council race, incumbent David Ryu listed
the endorsements of numerous labor unions, the LA County Democratic Party, numerous
local chambers of commerce, and a list of Democratic Clubs, including but not limited to:
New Frontier Democratic Club, Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains,
Valley Grassroots for Democracy, and Miracle Mile Democratic Club. His challenger,
Nithya Raman, listed endorsements from the Working Families Party, Democratic
Socialist of America Los Angeles, Feel the Bern Democratic Club, and East Valley
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Indivisibles. While both candidates certainly had some progressive chops on display, an
information-seeking voter looking at both of these lists, even with minimal knowledge of
these groups, could quickly infer that Raman was challenging Ryu from the left.
Most progressive groups communicate their endorsements digitally, sending
voter guides to their mailing lists, and pushing them out via social media. In some
cases, they are also sent to physical mailing lists prior to the beginning of voting periods.
For example, EAPD distributes their ballot guide via traditional mail, door-to-door
canvasses, email, its website, and social media.

Figure 27: A ballot guide produced by the East Area Progressive Democrats in advance of the November
2018 General Election.
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Some organizations push their endorsements out through posts in local blogs and
the social media accounts of both partner organizations and individual members.
Endorsements can also be captured indirectly as earned media, as journalists writing
about specific candidates or races will often list a candidate’s endorsements as part of a
larger profile (e.g. Garofoli, 2021). Media tactics such as these allow groups to do much
more than publicizing endorsements. They also use traditional and social media to carry
out another one of their strategies, holding elected officials, Party leaders, and candidates
accountable to the progressive grassroots.
Holding Leaders Accountable to Grassroots Progressives
One of the major ways in which progressive groups push for a more progressive society
is by holding elected officials, Party leaders, and candidates accountable. Especially in
strong Democratic areas, holding incumbents and Party leaders accountable is one of the
primary ways to push for, and maintain, progressive change. The process of holding a
political leader accountable manifests itself in different ways depending on the person’s
relationship to the organization, to the progressive movement, and to the constituents the
organization and leader claim to represent.
In some cases, political leaders have made commitments directly to a progressive
group. As discussed in the previous section, the processes through which group’s endorse
local candidates often involves the candidate engaging directly with the membership at its
monthly meeting. In such cases, progressive activists can point to these prior
commitments and statements in attempts to hold leaders accountable. For example,
in a debate about rescinding the endorsement of Ammar Campa-Najjar in his run for
266

Congress in San Diego’s conservative 50th district, members of the San Diego
Progressive Democratic Club pointed to his “double-talk” on true single-payer
healthcare, or Medicare for All, after he began using the phrase “Medicare for all who
want it” in public interviews. The president of the Club explained how its members aim
to counterbalance the forces that push candidates to the Center in advance of electoral
contests:
“When our candidates disappoint us, we do need to hold them accountable
because that sometimes is the only thing that pushes them in the right
direction. And unfortunately, that is just the case. Its human nature. That is
politics. And we need to just own up to that reality and be the club that’s
willing to hold the candidates accountable because I promise you, no other
Dem clubs are doing that.”
Feel the Bern Democratic Club in Los Angeles explicitly states that, due to threats…from
within the corporate Democratic Party…its endorsements will be withdrawn if once in
office [candidates] no longer uphold the mission statement of the Club (Feel the Bern
Democratic Club, n.d.). That said, this threat seems more rhetorical than practical, as
endorsements carry little weight when candidates are not seeking to win an election, and
standard practice is that a candidate reapplies for an endorsement each election cycle.
To combat such tacks to the Center, progressive groups aim to get candidates on
the record with the broader public. They often cosponsor debates and candidate
forums, or have their membership attend local events to get candidates and elected
officials to take public positions on specific issues. In another example from the San
Diego area, three Indivisible groups—Indivisible Committed to Building a Fair
Democracy, Indivisible San Diego Persist, and Hillcrest Indivisible—hosted 5 democrats
competing for an open congressional seat in California’s 53rd district. They were asked
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specific questions on topics including, but not limited to, racism, immigration, trade wars,
education, as well as balancing both Party and constituent interests. The debate was
covered by the Times of San Diego (K. Stone, 2020) and the San Diego Union Tribune
(Smolens, 2020).
In some cases, progressive organizations hold incumbent Party leaders and
elected officials accountable by supporting, or threatening to support, challenger
candidates with positions that hold more progressive positions. In California, the toptwo primary sometimes limits the efficacy of this option, though that does not stop
progressive challengers from emerging in numerous local and statewide races. For
example, in central Contra Costa County, a relatively moderate, though reliability
Democratic, part of the San Francisco Bay Area, several unions and progressive groups
supported Marisol Rubio in a challenge to incumbent Democratic State Senator Steve
Glazer. Glazer was seen by many progressives as anti-union and angered many by voting
against an increase in the statewide gasoline tax. Our Revolution Contra Costa County
endorsed Rubio as “an uncorrupted fighter for California’s working families” (Our
Revolution Bay Area, 2020).
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Figure 28: An endorsement advertisement, posted on social media, by Our Revolution Contra Costa. The
group supported Marisol Rubio against incumbent Democrat Steve Glazer in the 2020 Primary.

In a conventional primary, an activist Party base could have potentially helped
propel Rubio from this primary to the general election, where the County’s moderate-left
leaning political demographics could quite possibly have led to her winning the seat. At
minimum, her presence would have forced Glazer to the left in order to compete for the
votes of progressive Democrats. In the top-two system, Rubio, Glazer, and a local
Republican were competing for both Republican and Democratic voters during the
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primary, with Rubio ultimately coming in third behind Glazer and the Republican. Had
she made it to the general election, Republican voters with no candidate in the race would
have easily put Glazer, the more centrist Democratic, over the top. Primary races often
play out like this across the state. As such, some challenges from the left are largely
symbolic, or serve as political opportunities to pressure incumbents by activating
their communities via both local organizing and media activism. In many cases,
challenging incumbents is part of a process of, what the president of EAPD called,
“building a pipeline of well-trained leaders.” For example, Fatima Iqbal-Zubair was
endorsed by Our Revolution chapters in Los Angeles and Long Beach, as well by the
national Our Revolution organization. She also garnered the support of the Los Angelesbased Feel the Bern Democratic Club and other local progressive groups. While she lost
to incumbent Mike Gipson in the November 2020 general election, she has subsequently
raised her profile within the Democratic Party, successfully running for Vice Chair of the
Progressive Caucus at the state level and working to educate potential candidates on
campaign strategy. She plans to face Gipson again in the 2022 election and continue to
press him on progressive issues.
Given the limited opportunities for progressive groups to defeat incumbent
Democrats at the ballot box, they most often turn to educating their communities about
their elected officials using both in-person events as well as a combination of online
and traditional media. This activism can include group members reaching out in-person
or online to educate constituents and other local leaders about the incumbent’s
problematic priorities imploring them to share content online or contact that leader
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directly. Leaders and members of these organizations also write op-eds, and engage on
social media, local radio, television, and blogs.
The initial formation of the 1100-member EAPD, now the largest Democratic
Club in California, took place around a collective need to hold local Democrats
accountable. The Club was founded in 2014 around a lack of representation in the East
Area of Los Angeles that became apparent during the context of the political battle over
the state’s ban on single-use plastic bags. In May of the previous year, State Senator
Kevin de Leon, a self-proclaimed progressive Democrat, had, along with two other Los
Angeles-area state senators, vetoed legislation that would have established a statewide
ban on single use plastic bags. The president of the EAPD, explained:
“The [ban] had some of its earliest roots in advocacy from the
communities on the east side of Los Angeles. . . .And was more popular
here even than the Los Angeles Dodgers. And it was killed [in the
legislature] by three lawmakers purporting to represent this area. There
was no outcry in the media or at the community level over that maneuver.
. . . That was what I call the clarion wake up call that there needed to be a
presence within the Democratic Party that would hold law makers
accountable because they felt that they could make a decision like that
with impunity, with absolutely no pushback or accountability from
grassroots Democrats for whom this was a passionately held priority.”
The Club’s members saw the need to hold de Leon accountable as a Democrat, a
progressive; and as a representative of a place where single use plastic bags were causing
significant environmental problems. He further explained:
“…the Los Angeles River runs through these communities…[as] one of
the unifying geographical and ecological cracks…subject to a hundreds of
millions of dollars revitalization effort whose chief culprit, when it comes
to blight…was throw away plastic bags. How can you be killing off an
effort to remove the single worst culprit in blight while the government is
being asked for the bill for the revitalization of the ecosystem and
members of the public and grassroots Democrats [are] fervently pushing
for and wanting to enact a plastic bag ban similar to what more than a
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hundred municipalities around the state of California already had
implemented?”
Following the Club’s launch in May of 2014, they sought to be a vehicle for advocacy,
with the plastic bag ban as their first goal. Via op-eds, posts in local blogs and social
media, as well as other earned media, the Club revealed that the local lawmakers
opposing the ban, including de Leon, had accepted campaign donations from out-of-state
plastic bag makers. The Club wrote public letters—posted on social media and sent to
local media outlets—to the Los Angeles City Council urging them to push de Leon and
other local representatives to support the plastic bag ban as part of their legislative
program.
In August 2014, the State Senate, with supportive votes from de Leon and other
local representatives, ended up passing the first statewide ban on single use plastic bags
in the nation. EAPD’s leaders saw the Club play a specific role in that victory by holding
de Leon accountable to his constituents who supported the ban, to the Democratic Party’s
environmental platform, and to the progressive value that policy should not be influenced
by corporations to the detriment of citizens.
This skepticism about corporate financing of campaigns is an example of a value,
common across progressive groups, that not only influences each group’s choice of
strategies and tactics, but also contributes to the formation of that group’s collective
progressive identity. The next section will explore the interplay between a group’s
collective identity, how it defines progressivism, its discursive strategies for situating
itself in reference to the Democratic Party, and the selection of strategies and tactics its
leaders and members deploy towards political action.
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Local Progressive Groups and Identity
At the University of California, Berkeley on January 11, 2020, Kacey Carpenter of Our
Revolution East Bay (OREB), a local activist group spun off from Bernie Sanders’ 2016
run for president, addressed the statewide convention of the California Progressive
Alliance. After telling the several-hundred audience members his personal story of
political activation that began with Sanders’ first presidential campaign, he predicted that
the 2020 California Presidential primary—with its 415 convention delegates—less than
two months away, would be the moment when Sanders would garner an unsurmountable
delegate lead and eventually become the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee. He
further explained:
“What we’re doing is training everyone about how not only to support
Bernie, who we’ve endorsed of course, but also down-ballot candidates
including Shahid [Buttar] and Marisol [Rubio] who you heard today and
many many others. . . . [The Sanders campaign] has identified over
10,000”Bernie-strong supporters” in its database that are registered as
“No-Party-Preference. So, we need to do everything we can to reach out to
those folks that did not #DemEnter and let them know that now is the
moment for us to really elect Bernie and get this progressive movement
underway.”
Carpenter’s statement is notable for several reasons. It highlights his group’s use of two
of the tactics outlined in the previous section—endorsing candidates and mobilizing
activists to register voters—to push a progressive agenda both within the Party and the
electorate. It also exemplifies how the manner in which an organization deploys
strategies and tactics serves as a means to express and maintain its collective identity.
In the case of the endorsements, Carpenter’s group had endorsed two selfidentified progressives challenging incumbent Congressional Democrats. The first,
Marisol Rubio, was a straightforward attempt to help mobilize support for a progressive
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Democrat in a district held by a moderate incumbent, making clear that the group was not
one that would vote for any Democrat regardless of policy positions. In the case of
Shahid Buttar, the tactic was deployed symbolically. The seat he was competing for was
occupied by Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and was located in San Francisco
proper, outside the area officially covered by OREB. As such, the endorsement did not
serve to help OREB members or those in the East Bay progressive community make a
decision about candidate support, but instead defined the group in opposition to the
Democratic Party “establishment” via its public rebuke of Pelosi.
The voter registration efforts, focused on expanding the universe of primary
voters by pursuing “No Party Preference” or “Decline to State” voters, is also typical of
the current wave of anti-establishment progressive groups in California. The predilection
for pursuing these voters is common among Sanders-supporting activists and the
organizations they are drawn to, as many of them, including Carpenter, were similarly
unaffiliated with the Party prior to being mobilized in 2016. For them, activating voters
who are disillusioned with the major parties is essential to the “political revolution”
Sanders called for in both his 2016 and 2020 campaigns. Indeed, many of them had
decided to #DemEnter the Party, both to vote for Sanders and to support his policy
priorities via activism aimed at the Democratic Party. Given their own identity as
somewhat tentative Democrats, they are drawn to the strategy of pursuing potential
supporters who may share a common worldview, including a similar hesitancy about the
Democratic Party.
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The above examples depict how organizations develop and maintain their
collective identity through not only the combination of strategies and tactics they choose
to deploy, but also through the discourse they use both to define themselves and to
discuss these strategic and tactical choices. In this way, these groups distinguish
themselves in terms of how they view themselves as progressives, what they want to
achieve, and how they want to achieve it. New activists are then drawn to groups whose
collective identity matches up with their own worldview and understanding of politics.
This is an iterative and ongoing process of group negotiation, as the collective identity of
these groups influences their political goals and the tactics they choose to deploy towards
those goals, and their political goals and tactics reflect back on their collective identity.
This section digs into these dynamics, exploring how groups, through a
combination of action, explicit statements, as well as via internal and public discourse,
articulate their collective identity, including their relationship with the Democratic Party,
and assert that identity through political action.
Next, this section introduces two typologies—Party-First and Party-Second
groups—for classifying and examining progressive activist groups based on the
differences in both how they define progressivism and also the selection of and
discourses surrounding the tactics they employ for political action.
It begins by building on the previous section’s discussion of strategies and tactics
by exploring an additional strategic practice common to progressive groups: defining
progressivism. While the selection of strategies and tactics explored in the previous
section all contribute to the development and maintenance of a group’s collective
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identity, the way in which a group defines progressivism is, on its own, directly related to
identity. The strategies for defining progressivism differ from those discussed above in
that it they are most often implicit strategies, as groups rarely consciously set a goal to
define progressivism. And yet, the practice of doing so is endemic to progressive groups.
This discussion is thus structured in parallel to the previous examination section,
presenting a universal repertoire of strategies and tactics, of how organizations articulate
and negotiate their conception of progressivism for its members, the Party, and the
public. It then examines the distinct differences in discourse that exists between these two
typologies, related to how these groups present themselves in reference to the Democratic
Party and the broader progressive movement. Lastly, it explores how these differences
manifest themselves in the manner and choice of tactics deployed by these groups
towards progressive change.
Party-First and Party-Second Groups
As the previous sections have made clear, there are similarities across progressive groups
both in terms of how they use the term progressive to define themselves in relation to the
Democratic Party and the repertories of tactics they use for political action. Indeed, all of
the local progressive groups discussed in this dissertation pursue political, societal, and
policy change aimed at strengthening the progressive movement and bringing about a
more progressive society. Not to mention, because of the two-party system and the big
tent of the Democratic Party, there is a certain oppositional aspect to any group that
defines itself as progressive and engages in Democratic Party politics. Members of such
groups strive not only to push the Democratic Party to the left on key policy issues
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through their activism, but also to modify its practices, rules, and structures towards a
more democratic institution that is accountable to grassroots activists. And yet there are
also distinctions between these groups in terms of how they relate to the Party. While one
might be tempted to categorize these groups as either “inside the Party”—the formally
chartered Democratic Clubs—or “outside the Party”—all other groups—, that duality
ignores distinct political philosophies and practices that do not map onto the inside
vs. outside duality. Alternatively, progressive groups can be better understood using two
new typologies, “Party-First” and “Party-Second” progressive groups, introduced in this
section. This conceptualization allows for examination of the differences in how these
groups construct their identity based on their relationship to the Party, how they define
progressivism, the discourses that surround their activism, their networks of movement
allies, and their choice of strategies and tactics for achieving their political goals.
Party-First Groups
At their core, Party-First groups are comprised of Democratic Party members
championing a progressive agenda for society and a reformist agenda for the Democratic
Party. Party-first groups are committed to the Democratic Party as the primary vehicle for
progressive political change. The president of the EAPD explained how his group aims
to:
lead and help guide the learning process of local Democrats about the
value of being involved as Democrats and being strategically, more
viscerally, involved with Democratic politics. It is the vehicle for shaping
policy and for determining the quality of governance, upward from our
communities, a phrase we often use. This is about exerting leverage
upward from our communities to shape the direction of the Democratic
Party and of capital D democratic governance (Interview Quote).
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Further, these groups subscribe to an incremental theory of political change, working to
change the system through electoral activism for candidates and ballot measures,
community organizing, policy advocacy, and working to increase progressive
representation in local and state Party structures.
Party-First groups include those “Democratic Clubs” that are officially chartered
by their respective County Democratic Parties, as well as local chapters of Progressive
Democrats of America (PDA). In some cases, a single group can be affiliated with
multiple organizations. For example, the Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica
Mountains is chartered by both the Los Angeles County Democratic Party and PDA. This
category also includes several independent local progressive groups as well as local
chapters of Indivisible. Despite the fact that Indivisible chapters typically lack any
mention of the Democratic Party on their websites or literature, these chapters regularly
work collaboratively with leaders and members of Party-chartered clubs to pursue shared
progressive goals. This synergy has increased as Indivisible groups have expanded from
their initial mandate—resisting the Trump Agenda—to also include pursuing progressive
goals at the local, state, and national level.
Party-Second Groups
Party-second groups are comprised of Democrats, as well as third-party and unaffiliated
activists, seeking a more progressive society via a combination of social movement
tactics combined with targeted activism at and within the Democratic Party. Members of
Party-Second groups are more heterogeneous in their commitment to the Democratic
Party as an institution. But they collaborate around a shared, albeit sometimes reluctant,
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agreement that the Party is the playing field on which most progressive battles are
currently fought. Though these groups do engage in political activism toward incremental
change, they also criticize it as an insufficient means to achieve political change on its
own. Their theory of change tracks well with the multi-pronged “inside-outside” strategy
popularized by Michael Harrington, founder of the Democratic Socialists of America. An
officer of the SF Berniecrats explained:
“I think [Democratic Party] electoralism has its part to play. I don’t think
the left would be as big as it was if electoralism didn’t work. Like if
Bernie didn’t run for president, DSA wouldn’t be as big as it is, the left
movement wouldn’t be as big as it is . . . . I think you can have immediate
impacts on things, but in the long term if we want to make real change in
our country we have to recognize that electoralism can only go so far.
He further outlined the need to supplement Democratic Party politics with communitybased “left movement building,” and other activities, many of which are common to a
variety of progressive groups.
Included in this typology are local chapters of Our Revolution (OR) as well as
certain local chapters of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), such Our
Revolution East Bay and Our Revolution Contra Costa County. Some DSA Chapters,
such as DSA East Bay, are excluded from actively “reject[s] attempts to take over the
Democratic Party.” As with Party-First groups, there are some instances where PartySecond groups have multiple affiliations. For example, the Santa Clarita OR chapter is
also a DSA Chapter. Party-Second groups also include local “Progressive Alliance”
groups modeled after the California Progressive Alliance and Richmond Progressive
Alliance, which are discussed in more detail below. Like Indivisible, Progressive
Alliances often eschew mention of the Democratic Party, and their leaders even dismiss
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the idea that they seek change via the Democratic Party. That said, it is my observation
that many of its members use it as a vehicle for pursuing change within and via the
Democratic Party. A member of the San Jose Progressive Alliance explained:
“[The Alliance] is a mixed bag just like any non-Democratic Party event.
But I do know that some of the Democratic Party people running for office
will show up and speak and they have many people there who are engaged
and happy to have them there.”
The above examples reveal the nuances that exist in the ways progressive groups
conceive of themselves in reference to the Democratic Party and point to a need to move
beyond the inside-outside conception of party activism. Understanding groups as PartyFirst and Party-Second allows us instead to consider formal affiliation with the Party as
only one of several factors that distinguish progressive groups from one another. Another
feature that distinguishes Party-First groups from Party-Second groups is how they define
progressivism for their members, the Party, and the public.
Defining Progressivism
At the local level, there are so many groups that fall under the banner of progressive, and,
as discussed earlier in this chapter, they often choose from a relatively universal
repertoire of strategies and tactics. And yet, there are subtle differences in how PartyFirst and Party-Second groups differentiate themselves from one another in the broad
sphere of progressive groups. These groups engage in numerous implicit strategies and
tactics that define progressivism and by extension, construct and express their collective
identity for their membership, the public, and the Party. These strategies include defining
progressivism via their mission, mandate and issue priorities, organizational rules, norms,
and structure, media activism, and their endorsements.
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Mission, Mandate, and Issue Priorities
Though progressive groups engaged in Democratic politics rarely explicitly define
progressive or progressivism, their decision to identify as “progressive Democrats” or to
have “progressive” as integral to their group’s mission means that how a group defines
itself is by extension how they define what it means to be progressive. Groups define
themselves most deliberately via their mission statements, bylaws, and profiles found on
their websites, Facebook pages, and other media properties. Via these media, groups
typically define progressivism as some combination of values (e.g. economic, racial,
social, and environmental justice), political philosophies, as well as a skepticism of
institutional and corporate power. For example, the San Diego Progressive Democratic
Club, in their bylaws lays out the specific values that inform their progressive vision for
society:
“We envision a society where people work together for human rights,
equal economic opportunity, social justice, Party reform, and
environmental restoration & justice. We work to create a government for
and by the people, by getting dark money out of politics and expanding
grassroots participation in the political process” (San Diego Progressive
Democratic Club, 2020a).
This emphasis on grassroots participation is common across both Party-First and
Party-Second groups. San Luis Obispo Progressives also include “providing a
constructive role for volunteers in Democratic politics” (SLO County Progressives, n.d.)
as one of the stated purposes of their club.
Groups also define progressivism by communicating specific issue priorities.
Progressivism is thus defined by support for policies related to issues such as affordable
housing, immigration reform, and environmental justice. That said, many issue priorities
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are commonplace among the listed concerns of progressive organizations and even
among broader Democratic Party organizations. For example, Indivisible SF’s stated
issue priorities—strengthening democracy, healthcare for all, economic justice, climate
justice, racial and gender justice, and reproductive rights—are standard fare for many
Democratic groups and candidates nationwide. Likewise, it would be hard to find a leftof-center organization in California that doesn’t support two of EAPD’s priorities:
women’s rights and high- quality education. However, the decision by a progressive
group to highlight certain key issues can reveal where its progressive boundaries fall
compared to other groups and the broader Democratic Party.
For example, the San Diego Progressive Democrats has a specific “Progressive
Values” page on their website that lists twelve policy priorities, ranging from “Healthcare
for All” (as opposed to Single Payer or Medicare for All) to “Money Out of Politics” to
“Gender Equality” (San Diego Progressive Democratic Club, 2020b). The issue priorities
of SLO Progressives reveals subtle differences that reflect its origins in the Sanders
movement, including a call for open primaries, opposition to trade deals including the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, and support for Single Payer Medicare for All (SLO County
Progressives, n.d.) Our Revolution Kern County, a Party-Second group, presents a more
radical set of priorities, calling for Single Payer Healthcare, the abolishment of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (I.C.E.), and support for a “Robin Hood
Tax,” a nickname for a levy on financial transactions popularized in Europe and the
United States by the Occupy Movement in the early 2010s (Our Revolution Kern County,
2020).
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Organizational Rules, Norms, and Structure
The formal and informal rules of progressive organizations also serve to define
progressivism by setting the boundaries of their progressive discourse. For example, the
Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains incorporated into its bylaws a
requirement that candidates and elected officials requesting to address the club first
publicly pledge support for single payer healthcare in the form of “Medicare for All.”
Informal rules or norms also serve similar purposes. For example, some groups prioritize
debates between Democrats rather than between Democrats and Republicans, meaning
that the boundary of the debates only focus on intraparty differences rather than reflecting
the full list of concerns candidates face from the entire electorate. Party-Second groups
are much more likely to deprioritize or eschew involvement in debates between
Democrats and Republicans.
Other groups define progressivism through the crafting of their organizational
structure and decision-making processes. This includes both their own internal
democratic practices and the role of individual members, which range from traditional to
more radically democratic, as well as their array of committees and formal partners. For
example, the organizational structure of the Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club allows
for individual committees to meet independently and determine future activities
independent of the general membership. These communities focus on community
organizing (e.g. Block by Block Organizing Committee; East Bay Communities for
Action Committee) and specific policy issues (e.g. Education Committee; Racial and
Criminal Justice Committee). By contrast, the SF Berniecrats committees are processoriented (Endorsement Committee; Outreach Committee), with actions and decision283

making requiring by way of a comprehensive form of internal democracy that involves
presentation and approval of actions by the general membership. Internal practices, such
as these, are important for creating a collective identity for an organization’s members
that aligns with the forms of democracy they desire from the broader political system.
Thus far, this section has focused on strategies and tactics for defining
progressivism that have limited reach beyond that of a group’s individual membership or
an interested party perusing the group’s digital presence. These groups, and their
individual members, also define progressivism for broader audiences as they engage in
media activism.
Defining Progressivism via Media Activism
As discussed in the previous section, progressive groups engage in media activism for a
variety of reasons, including to publicize their endorsements, critique elected officials
and Party leaders, and promote progressive activities. This activism also serves as a
means for them to publicly articulate their definition of progressivism directly, and also
as a function of their support or critique of political leaders or news events.
On a rare occasion, a media outlet might provide a group with the opportunity to
explicitly define progressivism. Following the 2020 presidential election, Spectrum
News 1 in Los Angeles granted an interview to Hans Johnson, president of the EAPD and
captioned it “What does it mean to be progressive?” In the interview, he explained that
progressive candidates “responsiveness to the urgency of the issue they prioritize,
including homelessness…healthcare access…and protection of public schools.” He then
went on to highlight noteworthy progressive victories by candidates and on ballot
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measures. Tactics like this, including the highlighting of specific progressive activity, and
critique of non-progressive activity, is the most common form of media activism by
progressive groups. Similarly, the president of the Richmond Progressive Alliance, a
Party-Second group, in an interview with Jacobin magazine, defined progressivism as “as
anything or anyone that has a predilection for the poor, the working class, and for
historically marginalized communities, and that works to actively elevate, and not further
harm, these communities. This applies to issues, individuals, organizations, legislation,
and overall narrative” (Socialist Forum, 2018)
Highlighting progressive successes is one of the ways in which local groups can
use both national and local news to help them define progressivism. For example, during
the 2020 primaries, numerous groups posted on social media about incumbent Senator Ed
Markey’s victor over challenger Joe Kennedy III in Massachusetts. Because Markey had
authored the Green New Deal, highlighting his win both allowed progressive groups to
point to the Green New Deal as a progressive priority, but also to showcase a progressive
win over a well-funded member of a long-standing Democratic Party political dynasty.
By the same token, groups also critique policy positions, legislation, votes, or
other activity they see as anti-progressive. For example, the Progressive Democrats of
Orange County posted on Facebook a scathing critique of local Democratic Congressman
David Price’s vote in favor of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. Their
critique not only highlighted the anti-war priorities of their Democratic club, but also
highlighted other issues through a list of specific concessions Price should have sought in
exchange for his vote, including a reversal of the transgender ban in the military, and
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safeguards to limit Trump’s power to declare war with Iran. These critiques can extend
beyond policy to other progressive values, such as the importance of communication
between politicians and grassroots activists. This was apparent in early 2017 when
Senator Dianne Feinstein was publicly chastized by a coalition of over 30 Party-First and
Party-Second groups in the Bay Area for refusing to hold town halls with constituents.
The coalition, which counted among its members two-dozen Indivisible chapters and
numerous other local progressive groups, scheduled a town hall for Feinstein in February
2017. When Feinstein did not attend, they publicized the event on social media as
“Feinstein Empty Chair Town Hall + Activism Fair.” Attendees heard from local
progressive leaders, recorded comment and question messages for Feinstein, and were
presented with mobilization information for future local activist events. The empty chair
town hall was covered by media outlets including, but not limited to the Berkeley Daily
Planet, the East Bay Express, Mother Jones, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the
Huffingtonpost. Two months later, Feinstein scheduled town halls in the Bay Area and
Los Angeles.
Public critiques are also carried out by individual group members, often via
print and online op-eds or social media. For example, in September 2018, an activist
from the EAPD wrote an op-ed in the Los Angeles Daily News explaining the tactics he
and other activists successfully deployed to prevent State Assemblyman Miguel Santiago
from “gutting” the state’s impending net neutrality bill. In the article, he pointed to
Santiago’s acceptance of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from ATT and
other telecommunications companies (Chagoya, 2018). Some activist critiques are more
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tongue-in-cheek, such as the online response activists had to former president Barack
Obama’s November 2019 interview, in which he warned in an interview that the
Democratic Party’s “activist base” could limit the Party’s success in 2020. Activists
nationwide, including those from California progressive groups, engaged in a Twitter
campaign using the hashtag #TooFarLeft. Activists tweeted statements embracing the
accusation and pointing to their progressive priorities. An activist member of several East
Bay Area progressive groups wrote “I’m #TooFarLeft [because] I believe Public
Education, Healthcare, and Corrections should be not-for-profit.”
The most public way in which groups define progressivism is via their choice of
endorsements. An endorsement serves not only as a statement of a group priority in a
particular race, but also as an attempt to map those priorities onto candidates who often
hold diverse policy positions that may not uniformally correspond with those of the
endorsing group. For progressive groups, an endorsement itself communicates aspects
of a group’s definition of progressivism. For example, despite both being endorsed by
the Courage California progressive voter guide in the 2020 race for a San Francisco State
Senate seat, incumbent Scott Wiener saw much less support from progressive groups
compared to his opponent, Jackie Fielder. Fielder’s campaign highlighted the need to
include more marginalized groups in policy making processes. She also criticized
Wiener’s acceptance of campaign contributions from corporations and his legislative
attempts to increase the housing supply in California as too rooted in market-based
mechanisms that would benefit developers. That said, Wiener’s record in the State Senate
was what many would classify as extremely progressive. Given their similar policy
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positions, it is clear that the progressive groups that endorsed Fielder felt that her
definition of progressivism resonated with their own. In its endorsement, the progressive
group Bay Rising Action wrote:
“Jackie Fielder is a Latina and Native American candidate who is not
afraid to challenge the corporate agenda and lead with a bold vision for
California. Although she can’t match her opponent’s funding from big
corporate donors, she has real progressive values and a strong ground
game (Bay Rising Action, 2020).””
The endorsement process also acts to communicate the group’s definition of
progressivism to candidates in two ways - explicitly via the question-and-answer period
or questionnaire, but also implicitly, as any strategic candidate will do research and work
to articulate progressive positions in a way that speaks to the group’s membership on its
own terms. For example, at the January 2020 meeting of the Progressive Democratic
Club of (central) Los Angeles, Fatima Iqbal-Zubair highlighted her work in the Watts
neighborhood of Los Angeles and her support for the Green New Deal, both state
priorities of the Club. But more importantly, she spoke to a theory of change that its
members identified with:
“I’m not here for superficial change that’s gonna get incremental change,
I’m here for real, systemic change. I have always spoken truth to power.
I’m the only candidate here who has taken the no fossil fuel pledge and the
only candidate here who has taken the homes guarantee pledge because I
believe every person deserves a home.”
Some groups aim to force those seeking endorsements to make clear that they align with
the group’s uncompromising political values. To that end, Our Revolution Wellstone
Progressive Democrats of Sacramento, which walks a line between Party-First and Party
Second, as part of their endorsement questionnaire, explicitly asks those seeking
endorsement if they have “ever endorsed a Republican.” Tensions like these are common
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to the discourse surrounding group endorsements, as the relationship between identity
and progressive endorsements is extremely complex.
The above section has outlined the repertoire of strategies and tactics employed
by progressive groups to articulate their definition of progressivism. Via these activities,
individual groups construct, express, and maintain their own collective identity based in
part on their ongoing discourse around what it means to be progressive. The rest of this
chapter looks at group activity that more clearly reveals distinctions between Party-First
and Party-Second groups. It next examines progressive groups’ internal and external
discourses, and their deployment of strategies and tactics.
Discourse: Differences in the nature of opposition
Comparing organizational discourses across progressive groups reveals differences in
how Party-First and Party-Second groups situate themselves in reference to the
Democratic Party and how they view their role in party politics and the progressive
movement. These differing organizational discourses of Party-First and Party-Second
groups can be understood by examining them across three themes: inside vs. outside, big
tent vs. ideological purism, and Party critique.
Inside vs. Outside
Despite their progressive agenda, Party-first groups are committed philosophically to the
Democratic Party. As such, there is little discussion within these groups about how
outside they have to be in order to maintain credibility. There are less explicit discourses
around being Democrats because they simply are Democrats. This is clear in the

289

explanation given by Hans Johnson, president of the East Area Progressive Democrats, in
describing the founding of their club in 2014:
“The reality is that Democrats are the party of governance here at the local
level, at the County level and at the state level in California. And part of
the initial framing for the value of the club was that the largest base of
Democrats in Los Angeles is here on the East Side.”
Other Party First groups, including many local Indivisible chapters also signal their
insider status despite not formally being inside the Party. Most often, this is simply
through the use of the first-person plural pronouns—we, us, our—when referring to the
Democratic Party.
By contrast, many Party-Second groups, despite engaging in electoral activism for
Democratic candidates and pushing their members to pursue roles in the Party structure,
refer to the Party as a separate entity. For example, Gayle McLaughlin, founder of the
Richmond Progressive Alliance and later the statewide California Progressive Alliance,
regularly says that her organizations “support the good fight inside the Democratic
Party.” Other Party-second groups often present their members as outside insurgents,
members of the “political revolution” who are coming in to “take over the Democratic
Party”.
Regardless of these differences in how members of these groups discursively
situate themselves in reference to the Party, they are to some degree strategically
participating in the Party’s internal structure—e.g. via ADEM elections—and its public
electoral processes. In doing so, these groups differentiate themselves in how they relate
to others within the Democratic Party as well as how they define their adversaries.
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Big Tent vs Purists
In the process of engaging in the Democratic Party, members of progressive groups have
to determine how they understand and interact with others across the Party’s broad
ideological spectrum. Examining the specific discourses within progressive groups on the
topic of less progressive party members reveals differences in the degree to which PartyFirst and Party-Second progressive groups discursively separate themselves from others
within the Party.
In terms of major political institutions, the primary adversary of Party-First
groups is the Republican Party. For example, the Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club,
centered in the Oakland/Berkeley region of the San Francisco Bay Area, lists as one of its
goals as: “elect[ing] Democrats to all offices up and down the ballot to end the right-wing
stranglehold of our government in Congress.” Party-Second groups regularly present two
adversaries, the Republican Party and “the Democratic establishment,” or some variation
thereof.
In electoral contests, fissures often exist around the candidates supported by
progressive groups versus those supported by those toward the center of the Democratic
Party. That said, these fissures remain more durable between elections for Party-second
groups than for Party-first groups. For example, Party-first groups are more likely to
celebrate when centrist Democrats defeat Republicans in electoral contests or when they
pass progressive policy proposals over Republican opposition. For example, the EAPD
praised Governor Gavin Newsom on Facebook, Twitter, and via its email list after he
signed a bill regulating the extraction of groundwater located beneath the Mojave Desert,
an issue the Club and environmental activists had long pushed for at the state level. The
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Club also highlighted, early in Biden’s presidency, his executive orders on gun control
and his support for an Amazon union vote in Georgia. Similarly, the Progressive
Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains commended Biden’s choice of a seasoned
diplomat—rather than an adversarial hawk—to serve as the primary U.S. envoy to Iran.
Despite this affable public support from Party-first groups, observing group meetings
reveals disagreement and controversy about the appropriate timing and level of support
for non-progressives.
By contrast, it is difficult to find a positive comment about Newsom or Biden in
the social media accounts of Party-Second groups. Following Biden’s election most
group’s immediately hosted discussion group’s about, or posted strategies for, holding
Biden accountable to the progressive movement. In the early months of his
administration, Our Revolution East Bay criticized the Biden administration on several
topics, including a U.S. backed attack on Iranian Militants in Syria, and what they saw as
a failure to hold the line on unemployment benefits in its negotiations with Congress over
the February 2021 COVID relief package. In its public online platforms, the Democratic
Socialists of America San Diego only mentioned Biden once after he received the
Democratic nomination, when they made clear he would not receive their endorsement.
This variation in how groups engage across the Party also manifests itself in the breadth
of critiques made at the Party as an institution.
Scope of Critique
Party-first groups are more likely to engage in a narrower critique focused on specific bad
actors or problems. In the example of Kevin de Leon’s opposition to the state plastic bag
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ban discussed above, the East Area Progressive Democrats pointed specifically to de
Leon and other local legislators as at odds with progressive values of environmentalism
and campaign finance and highlighted those Democrats at the Los Angeles city and
county levels who supported similar bans.
Party-Second groups are more apt to make systemic critiques of the Party as
inherently “capitalist” or “corrupt.” Progressive failures by individual elected officials
and Party leaders simply serve as additional evidence that the Party as it stands is broken
and wins by progressives happen because of like-minded activists andin spite of Party
leaders and elected officials. For example, the 2020 Los Angeles City Council race saw
incumbent David Ryu, who had been endorsed by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Hillary
Clinton, and Mayor Eric Garcetti, defeated by Nathya Raman, who was endorsed by Our
Revolution and the Democratic Socialists of America. Raman connected with these
groups by actively avoiding seeking the endorsement of the Los Angeles Democratic
Party, calling it a political machine “designed to keep incumbents in power.” These
groups touted her win over those who had “received their marching orders” from the
establishment.
This is not to say that Party-First groups do not make systemic critiques, but even
those tend to have a narrower, reformist element to them. For example, broad, recent
critiques of the Los Angeles County and State Democratic Party are often linked to
former chair Eric Bauman. Party-First groups often refer to him as “Boss Bauman,”
invoking the imagery of early-to-mid 20th century party bosses and the endemic
corruption, including favoritism, harassment, and patronage, known to have plagued
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party organizations of that era. One local leader referred to Party leaders in the postBauman era as “Bauman’s minions,” calling out the lack of accountability for those who
enabled both his unethical political activity as well as the serial sexual harassment and
assault that eventually forced his resignation.
Looking at these group discourses through the lens of Party-First and PartySecond is important because we can learn about how they conceive of progressivism and
how they understand their relationship to the Party. It also allows us to explore how these
identities are reflected in their choice of tactics aimed at achieving progressive change.
Identity, Strategies and Tactics
The preceding sections have thus far outlined the difference between Party-First and
Party-Second groups based on a combination of their affiliation with the Democratic
Party and how they situate themselves discursively in reference to the Party. Their
collective identity, expressed via these explicit and implicit declarations, influence how
these groups navigate their relationship with the party. Their collective identity also
determines the strategies and tactics they choose to deploy, as well as how they deploy
them, in pursuit of progressive goals. This section returns to the universal repertoire of
strategies and tactics laid out at the beginning of this chapter. It outlines not only the
differences in how strategies and tactics manifest in Party-First and Party-Second Groups,
but also how a group’s selection of strategies and tactics reflexively contributes to and
reinforces their collective identity.
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Building Capacity for Progressive Action
As discussed early in this chapter, progressive groups work to build capacity for
collective action and other political activity by developing and training activists. In this
regard, the thematic difference between Party-First and Party-Second capacity building
efforts centers on the role they see activists playing in the Democratic Party, their
understanding of what the Party is, and their vision of what the Party can be. For PartyFirst groups, a progressive Democratic Party is the ideal. The president of the EAPD
explained how “The California Democratic Party should be the catalyst for nationwide
agenda setting right now and should have the paradigms for a variety of key functions,
including leadership development.” To that end, the EAPD lists “service [emphasis
added] by diverse, progressive Democrats in the Party structure” (Interview Quote) as
one of its four “gears” of strategic engagement.
To that end, Party-First groups are more likely to host educative events about the
nuance of the Party itself. For example, the San Diego Progressive Democrats in May
2018 hosted Kimberly Ellis, the former executive director of Emerge California and
previous candidate for state Party chair, for an event aimed at discussion the future of
progressivism in the Party. This event focused on strategies for “getting more millennials,
women, and people of color…involved in the political process.” Similarly, the EAPD, in
February 2021 hosted a question-and-answer panel called “Governance: Who, Me? How
Democratic Delegates & E-Board Members Can Understand the Party Governance
Structures, Build Bridges, and Shape Decisions in a Changing California.” This event
placed in conversation progressive elected officials, assembly delegates, and Los Angeles
County Central Committee Members to educate the group’s membership about both the
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formal and informal complexities and power dynamics that exist in the interaction
between the different State and Local Party Structures.
By contrast, Party-Second groups see the Party, often reluctantly, as the playing
field on which progressive politics currently takes place. Gayle McLaughlin, one of the
founders of the Richmond Progressive Alliance, explained how the “Democratic Party
leadership [was and is] corporate-controlled” (Socialist Forum, 2018) and thus
independent left movement building is necessary in concert with strategic Party activism.
As such, these groups may run some trainings around the ADEM elections, but educative
events around the Party tend to focus on critique, accountability, and public protest of the
Party and its elected officials and candidates. For example, the California Progressive
Alliance 2021 annual convention, attended via Zoom by many local groups statewide,
hosted an event, “The Donkey in the Living Room: Progressives and the Democratic
Party,” which placed in conversation progressive State Party leaders, activists, and
elected officials about activist strategies and the Democratic Party. Amar Shergill, chair
of the Progressive Caucus of the California Democratic Party implored activists to:
“Take a long at the Democrats that are running in your area. . . . take a
look at what kind of money they are taking and be very honest and public
about the fact that that money is toxic, make sure you call them out on it.
Get a consensus in your community about the fact that we’re not taking
that money, and that we are going to have some really honest discussions
face to face with those folks and encourage them to succeed…because we
want them to succeed without that money.”
In line with the “inside-outside” strategies of many Party-Second Groups, this panel was
followed by a panel entitled “Progressive Movement Outside the Democratic Party”
featuring discussion by leaders of various chapters of local third parties, as well as antifascist and labor organizers. The panel focused on highlighting successful tactics
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employed against what one panelist called “the Democratic Party’s allegiance first and
foremost to continuing destructive patterns of governance that are attached to corporate
control.” These included organizing around local non-partisan elections, direct action, as
well as other ways to “put cracks in the system to slow down and eventual stop this
destructive reproduction of the profit motive as the driver of our society” (The
Progressive Movement Outside the Democratic Party, 2021).
These same tensions around the formal linkages between activists and parties play
out in their tactics for leadership development. Party-First groups take a long-view of
developing leaders for advancement within the broader Party structure. As discussed
earlier in this section, these groups often funnel activists into formal training programs,
such as candidate trainings offered by Emerge California, or activists trainings via the
National Democratic Training Committee (NDTC), which partners with the state
Democratic Party. Via Party-First groups, activists might start out on group committees
or in service roles, or even run for assembly delegate, the process discussed early in
Chapter 3. However, there are other positions in the Party structure that necessitate a
long-term commitment to the Party that is recognized across communities that include
tens of thousands of Democratic voters. For example, Party-First groups help longstanding leaders run for central committee, which involves running on a primary ballot
that is distributed to all Democrats in a given assembly district. For example, in March
2020, the Democratic Primary ballot for central committee was part of the same ballot in
which voters were choosing between Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren, and
numerous other presidential candidates.
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Figure 29: A copy of the ballot for the County Central Committee race in California Assembly District 33.

To help activists compete in these contests, Party-First groups foster relationships
with other progressive groups, Party clubs, constituency groups, and other organizations
that can connect their leaders with broad communities as well as provide them with
endorsements and legitimization. The president of the EAPD explained:
Development of leaders by Party-Second groups is unsurprisingly less focused on
participation in the formal Party structure. That said, many Party-Second groups do offer
trainings about assembly delegate elections. As explained in Chapter 3, these elections
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are in many ways popularity contests among local activist communities that lend
themselves to the networked mobilization and “take over the Party” ethos common to
many party-second groups. As separate from the Party, they do not have the formal Party
linkages to participate in events like those offered by the NDTC. Even if they did, their
conception of politics is based more in movement building than in learning to use the
Party’s database or fundraising tools, both of which are skills taught in NDTC programs.
That said, some Party-Second groups encourage leaders to participate in the Emerge
California candidate trainings, especially given the progressive credibility brought to the
organization by its former executive director, Kimberly Ellis. For the most part,
leadership development in Party-Second groups is more informal, as activists develop
relationships with other leaders, take on roles leading actions, or eventually run for office.
Party-First and Party-Second groups also differ in terms of how they prioritize
organizing in concert with those on the margins of the Democratic Party. For Party-First
groups, network building often takes the form of coalition building around particular
issues or community organizing by members running for Assembly delegate or working
to build support for or against a specific issue. For example, the Harvey Milk LGBTQ
Democratic Club is a regular participant in numerous organizing events and coalitions
that aim to combat homelessness in San Francisco. Party-First groups are also more likely
to interact with Democratic constituency groups, such as Latinx Democratic clubs, that
do not identify specifically as progressive, as a means to spread ideas and engage new
progressives who may identify first as part of another constituency.
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By contrast, Party-Second groups more commonly discuss the concept of “leftist
movement building” aiming to build linkages between long-standing silos of the
American left. In some cases, this includes developing networks of similarly focused
groups around a grassroots definition of progressivism. The South Bay Progressive
Alliance, for example, aims to connect “corporate-free” progressive organizations. It
counts the California Nurses Association, the Green Party of Santa Clara County, and the
Silicon Valley DSA as partners in its mission to create “people-focused politics.” (South
Bay Progressive Alliance, 9/28/2021). Party-Second groups also network via action in
community-based, non-political programs, like those under the heading of “mutual aid.”
For example, DSA San Francisco in June 2019 held a free “Brakelight Replacement
Clinic,” in which they helped people fix broken break lights in their cars and engaged in
political discussion. All of these efforts build local progressive power and allow activists
to develop the relationships necessary for them to develop as leaders in both their
progressive groups and the community as a whole.
Mobilizing Effective Political Action
It has been established earlier in this chapter that groups recruit and train activists so they
can be mobilized to engage in effective political activism. Just as there are differences
between Party-First and Party-Second groups in terms of training, there are also related
differences in mobilization strategies and tactics. All progressive groups used their
websites, email listservs, and social media to provide mobilizing information for their
communities. In most cases, group websites were limited to information specific to the
organization itself, such as monthly meeting times and group-sponsored actions. In
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contrast, Facebook pages, across all groups, served as community calendars providing
information about a broader range of activities.
The mobilizing information provided on the community calendars of Party-First
groups tends toward more traditional political campaign organizing, such as door-to-door
canvasses, phone-banking, and letter writing for individual candidates or ballot measures.
Their mobilizing information for direct actions often highlighted those actions that serve
as boundary spaces for the greater Democratic Party electorate. For example, in January
2019, almost all Party-First groups posted information about their community’s local
iteration of the nationwide “Women’s March” protests that have become a common
annual occurrence nationwide since they were first organized on the day after President
Donald Trump’s 2017 inauguration. In most cases, these postings were limited to basic
logistical information. For example, the Modesto Progressive Democrats posted the event
start time, parking, and their group’s meeting location. Similar events were posted by
most other Party-First groups, that included logistical information and, in some cases,
broad language about women’s rights and healthcare.
By contrast, Party-Second groups either did not publicize these events or tried to
use them as an opportunity for collective visibility and issue activism. For example, Our
Revolution Wellstone Democrats of Sacramento, which straddles the line between PartyFirst and Party-Second, provided information for a “Women of Color Contingent” at the
march, organized collaboratively by groups such as The Decolonization Project, and the
Zapatista Solidarity Coalition. Along with logistical details, they called for both solidarity
around issues specifically facing women of color and accused leaders of the Women’s
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March of “silencing the voices” of Women of Color. The San Francisco Chapter of the
Democratic Socialists of America encouraged its members to march together with
members of the International Socialist Organization and the Trotskyist group, Workers
Voice/La Voz. They provided a location where their members could pick up large red
flags and signs that read “Working Women of the World Unite.” In a time where so much
attention is paid to personalized political action, this focus on traditional, collective
solidarity is notable.
Differences such as these were not only visible across the mobilizing information
of Party-First and Party-Second groups, but also within them. Within Party-First groups,
formally chartered progressive Democratic Clubs were more likely than independent
groups to limit their mobilizing information to either their own events or the events of
their endorsed candidates or partners. In contrast, the calendars of independent Party-First
groups, such as Indivisible, provided mobilizing information for numerous other PartyFirst groups, campaigns, and local issue-based advocacy organizations. In most cases,
these third-party events focused on relatively uncontroversial progressive priorities
(e.g. climate change) or efforts to mobilize activists to oppose the Trump agenda by
calling their representatives or maintaining the Democratic majority in Congress by
supporting Democratic candidates, often located out of state.
Party-Second groups also maintained calendars that served as broad, accessible
community calendars for many groups. For example, the various Our Revolution groups
in the San Francisco Bay Area all maintain public calendars on Facebook that are setup
so that other progressive candidates, issue-based citizen’s groups, and campaigns can
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freely login and publish their events. Participant groups in their calendars include tenants
unions, DSA groups, progressive alliances, as well as temporary groups that form around
specific issues or ballot measures (e.g. No on Prop 22 - Stop Uber and Lyft). These
calendars were also more likely to include information about events put on by
organizations that some would consider outside the margins of the Democratic Party. For
example, the Sacramento Progressive Alliance provided mobilization for the local
chapter of the Party for Socialism and Liberation and Our Revolution Southern California
similarly provided information about the events of the Movement for a People’s Party.
These differences in priorities and partners that are visible across Party-First and PartySecond mobilizing information also play out in the actions that progressive groups
choose to organize and cosponsor.
Even in the actions organized and cosponsored by Party-First groups, there is a
focus, thought certainly not exclusively, on traditional volunteer mobilization and
fundraising around electoral politics, especially in the months surrounding elections. To
some degree, the focus of these activities varied across geographic areas, depending on
both demographics and the political makeup of congressional and Assembly districts. For
example, the Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains, based in the
affluent areas of Topanga Canyon and Woodland Hills, maintained a focus on
fundraisers. In advance of the 2020 primaries the group co-sponsored multiple
fundraisers at members’ homes to support Democratic candidates from the surrounding
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areas.11 As their group is both a chartered Democratic Club and an affiliate group of
Progressive Democrats of America (PDA), they also hosted multiple fundraisers in
support of PDA’s political action committee. By contrast, groups like Our Revolution /
Wellstone Democrats of Sacramento and cosponsored events that included phone banks,
door-to-door canvasses, and letter-writing campaigns for progressive candidates.
While the above discussion of mobilizing information makes it clear that Party
Second groups certainly recruit their members to support traditional electoral organizing
campaigns, many groups were less apt to organize those events themselves. This trend
was most obvious among newer groups, such as Our Revolution chapters and local
progressive alliances. DSA chapters were much apt to organize electoral actions
themselves. DSA of San Francisco cosponsored numerous events supporting both Jackie
Fielder in her race for State Senate and Shahid Buttar in his campaign to unseat Nancy
Pelosi. DSA Sacramento organized phone banks around numerous ballot propositions in
support of increased rent control protections and abolishing limitations on commercial
property taxes. The main electoral actions organized by all Party-Second Groups were in
support of Bernie Sanders’ 2020 campaign for the Democratic nomination. Many PartySecond groups organized regularly scheduled events in cooperation with the Sanders
campaign. For example, Our Revolution Southern California, which operated in Inland
Orange County, and DSA Sacramento both organized weekly canvasses and phone banks
in support of the Sanders campaign. Our Revolution East Bay cosponsored events with

According to the 2010 census, residents of Topanga Canyon have an annual income of
$120,711 with only 5.9% living below the poverty line. Woodland Hills residents have an
average annual income of $135,260 with 8.4% of residents living below the poverty line.
11
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the Sanders campaign to connect its members with the campaign’s volunteer
opportunities. That said, these exceptions are both unsurprising given Our Revolution’s
roots in the Sanders campaign and Sanders’ strong identification with the DSA.
While Party-Second groups were less likely to organize their own traditional
organizing actions, they were much more focused on organizing direct actions compared
to Party-First groups. For example, DSA-Los Angeles, in March 2017, organized over
100 of its members to protest outside the victory party of Mayor Eric Garcetti, who had
just won the Democratic nomination, effectively securing his second term as mayor of
Los Angeles. The protestors demanded that Garcetti protect local undocumented
immigrants by officially declaring Los Angeles a “sanctuary city.” As his supporters
entered the event, the protestors made clear their values, chanting “money for jobs and
education, not for ICE and deportation.” In the context of the Black Lives Matter (BLM)
protests that took place nationwide in mid-2020, local chapters of both DSA and Our
Revolution in Kern County partnered with a local BLM group to organize a rally outside
of the Bakersfield Police Department.
Most often, the direct actions of Party-First groups were either focused on local
issues, such as EAPD’s protests in opposition of a proposed power plant in Glendale or
aimed at the Republican Party. The focus on the Republican Party is especially true,
given their origins in the anti-Trump “resistance” movement, of Indivisible groups, which
early on focused largely on protesting against local and regional Republicans, as well as
Democrats that they saw as complicit in enabling Trump’s agenda. For example,
Indivisible-39 in northeast Orange County organized a protest outside Republican
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Congressman Ed Royce’s local office to protest his ‘yes’ vote on the 2017 Republican
Tax Bill. Indivisible San Diego, in collaboration with local activists, organized protests
for 65 consecutive weeks outside the Vista office of Congressman Darrell Issa,
eventually resulting in weekly standoffs with counter protestors.
Party-Second groups, in areas represented by Republican politicians, did
occasionally engage in similar actions aimed at the Republican Party. In the context of
Covid-19, these often took the form of “car caravans,” parades of protestors driving a
pre-planned route to a politicians home or office. Our Revolution / DSA Santa Clarita
Valley and Our Revolution Kern County cosponsored a “car caravan and socially
distanced rally” in Lancaster that terminated at Republican Congressman Mike Garcia’s
congressional office. In their call to action, they accused him of “standing with extremists
like Donald Trump and Q Anon conspiracy theorists like [representative] Marjorie Taylor
Greene” and also “ignor[ing] and refus[ing] to meet with community organizations.”
These same groups, along with our Revolution Antelope Valley held a similar caravan
targeting Representative Kevin McCarthy, the Republican minority leader of the U.S.
House of Representatives in February 21, arguing he was complicit in enabling white
supremacy and they, as constituents, needed “to make [their voices heard]” since he had
not held a town hall in over 11 years.
Party-First and Party-Second groups also varied in their efforts to export
capacity to other regions. This variation reveals differences in the limits of Party support
between the two typologies. Party-First progressive Democrats across the Los Angeles
region in March 2020 were focused on exporting capacity to support Assemblywoman
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Christy Smith in a special election being held in California’s 25th congressional district
to replace Democrat Katie Hill, who resigned in October 2019. These groups organized
carpools to Santa Clarita and Palmdale to help her campaign knock on doors across the
wide geography that constituted the district. Smith, a moderate, received minimal support
from Party-Second groups outside of the district. Even Party-Second groups within the
congressional district, while certainly preferring Smith to her Republican opponent,
maintained their focus on mobilizing support for Bernie Sanders’ nomination battle.
Leading up to the November 2020 election, the candidates in the most competitive races
were from more moderate areas of the state, such as Orange County, where progressive
candidates either had not contested, or had been filtered out by, the earlier March
primary. Efforts were made by many Party-First groups to travel or make calls to support
those candidates and maintain the Democratic majority in the U.S. House. Party-Second
groups limited their support to the two competitive races that featured progressive
candidates, Katie Porter in Orange County, and Audrey Denney in rural Northern
California. Denney had been endorsed by Bernie Sanders. Party-First groups also
partnered with strategic mobilization groups, such as Sister District, to help export their
capacity outside the state to support Democratic candidates in to not only support
regional competitive races, but also similar races across the country.
Increasing Public Pressure for Preferred Policies
Examining the deployment of strategies and tactics for putting public pressure on
political leaders and elected officials reveals differences both between and within PartyFirst and Party-Second groups. The act of publicly taking positions on candidates,
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legislation, and ballot measures is arguably the most consistent and public way that
progressive groups express and maintain their identity. In the case of candidate
endorsements, groups are mapping their own values and priorities onto complex
candidates whose values and priorities may not align unilaterally with those of their own.
The intricacies of legislation and ballot measures may also not perfectly align with a
group’s ideal solution to the societal problem the bill or proposition is aiming to manage
or improve. Accordingly, decisions about endorsements require a group’s membership to
consider whether a given endorsement
Party-First groups are also more likely to weigh both political experience and
legislative accomplishments against ideological purity when deciding on an endorsement.
Party-Second groups give more weight to ideological purity, particularly in regards to
campaign finance, than Party-First groups.
These dynamics are well illustrated by the endorsements made by progressive
groups in advance of state’s 2018 Democratic Senatorial primary election in May of
2018. Recall from Chapter 3 that U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, a 26-year incumbent
Senator, was being challenged for re-election by Kevin de Leon, the President pro
tempore of the California State Senate. De Leon was regarded in circles of Party activists
and the media as the main progressive in the race. Also in the primary race were several
longshot candidates, including legislative analyst David Hildebrand and former public
high school teacher and organizer Alison Hartson, both Democratic Socialists. Among
Party-First progressive groups throughout the state, de Leon was the clear favorite,
receiving the endorsements of almost all Progressive Democratic Clubs throughout the
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state. Notably, he was not endorsed by the progressive Democratic Club in his own
community, the EAPD. The EAPD instead chose to endorse Feinstein. In an op-ed titled
“The Progressive Case for Re-electing Dianne Feinstein,” the Club’s president and one of
its members cited her role as “a woman with hard-earned authority in elected office” as
well as her numerous achievements on environmental protection (Johnson & Suarez,
2018). The group simultaneously accused de Leon of blocking state environmental
legislation to benefit a company that contributed to his campaign. The president of EAPD
explained the need to guard against those who may try to take advantage of progressives,
explaining that “you have to be cognizant of those elected officials who may try to use
progressive policy proposals as a kind of song to win over reformist activists” (Interview
Quote). EAPD also had other grievances with de Leon, beginning with his opposition to
the statewide plastic bag ban in 2014, discussed earlier in this chapter. This decision
reveals a level of flexibility within the EAPD that, despite noting the corrupting role of
money in politics on their website, allowed them to endorse a candidate who has not
rejected money from political action committees or corporations. That same flexibility
and pragmatism was visible in the endorsements of other Party-First groups, such as
Indivisible-48, which endorsed moderate Harley Rouda for Congress in 2018. Rouda,
who donated to Republican John Kasich in the 2016 presidential primary and only
registered as a Democrat after the 2016, was viewed with skepticism by much of the
progressive community.
In the battle for Feinstein’s seat, there were also clear divisions among PartySecond groups. Unsurprisingly, none supported Feinstein. In fact, DSA-LA, in its 2018
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voter guide, endorsed no specific candidate, but simply recommended “Not Dianne
Feinstein.” While Kevin de Leon received the endorsement of a few Our Revolution
chapters throughout the state, the bulk of the chapters opted instead to endorse either
David Hildebrand or Alison Hartson, due to their emphatic rejection of corporate and
PAC campaign contributions. Indeed, Hildebrand would actually introduce himself to
groups as “the Democratic Socialist, Corporate-Free, Pro-Union, Working Class
candidate for U.S. Senate.” These endorsements were in spite of both candidates’
significant lack of political experience. That said, this decision tracks with the tendency
of Party-Second groups, discussed earlier in this chapter, to highlight and promote those
who, like them, consider themselves to be new insurgents inside the Democratic Party.
Two DSA chapters also endorsed Hildebrand, though the bulk of DSA chapters made no
endorsement in the race. This reveals that for many Party-Second groups, the need to
maintain ideological purity supercedes choosing who to endorse from the two
realistically viable candidates, in this case, Feinstein and de Leon.
Across the universe of Party-Second groups, the endorsement strategies fall on a
range. At one end, are groups like SF Berniecrats, the San Francisco Our Revolution
Chapter, that chose to endorse candidates in most races, excluding a few races where they
advised: “No Recommendation. Leave it blank. We need a candidate that reflects
Berniecrats values.” At the other end, are groups like DSA of San Francsico, who found
only a single candidate on their ballot who met their ideological test: Gayle McLaughlin,
co-founder of the Richmond Progressive Alliance and Green Party candidate for
Lieutenant Governor. In the middle, are groups like DSA Los Angeles and DSA San
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Diego, that distinguish in their voter guide between their short list of endorsed candidates
and their full list of recommendations for the actual existing electoral races. In their
guide, they make clear their dissatisfaction with the available candidates, but recognize
the risks in not encouraging their audience to support Democratic over Republicans. DSA
Los Angeles wrote about Christy Smith’s race in Congressional District 25, which covers
suburan and rural areas around Santa Clarita and Palmdale:
Mike Garcia is absolutely awful. His background includes working as an
executive for Raytheon, and he campaigned as a strong Trump ally, which
he has proven true during his short time in Congress. His website literally
lists “socialism” as an issue he fights against. And yet, it is not easy to
support Christy Smith. Her time in the State Assembly has shown her to
be a corporate neoliberal who has cast plenty of bad votes. She voted
against the California Tenant Protection Act of 2019. She also voted
against allowing formerly incarcerated people to be on juries, against
prohibiting landlords from rejecting applicants based on Section 8 status
and voted in favor of eliminating oversight of telecom companies. But at
the end of the day, Christy Smith is massively better than Mike Garcia,
and she needs support in this extremely tight race. (DSA Los Angeles,
2020)
Differences in expectations of self-proclaimed progressive candidates was also visible in
the endorsement questionnaires used by Party-First and Party-Second groups to garner
information about and evaluate candidates. In their questionnaires, both groups asked
candidates to take positions on specific issues, including, but not limited to, voting rights
for the incarcerated, abortion rights, the Green New Deal, systemic racism, and marriage
equality (Indivisible East Bay, 2021), though the issues raised by Party-Second groups
were both more specific and farther to the left. DSA of Los Angeles asks potential
candidates, “How do you believe capitalism affects your constituents and the issues in
your district.” Moreover, Party-Second groups were more apt to include potentially
exclusionary questions. For example, Our Revolution / Wellstone Democrats of
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Sacramento asks its candidates, “Have you ever endorsed a Republican?” Holding
Politicians and Leaders Accountable to Grassroots Progressives
Party-Second Groups are more likely to use the direct actions, discussed above, to
hold politicians accountable to the grassroots. For example, a coalition of Party-Second
groups, including DSA Long Beach, Our Revolution Long Beach, and Long Beach Gray
Panthers partnered with the California Nurses Association to organize a car caravan
aimed at mobilizing citizens to contact state senators and assemblypersons to push them
to vote for Medicare for All. A DSA member who organized the rally said the
organization had dozens planned throughout the state. She explained that “rais[ing] some
hell was the only way to get Newsom all the Democrats who say one side and down that
they support Medicare for All to not only talk the talk but vote what we need” (Alvarado,
2021).
While both Party-First and Party-Second groups work to get candidates on the
record with the broader public, Party-First groups, especially those in moderate areas are
more likely to host events that place Democrats in conversation with Republicans. For
example, Indivisible of Ramona, based in a rural area northeast of San Diego, hosted a
bipartisan forum with two congressional candidates that focused on the environment and
deregulation. While the Republican frontrunner opted not to attend, the event placed two
competing candidates, a Republican and a Democrat, in conversation around issues
related to climate change and public policy in a way that forced the Democrat to
articulate his positions so as to separate them from those of a moderate Republican.
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Party-First groups are also more likely to use op-eds or radio interviews to get
their message out. For example, the San Francisco-based Harvey Milk LGBTQ
Democratic Club, along with two other community-based political groups, wrote an oped in the San Francisco Examiner criticizing community and business leaders in the city’s
Castro Neighborhood for considering accepting and implementing throughout the
neighborhood a network of 125 surveillance cameras provided for free by a billionaire
tech mogul (Harvey Milk LGBTQ Club, 2021). Less than a month later, following
additional community activism, the proposal was abandoned at a meeting of the
Castro/Upper Market Community Business District. Also, as made clear throughout this
chapter, EAPD has made numerous efforts in traditional and social media to highlight the
shortcomings of State Senator, and now Los Angeles Councilperson, Kevin de Leon.
Despite successful cases of online activism, leaders of some progressive groups also
noted the challenges and opportunities that social media bring to their members and the
progressive movement. The leader of a Los Angeles based Democratic Club explained:
“Social media has allowed us to amplify individual messages in ways that
used to require, earned media to propel outward. But I think social media
has also presented a major challenge for the club and that we have had to
prioritize training for club activists on fighting disinformation because
social media is not a unilateral vector of truth. . . . by virtue of having a
large cohort of very informed well-trained people, we have a particular
opportunity, especially given the vectors of disinformation, to use those
skills to [combat disinformation].”
Party-Second groups, possibly because they have fewer relationships with media outlets,
are committed to social media as a means for to hold political leaders accountable. This
points to an important consideration in using this construction going forward, which is
that there may be other cases where differences between Party-First and Party-Second
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groups are less a function of their identity and political goals, but rather of other factors,
such as their available resources and their relationships in the community.
This section depicted how Party-First and Party-Second groups can be
distinguished by the manner in which they deploy strategies and tactics towards
progressive goals. These discourses and actions also serve as a means through which
group members negotiate and renegotiate their collective identity. The next section
provides an extended case first provides an extended case study that depicts this reflexive
and ongoing process. It then discusses some contradictions in how the typologies of
Party-First and Party-Second play out differently across locales, and what this means for
how we understand the broader progressive movement.
Negotiation and Renegotiation in Local Groups
The previous section outlined different ways in which Party-First and Party-Second
groups express their collective identity via tangible political action, as a means of
situating themselves in opposition to the Democratic Party. Via participation in these
actions, groups not only carry out actions that reflect their collective identity but are also
simultaneously maintaining that identity. In many cases, the different actions that these
groups choose serve to draw in new members whose own personal identity makes them
motivated to act politically in the same way. For example, an activist who had been
activated by the 2016 Sanders campaign and successfully ran for assembly delegate
described how he was impressed with the Progressive Caucus of the CDP as “a group of
punk rockers” (Interview Quote) forcing uncomfortable conversations within the Party.
He found his home in a Party-Second group at the local level, the South Bay Progressive
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Alliance, and found joining to be “like a vacation to be surrounded by such friendly and
like-minded folks,” saying that “it felt like an ‘our tribe’ type of thing.” He was drawn to
the alliances roots in the Richmond Progressive Alliance and its roots opposing the local
oil industry, explaining:
They went head-to-head with the oil companies who were putting millions
of dollars into electing city officials. They worked at it. They took on
Chevron and took them to court and got the states largest payout up to that
point. Amazing, amazing stuff. They wanted to take that model onto a
statewide level which is just beautiful (Interview Quote).
It is also common for groups to pull in activists who have significant differences in their
personal identities and vision of politics. This can manifest in a variety of ways. An
activist from the Auburn Democratic Club explained how she finds it “important to
engage with [super-progressive] folks and dialogue with those folks so they know me they understand that I consider myself liberal even though they don’t think I’m liberal
enough” (Interview Quote). There are also moments when, within a progressive group,
personal identities collide and force a reckoning on the group’s identity. The next section
explores such conflict, first providing a rich discussion of an intragroup conflict over an
endorsement. It then discusses the fungibility inherent in the Party-First and Party-Second
typologies.
Endorsements and Accountability: The Case of Ammar Campa-Najjar
On February 10, 2020, Ammar Campa-Najjar stood in front of the membership of the San
Diego Progressive Democratic Club (SDPDC) as their endorsed candidate for the
upcoming “top-two” primary election for U.S. House California District 50, a
conservative district in East San Diego. The club, which had voted to endorse his
candidacy months earlier, was now debating whether or not to rescind that endorsement,
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with many members accusing him, in his January 12, 2020, interview with the San Diego
Union Tribune, of walking back his previous support for key progressive issues,
including Medicare for All and the Green New Deal. In the interview, he stated that he
“[didn’t] believe in taking 160 million people off of private healthcare insurance” and
would thus offer “Medicare for all who want it” combined with additional public and
nonprofit healthcare options. On climate change, he highlighted the need for “a big
mobilization towards combating climate change” but said he didn’t “think the Green New
Deal is all that realistic.” Over the course of the next 90 minutes, Campa-Najjar and his
supporters, as well as his detractors, made their cases for rescinding or maintaining the
Club’s endorsement.
Campa-Najjar’s conflict with the Club was several years in the making, and had
as much to do with conflicting identities within the club as it did with his behavior. The
San Diego Progressive Democratic Club was launched in 2017 by self-identified
Berniecrats. In the years that followed, it received such interest that it expanded to five
chapters—north, south, east, and west, plus the original primary chapter—across the
geography of greater San Diego. Over time, the group grew so large that its membership
included activists with varied conceptions of progressivism and the Democratic Party.
Further, with the exception of DSA-San Diego, the region lacked any Our Revolution
chapter or other Party-Second group of that nature. For many committed Democrats,
participating in DSA San Diego instead of the local progressive club would constitute a
huge jump ideologically and tactically for an activist choosing how to get involved in
progressive Party politics. As such, the SDPDC continues to be the primary place for
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progressive activism in San Diego, and its endorsements are sought by candidates, like
Campa-Najjar, seeking both the legitimacy provided by the endorsement, and the
volunteer resources its Club offers to its endorsed candidates.
Two years earlier, during the 2018 election for the Congressional seat, CampaNajjar had emerged to challenge incumbent Duncan Hunter Jr., who was embroiled in an
eventually career-ending scandal over misappropriation of campaign funds. Winning the
reliably Republican seat would have been a reach for any Democrat, but especially one
running as a progressive. Hunter’s father, Republican Duncan Hunter Sr., had represented
East County San Diego in Congress since 1981 before his son won the seat in 2012,
2014, and 2016 by 35 points, 42 points, and 27 points, respectively. National media
outlets, uncharacteristically focused on the race because of Hunter’s scandal, were
presenting Campa-Najjar as a “Mexican-Palestinian-American Progressive” (e.g.
Golshan, 2018). His endorsements bolstered his progressive bona fides. Justice
Democrats, the national progressive organization that was also supporting progressive
darling Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in what would be her upset victory over a longstanding Democrat, endorsed Campa-Najjar in the same election cycle (Justice
Democrats, 2017). Eric Garcetti, the Democratic mayor of Los Angeles, complimented
him for “building an incredible grassroots movement” (Garcetti, 2018) and campaigned
for him in the primary. Campa-Najjar was also recommended by the local Democratic
Socialists of America as part of their 2018 primary voter guide (DSA San Diego, 2018b)
and highlighted in their general election guide as “the only progressive Congressional
candidate running in [all of San Diego] County” (DSA San Diego, 2018a). However,
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despite the so-called “Blue Wave” that increased Democrats’ hold of state and federal
offices in 2018, California’s 50th district proved too conservative for Campa-Najjar, who
lost to the embattled Hunter by 3.4 percent of the vote.
In early 2020, following Hunter’s resignation, Campa-Najjar was again
campaigning for the seat in the “top-two” primary, this time against two Republicans,
former Congressman Darrell Issa and former San Diego City Council member Carl
DeMaio. With less than two months until the primary, he had again secured the
endorsement of the SDPDC. His position was bolstered because his Democratic
opponent, realtor and affordable housing advocate Marisa Calderon, had withdrawn from
the race for personal reasons (Clark, 2020). In most states, being the lone Democrat on a
primary ballot would have guaranteed Campa-Najjar a slot in the general election.
However, California’s “top-two” primary system meant that, with two viable Republicans
on the ballot in a conservative district, Campa-Najjar could come in third place in total
votes to his two Republican opponents and be excluded from the general election. In
practice, this meant there was pressure on Campa-Najjar to tack toward the center,
courting moderate Republicans and centrist Democrats at the same time that Bernie
Sanders was unapologetically pushing progressive policies as part of his second
campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination. Campa-Najjar’s strategic move to
the Center via his interview with the Union Tribute set off alarm bells in the San Diego
Progressive community, with debates immediately emerging on the listservs and
Facebook groups of various progressive organizations, including the San Diego
Progressive Democratic Club, the Democratic Socialist of America of San Diego, as well
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as in local “Berniecrat” online communities. At the January 13 meeting of the San Diego
Progressive Democrats, just one day after the Union Tribune interview, the membership,
encouraged by its new president and self-described Berniecrat, passed a motion to
reconsider Campa-Najjar’s endorsement at their next meeting.
At first glance, it is easy to see this conflict among Progressive Democrats as just
another example of the long-standing struggle between progressive ideology and
compromise discussed in the literature review of this dissertation. While that tension was
certainly present, the next meeting turned out to be a debate not only over CampaNajjar’s increasingly centrist strategy for winning a conservative district, but also over
differing visions among the Club’s membership about both the role of their
organization’s endorsements in the broader political system of San Diego and in the Party
itself. It also revealed divisions among progressives as to the role of progressive
organizations in holding Democrats accountable to progressive ideals.
Arguments Against The Rescindment of the Endorsement
The meeting was an incredibly tense affair, with supporters of Campa-Najjar lined up
along the walls, and Club members whispering in circles in advance of the meeting.
During the meeting, Campa-Najjar answered questions on his public positions for almost
an hour. Throughout his defense, he repeatedly argued that his public statements were not
a repudiation of progressive policies, but rather strategic communication tactics aimed at
making his positions palatable to voters in a conservative district. For example, to discuss
climate change with military families, he argued, highlighting statements by high ranking
military officials who saw climate change as a national security threat and advocating for
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a “World War II mobilization towards climate change. . . . resonate[d] more than the
Green New Deal because it’s a military town.” He argued that such discursive tactics
speak “the language of the district where there’s 60,000 more Republicans than
Democrats.” Further, he lightly chastised those who would engage in progressive purity
tests, arguing that “if you want perfection, there’s a cult [for that],” and pointed to Bernie
Sanders’ recent public apology for being less than progressive on the issue of gun control
as an analogue to his own flexibility on certain issues. His supporters in the membership
echoed Campa-Najjar’s statement that he was “using words that resonate with people
he’s talking to in his district,” arguing that those pushing to rescind the endorsement were
“caught up in words” to determine who is and is not progressive. While some of his
supporters admitted they were disappointed in Campa-Najjar’s recent statements, they
saw his decision to explain himself at the meeting, and engage in debate, as a sign that he
was accountable to the Club and its members.
Arguments For the Rescindment of the Endorsement
For Campa-Najjar’s detractors, his fungibility, discursive or otherwise, on progressive
issues was indefensible. The Club’s president made her case to the membership for the
rescindment of his endorsement:
Progressives have drawn the line in the sand on [Medicare for All]. We
have been crystal clear on this issue, and we are not messing around
anymore on this issue. We’ve had enough. We’ve had enough of the
double talk; we don’t want to hear one thing one day and then another
thing another day. No. We want someone who is willing to stand up every
single day fighting for this cause. . . . If you are a progressive candidate
that means in every room, in every interview, you are pushing this
movement, you are selling the points, and you are convincing the
American people that this is the time. Medicare for All.
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She further explained her view of the progressive Club’s endorsement in the context of
dozens of other local Democratic Clubs that choose not to fly the progressive banner:
“Every other Democratic club is going to endorse Ammar - or already has.
I would like our Club’s endorsement to designate a progressive
candidate.”
One of the Club’s previous presidents echoed her concerns, arguing that Campa-Najjar
was “shift[ing] the overton window,” the range of ideas that are politically possible, “to
the right, and actively work[ing] against the progressive movement.” “We do not need a
Joe Manchin of San Diego,” he stated. Another member argued against “supporting a
candidate who uses Republican talking points.”
Among those arguing for rescindment, there was disagreement as to whether
doing so meant also abandoning other types of tangible support for Campa-Najjar in his
fight against his Republican opponents. The Club’s president, who had made the most
detailed case for rescindment, remained committed, and encouraged other members, to
continue supporting Campa-Najjar with resources—money and volunteer time—in an
attempt to flip the seat from red to blue. For her, there was obvious strategic value in the
Democratic Party winning control of a long-standing conservative seat in the U.S. House
of Representatives, but it did not outweigh the importance of reserving endorsements
solely for those candidates who aligned with the Club’s values. Others argued against
even such a compromise. One member argued:
If we have to vote for the least bad, I’m not going to vote for the least bad.
I’m going to not vote for a compromise position. I’m going to vote to save
the planet. In fact. I would not support Ammar Campa Najjar for the seat,
I would support his opponent [Peace and Freedom Party Candidate] Jose
Cortes who is much more progressive.
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The Outcome of the Rescindment Debate
In the end, approximately half of the Club voted to rescind Campa-Najjar’s endorsement,
highlighting the division amongst these progressives, but failing to meet the necessary
60% for rescindment. As such, Campa-Najjar maintained his representation on the Club’s
voter guides. He came in first in the “top-two” primary in March with 36% (his
Republican rivals split the vote with 23 and 20%) of the vote, and advanced to the
general election. Notably, he failed to receive the recommendation of the Democratic
Socialists of America in their primary voter guide, who instead recommended the local
Peace and Freedom Party candidate, or the endorsements for the general election that he
had received in 2018, from the national arms of Our Revolution and Justice Democrats.
He also received almost no support from the SDPDC’s social media accounts following
this meeting despite maintaining the endorsement.
This detailed look at the controversy surrounding Campa-Najjar’s endorsement
highlights two strategic goals—defining progressivism, and holding elected officials,
candidates, and Party leaders accountable—and related tactics—endorsements, and
public critique—employed by activists working both to create a more progressive society
and to push the Democratic Party to the left. It also highlights the challenges progressive
activists face when operating in competitive or Republican-leaning districts. Those who
supported rescinding Campa-Najjar’s endorsement saw the Club’s endorsements as one
of its main tools for defining progressivism for the public and for the Democratic Party, a
function which they believed would be undermined by maintaining Campa-Najjar’s
endorsement.
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As mentioned above, San Diego has a massive progressive Democrats group in
SDPDC, but lacks an Our Revolution or other independent multi-issue group, and as a
result Party-First versus Party-Second is playing out inside the SDPDC rather than across
groups. This conflict also points to some of the ways in which Party-First and PartySecond does not map neatly on to all organizations.
For example, Bakersfield, a conservative city in the Central Valley houses an Our
Revolution chapter that regularly engages in a discourse that is substantially more radical
than chapters in metropolitan, liberal cities. Both Our Revolution/DSA of Santa Clarita
and Our Revolution Antelope Valley have recently become chapters in the Progressive
Democrats of America (PDA), which as a general rule would be considered Party-First in
most locales. It remains to be seen whether PDA will change Our Revolution/DSA or the
other way around, although the act of joining PDA in and of itself represent a conscious
decision to merge with a less radical organization.
It is also common for activists to participate in multiple groups across typologies.
Participation in multiple progressive groups allows activists to express different aspects
of their identity and engage in different repertoires of action. An Our Revolution member
in Contra Costa County explained to me:
Yeah, there’s a lot of overlap. I would state that anybody that I know
who’s involved in Our revolution or Indivisible is involved in the party.
Mostly through local chapters so that’s a big thing especially in East
County. I think we have I want to say three clubs. Three Democratic clubs
and they’re all very unique and I would say that everybody that I know
from Indivisible or Our revolution in East County are in one of those
chartered clubs.
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Another activist from Auburn, in rural northern California also saw overlap between
Indivisible and his local Party group, but he also posited that the distance he drove to get
to Our Revolution meetings in Sacramento was likely prohibitive for most people.
This points to another factor, geography, that impacts the way in which Party First
and Party Second is applied. In Los Angeles, where the ideological breadth of the
spectrum of groups is so substantial, a group may go to an extreme in order to
differentiate itself from others in the region. Indeed, Our Revolution Los Angeles, soon
after this research was concluded, renounced any relationship with the Democratic Party
after a dispute with Our Revolution National, which effectively overrode their local
endorsement of a Congressional candidate. The group, and its members, voted to join
Movement for A People’s Party, in one of the few cases of “exit” observed during the
course of this project.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the interplay between collective identity, strategies, and tactics
across progressive organizations. I began by outlining a universal repertoire of strategies
and tactics employed by progressive groups, explaining that progressive groups first aim
to build local progressive capacity. To that end, I argued that groups serve as an entry
point to ongoing political engagement, using in-person events and digital media to recruit
and onboard activists who are expressing their first interest in progressive activism or
have been initially activated by fleeting candidate and issue campaigns. Local progressive
groups help these activists realize a more durable commitment to progressive activism.
For activists with minimal experience, local groups provide them with tangible actions
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through which they can feel engaged and develop a sense of their own political efficacy. I
also showed how local groups also play an educative role, hosting events and providing
resources through which new activists can understand not only the formal structure of
Democratic Party politics, but also the state of longstanding battles around progressive
priorities such as universal health care and criminal justice reform.
I then argued that these capacity building activities primarily serve to build a
bench of political activists who can be mobilized toward effective political action. I
showed how, in many cases, these activities are organized by third parties, such as
candidate campaigns, with local groups acting as facilitators. Local candidates, especially
those who have been endorsed by local progressive groups, use these groups as spaces
through which to recruit activists to support, and in some cases lead, aspects of their
campaigns. Local groups also serve as a nexus for mobilizing information about not only
a variety of local candidate and issue campaigns, but also protests, demonstrations, and
other actions through which activists can make their voices heard. In addition to
connecting activists with third Party activities, activist groups also plan their own local
political actions, as well as export their political capacity to support regional and national
Party priorities.
I then focused on a third strategy of progressive groups, increasing public
pressure for progressive policies. I argue that progressives pursue this goal through a
combination of direct, strategic communication—publicizing endorsements, writing opeds, organizing protests, and engaging in media activism—, and also indirect pressure,
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interviewing candidates for endorsements and encouraging them to go on the record in
public debates.
Following my explication of universal strategies and tactics, I then argued that
activist groups also engage in the implicit strategy of defining progressivism. I outlined
the different ways in which progressive groups articulate and define what their definition
of “progressive” is, via a combination of value statements, issue priorities, organizational
rules and structure, and media activism tactics. With these points in mind, I then argued
that progressive activist groups can be understood across two new typologies —PartyFirst and Party-Second—for classifying progressive groups. Using these typologies, I
first presented differences in how these groups negotiated, and renegotiated, their identity
via both their external and internal discourses, with Party-First groups being more likely
to identity discursively as “inside” the Party, placing themselves in opposition to both
Republicans and non-progressive Democrats, and critiquing narrowly specific
problematic Democrats or centrist policies. Party-Second groups were more likely to
present themselves in opposition to “corporate Democrats,” and engage in broad
structural critique of the Democratic Party and the broader two-party system. Following
this discussion of discourse, I then argued that Party-First and Party-Second approaches
manifest in the manner and choice of tactics they deploy toward progressive change.
These discourses and actions serve as a means through which group members negotiate
and renegotiate their collective identity.
Finally, beginning with the case study of Ammar Campa-Najjar and the San
Diego Progressive Democratic Club, I first showed how groups negotiate and renegotiate
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their collective identity as progressives via deliberation, discussion, and implementation
of strategic political action. I then discussed how Party-First and Party-Second, as an
emergent pattern, plays out differently across locales, depending on factors such as the
development of the progressive movement in the area and the local ecosystem of
progressive groups. I also discussed how a group’s categorization of Party-First and
Party-Second is fungible over time, as its members learn Party politics and renegotiate
their tactical repertoire.
This chapter also lays out how at the group level, there are numerous tactics—
levers that its members can pull—as they carry out progressive activism and define their
collective identity. At the theoretical level, this fluidity applies to the conception of PartyFirst and Party-Second as well. It is an emergent pattern that is not immutable. This
chapter showed how, as an analytical construct, the variation in tactics helps one
determine if a group is Party-First or Party-Second, but this does not map neatly onto
different organizations across time or space. Whether or not a group, or loosely
networked entity is Party-First or Party-Second depends on the role it is playing at that
particular moment. It can vary based on factors from region to region, and also does not
map neatly on to urban/rural or conservative/liberal areas of the state. In the end applying
Party First and Party Second in any way other than ad hoc is quite complex and can vary
by how developed the progressive movement is in that area. For example, there may be
gaps that need to be filled within the broader ideological movement. In some cases,
groups fracture and do not neatly fall back neatly onto a spectrum of Party-First and
Party-Second, because the group’s collective identity may not have completely fractured.
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These dynamics can also vary over time, as exemplified by OR/DSA of Santa Clarita’s
merge with PDA. Over time, it may come to be characterized as a Party-First group,
serving as a training ground for dual-membership radical Democrats who have also
joined the newest Party-Second group. This implies that potentially, as activists learn
Party politics, and engage in trial and error of different strategies, certain groups tend to
converge on Party-First as time passes.
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Conclusion
In the months following the 2016 election, there was a seemingly endless barrage of
stories about “civil war” in the Democratic Party as new activists, motivated both by the
contentious primary between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton and by the election of
Donald Trump, entered the Democratic Party in droves. Four years later, the 2020
Democratic primary was rife with hand-wringing from pundits and Party elites over
whether or not the “Sanders-wing” of the Democratic Party would revolt if he were not to
win the nomination, exiting the Party and leaving the nominee without a substantial
portion of the Party base necessary to win the presidency.
In many ways, such concerns should be met with skepticism by those who follow
the history of Democratic Party activism over the last century. Indeed, influxes of new
activists have always raised concerns about their impact on the Party and the U.S.
political system. This tendency is visible at least as far back as the concerns over
“amateur democrats” (J. Q. Wilson, 1962) who entered the Party following Adlai
Stevenson’s failed presidential campaign or the “new breed” (Kirkpatrick, 1976) of
“purists” (Polsby & Wildavsky, 1964/1976) who were ostensibly going to swing
Democratic nominations to unelectable leftist candidates.
As discussed early in this dissertation, California has seen activists enter the Party
to support change-focused candidate campaigns and then remain inside the Party pushing
for change. Movement activists, including Tom Hayden of the New Left, entered the
Party to support George McGovern in 1972, and then stayed to influence the California
Democratic Party from the inside via his Campaign for Economic Democracy. Others
entered via Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, and remained inside the Party as activists
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(Katsiaficas, 1987). Many of the Democratic Clubs in California that were a focus of
Chapter 5 were formed in the mid-2000s by supporters of Howard Dean and Dennis
Kucinich (Larimore-Hall, 2014). These members of the “netroots”, identifying both as
Party activists and anti-war activists (Heaney & Rojas, 2015) were going to upend first
the invisible primary with their small-dollar donations and then the Party structure with a
surge of new Party activists engaged in hundreds of Party-adjacent voluntary associations
formed nationwide. In that context, it is easy to view the influx of new activists in late
2016 and early 2017 as simply another surge of activists into the big tent that is the
modern Democratic Party.
In this dissertation, I aimed understand how progressive activists engage with and
conceptualize themselves in reference to the Democratic Party. I began with the premise,
informed by the 2016 election, that a combination of disaffected Democrats and
independent Sanders supporters were opting for voice as a means to change the
Democratic Party, and taking steps to increase their involvement with the Party as a
means to make their voices heard. I also posited that new technologies were potentially
enabling activists to organize around and engage in public critique of political parties in
new ways. To that end, I examined three pathways through which activists were
attempting to influence the Democratic Party: as delegates to the 2016 and 2020
Democratic National Conventions, by involving themselves in and engaging in actions
via the formal Party structure of the California Democratic Party, and by engaging in
activism via local progressive groups. In each case, I looked to understand how new and
long-standing activists negotiate their relationship with the Democratic Party, how new
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progressive activists enter Party politics, and what voice looks like in the context of
progressive Party activism.
Horizontal Voice, Collective Identity, and the Party
This dissertation first set out to understand how activists negotiate their relationship with
the Democratic Party. I have shown that much of this negotiation is done collectively,
through the use of “horizontal voice,” and other discursive means for developing
collective identity. In outlining the concept of “horizontal voice” and its relationship to
Hirschman’s model, O’Donnell (1986) explains how horizontal voice serves as a first,
and possibly sufficient step through which activists can develop a collective identity.
Across each of the empirical chapters, this dissertation revealed the central role of
horizontal voice in the process through which progressive activists develop collective
identity in relation to the Democratic Party.
In Chapter 3, I showed how horizontal voice played out differently in two national
political conventions. I examined the 2016 and 2020 Sanders delegations to the
Democratic National Conventions and argued that a self-reinforcing relationship exists
between activists’ personal identities, the level of control exerted by a campaign, and the
potential for horizontal voice and by extension, strong collective identity. I showed how
horizontal voice, unmitigated by campaign forces and controlled interactivity, allowed
the 2016 Sanders delegates to develop a collective identity in opposition to the
Democratic Party. This absence of formal campaign infrastructure or guidance from the
national Sanders campaign meant that the practice of digital campaigning within
Democratic Party campaigns, which since the Obama era had been characterized by
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“structured” (Kreiss, 2012) or “controlled interactivity” (Stromer-Galley, 2014),
expanded to include the loosely-networked organizing and personalized engagement
practices more characteristic of recent “crowd-enabled” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) and
hybrid movement-activist networks. In this way, digital media was essential for the
formation of progressive communities around Sanders, but few would argue that his
delegates were the “managed citizens” (Howard, 2006) warned about in early literature
on political consultants and digital campaigns.
I argued that the anti-institutional personal identities and limited Party loyalty of
many Sanders delegates, augmented by a flexible, hybrid online and offline environment,
allowed them to engage in horizontal voice and carry out many of the processes
associated with collective identity formation. These included, but were not limited to,
maintaining commitment and forging bonds of solidarity through shared leadership
via the electing of delegate whips, organizing as they planned for the convention,
constructing and expressing ideologies via discussions about their support for Sanders
and critiques of Clinton, and using rituals such as attending local protests (Downton &
Wehr, 1991; Hirsch, 1990; Hunt & Benford, 2008; Klandermans, 1997). They also
formed collective identity through the processes of working toward a shared collective
action project (Barr & Drury, 2009) in the form of the convention and via the shared
antagonist of Clinton and the Democratic National Committee. The widespread anger
over the DNC’s perceived favoritism toward Clinton, that was finally confirmed by
Wikileak’s #DNCLeaks the day before, modified the “political opportunity structure”
(McAdam, 1982/1999) of the convention and created an opening for the Sanders
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delegation, while also further strengthening the delegation’s political identity. This
solidifying of their collective identity continued as they carried out acts collectively
(Polletta & Jasper, 2001) inside the convention, as they found themselves at odds with
DNC staff and Clinton supporters, as well as the discourse of the convention program.
Examining the use of horizontal voice also reveals parallels and differences
between the experiences of the 2016 Sanders delegates in California and early studies of
Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination.
Those studies praised the Dean campaign for implementing digital systems that had the
opportunity to democratize political campaigns via a new kind of open-source politics
(Trippi, 2004). And yet subsequent studies found that the Dean campaign employed those
tools strategically, allowing tasks like fundraising and voter contact to be decentralized,
while maintaining control over the big picture aspects of the campaign (Kreiss, 2012).
Like the Dean campaign, the Sanders campaign certainly was not allowing local activists
to engage in decision-making about the broader campaign, and Sanders’ supporters were
certainly using the campaign’s digital tools to setup phone banks and organize house
parties. And yet, Sanders supporters were also using third party tools, such as Facebook,
to create separate communities in parallel to the Sanders website, where they could
engage in horizontal voice without the campaign’s knowledge.
Looking at the 2020 Sanders delegation four years later, I showed how numerous
factors reduced the potential for horizontal voice within the Sanders delegation. The
resulting absence of similar opportunities for leadership, ritual, organizing, and ideology,
all of which were present in 2016, contributed to a delegation that was substantially
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different from the previous one. The absence of these opportunities limited the
delegation’s ability to discursively develop as a group, and by extension, its potential for
action. Even in interviews, the sense of collective “we-ness,” a marker of collective
identity (see e.g. Snow, 2001), that was so palpable among delegates at the 2016
convention was clearly diminished. The online organizing that took place in advance of
the convention, around issues like the delegation chair and the vice-presidential selection,
also became professionalized by progressive organizations under the banner of “The
2020 Bernie Delegates Network,” supplanting any potential for self-organization by
delegates. With virtually no way to engage in vertical voice at the virtual convention, a
minority of the delegation, led largely by still-active 2016 delegates, engaged in
horizontal voice using social media, including Twitter, YouTube, and Zoom, to plan
events the weekend prior to the convention that allowed activists from around the state to
engage in discursive community building around progressive activism with an eye toward
maintaining progressive solidarity in advance of future ideological battles within and
around the Democratic Party.
In Chapter 4, activists again negotiated their identity in reference to the Party as
they engaged in horizontal voice to decide collectively to run for assembly delegate,
articulating, with the help of long-standing Party activists, their identity as both
progressive activists and potential participants in the formal Party structure. They also
engaged in horizontal voice as they reached out to like-minded activists in their networks
in their attempts to turn out voters for their local elections. Reaching out to their personal
networks, including online communities that formed during Sanders’ 2016 run, these
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activists mobilized their networks with promises of taking over the Democratic Party. At
the first state convention, many of these new delegates wore Bernie Sanders shirts,
buttons, and hats in order to identify themselves to like-minded peers and to make their
presence known to long-standing activists. I also argue that these served as a use of
symbols through which they maintained their collective identity within the broader space
of the California Democratic Party.
Adems.vote was itself a technological platform for horizontal voice between
progressives. The act of posting a bio to adems.vote was not only an instance of
horizontal voice but also an expression of the personal identity of each activist, many of
whom had been influenced by their collective identity as Sanders delegates. Writing these
bios allowed activists to articulate what, for them, it meant to be progressive. As
discussed in Chapter 4, the ADEMs.vote and Progressive Caucus websites both showed
how digital properties can be used to combine local activities together and create a
collective sense of statewide momentum and organizing, the idea that “we”—activists
from throughout the state—are taking over the Democratic Party.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I also showed how the act of joining and participating in
progressive groups is a means through which progressive activists negotiate their
relationship with the Party and their understanding of what it means to be progressive. In
Chapter 4, this was depicted in the decision by progressives to join, or not join, the
raucous CDP Progressive Caucus or to engage in progressive activism via another
statewide caucus, such as the environmental caucus. In Chapter 5, I showed how
collective identity formation runs through numerous aspects of local progressive
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organizations, as activists regularly engage in elections of leaders, discussion of goals,
planning of actions, as well as rituals such as debate watch parties, volunteer service
activities such as nature clean-ups, or annual parties. In the context of these groups, I
argued that a group’s collective identity influences how they define progressivism,
engage in internal and external discourse, and also informs the choices of and manner in
which they carry out strategies and tactics aimed at progressive change. In individual
locales, the discourses and actions of these groups draw in new members whose personal
identity, understanding of activism, and relationship with the Democratic Party parallels
those of the group. In this way, the collective identity of progressive groups is reinforced
both within and via the influx of new members.
Further, as progressives, every person engaging in this space has some kind of
identity in opposition to the Party, but their negotiation of what they are opposed to, if
and when they see themselves as part of the party, is fluid and ongoing. They may be
aligned with the Party, carrying out critical engagement, or a combination of both. These
same factors apply as well to individuals as they negotiate their identity, sometimes
through participation in multiple groups carrying out very different actions. The nature of
progressive activism is that at both the group and individual level, it is a negotiation of
identity as part of the large and ever-changing political entity that is the Democratic
Party.
How Activists Enter the Party
A major contribution of this dissertation is the refinement and extension of Hirschman’s
theory to both add the notion of “entry” and to show the hybridity of his concepts of exit,
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voice, and loyalty. Throughout this dissertation, I presented examples of activists entering
Democratic Party politics in order to exercise their voices. In the context of U.S. political
parties, entry should be understood as a broad and diffuse concept, in line with the
nebulous nature of Party membership in the U.S. The lack of clear, traditional Party
membership in the two-party system (Schudson, 1998) in the U.S. as compared to
systems with card-carrying Party members, makes delineating the moment or action
when someone has formally entered the Party difficult. I argue that to enter the
Democratic Party thus means to enter Democratic Party politics, through engagement and
action to try to bring change via, or to, the Democratic Party. That said, as this
dissertation depicts, certain Party activists do formally enter the Party structure, through
avenues like running to be assembly or central committee delegates. I argue below that
this initial entry often leads to further engagement with and identification with the Party
and Party politics.
Building on the above, I address one of the goals of this dissertation: to
understand the processes through which new progressive activists get involved in
Democratic Party politics. I argue that the process of entering Democratic Party politics
as an activist is done via the discursive act of engaging in activism in which the Party is
the vehicle for, or in the case of reformists, the subject of that activism. It is also an
incremental process that at each step requires a person to negotiate and renegotiate not
only their relationship to the Party but also their conception of politics and their potential
role in it. At the local and state level, this dissertation showed how experienced
progressive activists, in their attempts to mobilize new activists, employed rhetoric that
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matched the collective identity frames (Benford & Snow, 2000) that many such activists
had developed through their experience on the Sanders campaign. Experienced Party
activists both at the state and local level worked to help new activists negotiate their
relationships with the Party, and to facilitate their entry process through acts such as
engagement, education, and community building.
This dissertation showed that activists have several paths through which to enter
the Democratic Party, including by engaging with local multi-issue progressive groups.
These groups serve as entry points for activists to engage in consistent progressive
activism aimed at pushing the Party to the left on issues and, in some cases, reforming its
processes towards more democratic ends. Campaigns also continue to facilitate the entry
of new activists into Party politics (Nielsen, 2011). Just as those activists who went
“Clean for Gene” in 1968, joined Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition in the 1980s, or became
part of a Democracy for America group after Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, became
durable contributors to the Democratic Party (Katsiaficas, 1987; Kerbel, 2016; Rising,
1997), this dissertation revealed how many Sanders supporters did the same. This
dissertation showed how new activists involved themselves in the Party structure via both
the ADEMs and the joining and forming of local progressive groups. That said, for this
iteration of activists, the boundaries of the Party were more diffuse than for their
predecessors. Whereas the Dean-inspired Democracy for America groups in California
all became chartered Democratic Clubs with tacit links to the California Democratic
Party (Larimore-Hall, 2014), many groups that emerged in 2016 and 2017, such as Our
Revolution, actively organized as distinctly separate from the Party.
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In Chapter 3, the case of the 2016 convention delegates showed how individuals
who were inactive in politics entered the Party for this first time via the decision to
engage in tangible activism aimed at securing the Democratic nomination for Senator
Bernie Sanders. It then saw those same activists enter further into the Party as they
announced their intention to compete to be Sanders’ delegates. Their role as delegates
meant they not only entered Democratic Party politics as activists working to change the
Party from the metaphorical inside, they also engaged in activism from physically inside
the Party’s most public of events, the Democratic National Convention. While many of
these delegates considered themselves outsiders, I argue that by crossing the country,
contributing to debates shaping the Party from both the convention floor and committee
meetings, and acting impassionedly on behalf of a candidate’s nomination, they had
inarguably, even if possibly temporarily, entered the Democratic Party. Following the
convention, these delegates renegotiated their initial entry collectively, as they engaged in
debates or whether to #DemEnter and “try to take over the Party” or #DemExit the Party
in response to what they saw as unfair treatment of Sanders. The fact that they were
deciding between “DemEntering” and “DemExiting,” is notable, as that dichotomy
discursively placed them simultaneously inside and outside of the Party at that moment.
In Chapter 4, the decision to #DemEnter represented a further incremental step
into the Party, this time into its formal structure via the ADEMs. After Kimberly Ellis
lost the race for Party chair, many of these delegates had to again renegotiate their prior
decision to enter the Party, as the avenues for a sudden overthrow of the leadership had
been exhausted. Staying in the Party would thus require a strategic switch, and to enter
339

even further in, by committing to engaging in “institutionalized voice” (Hirschman, 1980,
p. 439) by crafting and submitting resolutions and through other formal Party processes.
Vertical Voice and Progressive Activism
The final question I set out to answer in this dissertation was, what does voice look like in
the context of the progressive activism and the Democratic Party. In conducting this
research, I realized that horizontal voice, as discussed above, was largely related to my
questions about how activists negotiate their relationship with the Democratic Party. As
such, this question was largely about what vertical voice looks like in the context of
progressive Party activism. Across these chapters, the unique contexts that exist for
convention delegates, state Party activists, and local progressive groups meant that
specific acts of vertical voice varied significantly between chapters. And yet, several
strategic goals associated with the use of vertical voice remained constant. I argue that
the most common aim of vertical voice by Party activists is to hold political leaders
accountable to grassroots Democrats. Beyond accountability, activists also use vertical
voice to increase the prominence of progressive ideas and discourse, promote candidates
or issue positions, mobilize other activists to political action, and to put pressure on Party
leaders and elected officials. Further, the use of social media by activists allowed them to
engage in vertical voice in new and collective ways.
Technology and Vertical Voice
Throughout this dissertation, technology played a role in enabling instances of vertical
voice in a variety of ways. In Chapter 2, I argue that social media allowed motivated,
networked activists to subvert the long-standing media practices surrounding large-scale
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political conventions. I showed how protestors used social media as a means to hold
Clinton and the DNC accountable for what the activists viewed as unfair treatment of
Sanders throughout the 2016 primary. I also revealed how activists at the in-person
convention carried out coordinated protests around specific issues predetermined by
activists in advance of the convention. Compared to the convention delegates described
by Pomper (2007) as having, over several decades, “been reduced to (literally) dumb
claques who (literally) applaud on cue for the show’s top banana,” the Sanders delegation
engaged in numerous efforts aimed at critiquing the Clinton campaign and the Party.
Using social media, the 2016 delegates were able to increase the visibility of their
activism, publicizing via social media protests that took place at moments that would
have previously been considered mundane, such as delegation breakfasts and rules
committee meetings. Several times, activist coverage of these events was picked up by
legacy media resulting in even more visibility.
Whereas planners of recent conventions have made successful attempts to
coordinate delegates’ use of social media for “active spectatorship” to highlight support
for the nominee (Kreiss et al., 2015, p. 3), I showed that the 2016 delegates used the realtime nature of social media (Poell & van Dijck, 2015) to turn the tables on Clinton and
the Party. I showed how social media provided them the ability to coordinate carefully
timed actions on the convention floor that publicly critiqued Clinton and the Party, and to
provide supporters outside the convention with real-time coverage of aspects of the
convention that were normally not included in convention coverage by journalists. In the
process, they took advantage of the potential for crowd-enabled connective activism
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(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013), as they connected online with members of other
delegations throughout the arena to carry out larger actions and help publicize their
activities to a wider audience outside the convention via social media. In the context of
the 2020 convention, I also showed how, in a more controlled environment with a less
strong sense of collective identity, progressive groups can serve to mobilize activists via
organizationally-enabled connective action.
In Chapter 4, I again showed how social media can help progressive Party
activists hold leaders accountable, this time in the context of the state Party, by making
instances of Party activism and Party processes more visible. At the ADEMs, activists
used social media platforms to engage in real-time reporting of what they saw as
problematic activities, ranging from long lines, to the arrival of large busses of supporters
sponsored by elected officials, to questionable ballot-handling procedures. At state
conventions, progressive activists used digital messaging platforms to summon other
activists to observe, and in some cases protest, the activities of Party leaders at committee
meetings and other events. Social media was also used by activists to enable more public
forms of protest, such as calling out elected officials for changes in Party policy or
organizing protests at events, as the Progressive and Environmental Caucuses did to
criticize the DNC’s refusal to hold a presidential debate focused on climate issues. At the
2017 and 2019 CDP state conventions, activists again engaged in protest of Party leaders,
this time at the state level convention. In both the ADEM elections and the 2017 race for
Party chair, social media provided an avenue for activists to point to irregularities in the
Party’s internal elections and demand accountability from Party leaders.
342

Vertical Voice and Loyalty
In Chapter 5, we saw vertical voice operationalized by local groups through a variety of
activities, including endorsements; op-eds; protests and the co-sponsoring of electoral
activities. Via these tactics, local progressive groups not only pursue progressive goals,
but also define what it means to be progressive. I laid out how at the group level, there
are numerous tactics— levers that its members can pull—as they carry out progressive
activism and define their collective identity. I introduced the concept of Party-First and
Party-Second to explain the underpinnings behind differences in selection of strategies
and tactics that play out across progressive groups. What becomes clear in examining
these groups is that exit, voice, and loyalty, as well as entry, are not as distinct as one
might expect. Hirschman argues that lack of loyalty can be mitigated by confidence in
one’s ability to bring about change. This could then explain a Party-Second group’s
continued involvement in Democratic Party politics. But this presumes a conception of
loyalty to the party that is increasingly out of sync with research on how citizens are
conceiving of themselves in reference to parties and other institutions. What emerges
from this research is that progressive Party activists are often loyal to the cause of
progressivism or to their identity as a progressive or a progressive Democrat. As such, I
also argue that identity is an equally useful moderator of exit and voice. Given the role
that identity plays in the individual and collective decisions around when and how
activists choose to act politically (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) including both loyalty and
identity within the framework provides additional theoretical space for articulating why
those who lack loyalty to the party as an institution would choose to continue to remain
in the party politics and exercise their voice.
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Learning Politics and Developing Partisans
This dissertation research also produced findings that extended beyond my initial
research questions, contributing to our understanding of how people learn to carry out
political action and adapt those actions over time through an ongoing learning process, in
some cases guided by experienced leaders and in other cases through their own
experience of trial and error. After activists entered the Party via the Sanders campaign,
their experience in self-organizing served as a form of “practice” (Williams & Delli
Carpini, 2011) through which they became prepared for future political activity and
developed a sense of their own political efficacy that facilitated their participation in
delegate elections and their planning of and executing of actions at the convention. Their
successful experiences in network mobilization during the Sanders campaign were
carried by many of these activists into the ADEMs, where, at least outside of the most
heavily Democratic districts, they were successful. They then brought the same tactics to
the Ellis campaign, where they came up short, and had to reorient themselves to the
incremental realities of intraparty activism. At this juncture, some activists decided to
exit, or at least retreat to extra-Party organizations such as Our Revolution, as their
personal identities and vision of their roles in politics was more in line with the more
radical activity they carried out as part of the 2016 Sanders delegation. Others remained
involved in a combination of ways, as ADEMs working to change the Party via more
mundane insider tactics, such as resolutions, rule changes, and attempts to influence the
Party platform.
Others begin their Party activist journey via local Party groups engaged in
community organizing, educative activities, and electoral work. I argue that via these
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processes, both groups and individual activists develop the repertoires of strategies and
tactics discussed in Chapter 4 and develop an understanding of when and how to use
them to mobilize tangible political action. This learning process, often via trial and error,
is not just about the efficacy of tactics, but also about the development of individual
activists. As activists learn what is and is not successful, and try new things in other
contexts, it helps them develop a sense of themselves as activists and an understanding of
what they want to do in the Party. The ongoing process of determining one’s position in
reference to the Party is in itself the navigating of one’s personal identity. The decision to
enter further into the Party, retreat, or exit, depends on how individuals see themselves
and their own political possibilities. The process of engaging with the Party and feeling
like one is making progress can also serve to bring them further into the Party, eventually
identifying as part of the institution and developing an identity as a partisan.
While the above outlines processes through which individual activists learn
politics, this dissertation also revealed that learning and renegotiation of practice also
takes place at the group level. In Chapter 4, I showed how recently, the discourses and
tactics of certain Party-Second groups have shifted such that they are beginning to subtly
resemble Party-First groups. Just as individual activists go through a process of trial and
error as they engage in different tactics for achieving progressive goals, the same is true
for groups. Party-Second groups may find that leaders in their membership are
collectively taking steps to “enter” further into the Democratic Party, by getting involved
in the formal Party structure. Groups that two years ago were organizing car caravans to
protest in front of a legislator’s home are now supplementing those activities with
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mobilization of members to attend public meetings and engage in the Party’s get out the
vote efforts.
This process of learning Party activism, as well as the fluidity through which
activists negotiate their identity in reference to the Party via multiple groups and
activities, can also help explain actions that to some, seem like co-optation or
contradiction. For example, the recent landslide win by Governor Gavin Newsom in the
2021 California recall election included significant grassroots organizing support from
progressive Democrats in California who have often complained that his policies were
not sufficiently progressive (Bernstein, 2021). That said, all evidence from this
dissertation makes it completely unsurprising that progressive groups would support
Newsom in this context. As this dissertation has argued, progressive groups can be placed
in one of two typologies, Party-First and Party-Second, both of which strategically
prioritize the Democratic Party at certain times. Even Party-Second groups don’t line up
opposing against Democrats all the time, they have wider goals. Some might engage in
strategic protest votes, even voting for Jill Stein in 2016. But strategic is just what those
votes are. In 2016 Trump was never going to win the state and a vote for Jill Stein in
California had little to no risk of changing an electoral outcome. As we saw with DSALA in Chapter 4, some groups might walk a fine line between choosing to formally
endorse in a race vs making a pragmatic recommendation. Progressives saw the recall as
what it was: a blatant attempt by a minority of Republicans to leverage Newsom’s
admittedly stupid personal behavior early in the pandemic towards a gubernatorial recall.
Writing in LA Progressive in August 2021, Amar Shergill, chair of the CDP Progressive
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Caucus called for unanimous support for Newsom in the form of organizing efforts,
pointing out that unlike his opponent, Newsom would likely:
sign almost every progressive bill passed by the Democratic-controlled
legislature…continue to deploy resources to limit the spread of COVID
while a Republican replacement will pander to anti-vaxxers and put us all
at greater risk. Should Senator Feinstein retire or fall ill, Governor
Newsom will appoint another reliable Democrat to the US Senate and
keep the Democratic majority intact, while a Republican replacement will
bring all DC legislation to a halt by appointing a Trump-friendly train
wreck. . . .It may not be as energizing as the Bernie campaign or the Nina
Turner campaign, but it is definitely worth the effort. We need to get in the
game (Shergill, 2021).
Similarly, though with the discursive tone expected of a Party-Second group, SF
Berniecrats posted:
Let’s be honest – we’re no fans of Gavin Newsom. Yes, he’s still a
corporate Dem, and No, he’s not nearly as progressive as we’d like him to
be. But you know what, he has handled the COVID-19 pandemic better
than most other governors in the country for a state our size. Right now
the polls show that if the recall goes through, we WILL have TRUMPSUPPORTING conversative radio host LARRY ELDER as governor. The
governor proposes the state’s budget to the legislature, has veto power,
and handles things like the pandemic response. Having a Republican in
that seat WILL do a LOT OF DAMAGE (San Francisco Berniecrats,
10/10/2021).
These quotes exemplify how, across progressive groups, activists make strategic choices
as to when to engage in activism at odds with the Party. Both of these groups would
prefer a more progressive governor, but they see the strategic value in opposing the
recall, and also see the opportunity to write about it as a means to express their group’s
collective identity and understanding of progressivism.
Moving forward, I expect progressive activists to continue to evolve and learn,
with some certainly becoming more institutionalized within the formal structures of the
Democratic Party and others to maintain their staked-out position just inside the edge of
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the Party, working to holds its leaders accountable to grassroots activists. As mentioned
in Chapter 4, these group and personal identities are fungible and exist in the broader
sociopolitical context of the state of California as well as their local communities. Groups
will also be influenced by happenings at the national level. For example, the national arm
of Our Revolution announced in late July that it will rebrand as “Pragmatic Progressives”
as it works to move beyond its association with Bernie Sanders. From the research
conducted via this dissertation, I find it unlikely that these Party-Second groups will be
interested in that new name. As such, they will have to find new organizations with
which to affiliate and again renegotiate their collective identity in reference to the Party,
in an ongoing, reflexive process.
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